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Preface
In the European public policy debates the Nordic countries are often praised 
for having successfully adapted their labour market institutions and welfare 
states to the era of globalisation while maintaining a high degree of social 
cohesion. The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) study The 
Nordic Model – Embracing globalization and sharing risks (2007) is a classic 
case of this literature. The study emphasised that the Nordic countries have 
clearly benefitted from the globalisation that has led to productivity growth 
and rising income levels. On the other hand, the Nordic welfare state and 
labour market institutions have provided protection against the risks asso-
ciated with economic openness, such as industrial restructuring. Economic 
openness is seen to require the collective risk-sharing. Therefore it has been 
possible for the Nordics to embrace both globalisation and the welfare state. 
The ETLA study underlines that the Nordics must make reforms in order 
to hold their ground in the global competition and to counteract the demo-
graphic change. These reforms include the decentralisation of the wage setting 
processes, a re-definition of the core competencies of the welfare state and the 
strengthening of economic incentives to work. Overall, the main focus is to 
guarantee the competitiveness and fiscal sustainability of the Nordic model 
in the changing environment. These kinds of analyses tend to pay less atten-
tion to the question whether the Nordic collective risk-sharing institutions 
are in fact efficiently protecting the people from different social risks that 
they face in this new environment. Moreover, the notion of `Nordic model` 
tends to emphasise the historical continuity of the institutions of social risk 
sharing and the similarities between Nordic countries. But have politics of 
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social risk and collective risk-sharing in fact changed over the years? Have 
different countries opted for different reform paths? Is there anything that can 
be called a Nordic model today?
The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) started the 
Nordic Economies after the Crisis project in 2010 with the support of the 
Finnish Kalevi Sorsa Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Joint Committee 
of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement (SAMAK), Economic 
Council of the Labour Movement in Denmark and Swedish Arbetarrörelsens 
Tankesmedja. The seminars in Stockholm and in Helsinki strengthened the 
idea that rethinking and looking at the politics of social risk in the Nordic 
context might open new perspectives for the European debate concerning the 
much discussed Nordic economic and social model. This is the reason why 
the project started working with this edited volume. Overall, I think that the 
volume offers many new insights to the development in the Nordics, ranging 
from pension policy in Finland and Sweden to economic and social costs of 
school dropouts in Denmark. 
On behalf of the partnering organisations of the Nordic Economies after 
the Crisis project I would like to thank the authors of the volume for their val-
uable contributions. Most of all many thanks to Dr. Ville-Pekka Sorsa whose 
dedication to the project has made this volume possible. Finally, I would like 
to thank FEPS, FES and the Nordic partners of the Nordic Economies after 
the Crisis project for support and therefore promoting European debate on 
the Nordic economic and social development. 
Helsinki, 13 November 2011
Antti Alaja
Project coordinator, Kalevi Sorsa Foundation 
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V il l e - Pekk a  S or S a
Social risks are present everywhere in our everyday lives. Most people in 
the developed countries think about the risk of losing their jobs or sufficient 
sources of income in a way or another at some point of their lives. Parents 
often think about social risks related to the future of their children – will 
they get a decent education and land a meaningful job, can they stay healthy 
throughout their lives, will they be able to raise a family and so forth. Politi-
cians are happy to talk about social risks like unemployment and education 
because they are important topics for the vast majority of their voters. Busi-
nessmen from insurance sector to the financial sector are specialised in cre-
ating and marketing products with which people should be able to mitigate 
the risks. The media, social scientists, businesses, public servants and ordinary 
citizens alike have witnessed the devastating effects of the dozens of interna-
tional financial crises during the last century or so.
Some social scientist have argued that the current social order can be best 
characterised with the notion of world risk society according to which risks of 
all levels from micro to macro and local to global are of central tenets of this 
order (Beck, 1999). Even though social risks are certainly broadly acknowl-
edged, social risks are surprisingly rarely thought in political terms. It is, of 
course, quite easy to see that risks like unemployment or loss of ability to work 
include many direct political aspects. Unemployment may be sometimes gen-
erated politically or at least may seem to be the indirect result of some kind 
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political actions like deregulation of international competition policies. Cen-
tral national policy tools like pension benefits and public services have much 
to do with helping to cope with materialised risks like the loss of working 
capacity. Sometimes policies may even help to prevent risks from material-
ising in the first place. 
It is often forgotten, however, that even those risks that cannot be purely 
explained by political actions or fully tackled with national or international 
policies are in fact risks with social consequences. Although we do not nec-
essarily think natural events like earthquakes, seemingly private events like 
family break-ups or simple everyday issues like trains being late as social risks, 
they all have social consequences that can be changed. Even if we cannot 
eliminate, prevent or effectively manage all risks, we can always at least in part 
reshape the social consequences any kinds of events will have. Social risks can 
thus always be politicised and are in nature essentially political. 
The politics of social risk has been a central issue in modern national 
social and public policy from early professional and intellectual history to 
contemporary political and academic debates. It became a major issue of 
political interest internationally right from the early days of social risk man-
agement, starting with the labour protection schemes of the late 19th century 
Bismarckian Germany. More recently, politics of social risk has become so 
essential that modern welfare regimes have been classified according to policy 
approaches to social risk (perhaps most famously by Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Yet if one had to pick one type of welfare regime in the world in which social 
risks have been so essential in public policy that one could not even explain 
the plain existence of the regime without addressing the politics of social risk, 
the choice would be clear. It is the Nordic welfare regimes.
The Nordic countries have been for long characterised by effective state-
led social risk management regime based on the idea universalism, which 
means that social risk management is accessible equally by everyone on basis 
of either citizenship or residence. The model has made citizens and different 
groups of people equal in face of the risks generated by the society. The Nordic 
approach to maintaining a capitalist market economy has been to comple-
ment it with a high level of decommodification through active and all-encom-
passing social policy. In international comparison, the Nordic welfare states 
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have always topped the levels of decommodification in the overall population. 
The Nordic model has been more generally characterised by the elimination 
of social risks that can be eliminated, by the management of those risks that 
cannot be eliminated, and by the efforts to prevent those risks that cannot be 
effectively eliminated or managed from materialising.
This is how the story is usually told or at least the point from which the 
discussions on the Nordic model almost always start. Unfortunately, the story 
has major gaps and even flaws. Probably the one best recognised in the aca-
demic literature is the heterogeneity of Nordic countries. The Nordic coun-
tries are hardly isomorphic in their approaches to social risks today even 
though some loose family resemblance might still exist both in welfare insti-
tutions and in their post-expansionary developments (see e.g. Kautto et al., 
1999; Kananen, 2011). Yet for example the Finnish politics of social risk have 
been somewhat different from the other Nordic countries from the start. The 
Finnish political initiatives have been lead equally much by the social partners 
(i.e. central labour market organisations) as by the state, and most social poli-
cies have been based on much more modest levels of prevention and mitiga-
tion of social risks than in other countries (e.g. Kangas, 2007). If we addressed 
all the politics of social risk in different countries – including the politics 
taking place at the private sector – it would probably get even more difficult 
to maintain the idea of Nordic model as a homogenous one. 
The most pressing problem with the story is that it assumes that there 
is something that can be called “a model” with no reservations. Today nei-
ther in international comparison nor in any undisputed theoretical terms a 
distinct Nordic model exists (see Greve, 2011). The social success stories of 
Nordic countries are typically seen as products of some basic principles of 
the Nordic institutions (e.g. Becker, 2007). Yet it is questionable whether the 
social successes can be traced to any kinds of explicit political principles in 
the first place. It is rather a question concerning the institutions that produce 
the aspired outcomes, not just the key ideas or histories of such institutions. 
The Nordic institutions of social risks management have been anything by 
static – in fact, the Nordic countries have adapted to new and emerging social 
risks with very effective institutional changes in international comparison 
(see e.g. Armingeon & Bonoli, 2007). For instance the most famous ones, the 
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Danish flexicurity institutions have been a new and innovative way to tackle 
the changing social risks related to work in a small economy.
The idea of a distinct model has another theoretical deficiency, which is 
perhaps less often discussed and indeed the main topic of this book. Under-
standing the politics of social risk only as some specific principles embedded 
in some specific institutions provides a flawed picture on the actual politics of 
social risk. If politics are not regarded as contingent, politicised and institu-
tionally varying processes of shaping and re-shaping societal institutions that 
generate, address and manage social risks, a misguided view on Nordic poli-
tics is guaranteed. As noted, it is often assumed that social risks are tackled 
effectively by the state. If we look only at the activities of the Nordic states 
on basis of this assumption, we may fail to grasp essential changes that effec-
tively reshape the politics of social risk just because the change takes place 
somewhere else than we expect. As already mentioned, the Finnish politics 
have been more tripartite or social partner driven than state-led for the last 
half century. For another example, the Swedish regime is now increasingly 
based on the individuals’ capability to hedge against social risk than on the 
political actions by the state. Although national policy has much role in pro-
ducing this situation, the politics or social risks are becoming as much driven 
by individual choice as by the state (see chapters by Lindgren and Belfrage in 
this volume). 
Both the institutions that generate and shape social risks, and the political 
paradigms and processes addressing social risks are constantly changing in 
the Nordics. Furthermore, as it is argued in many chapters of this volume, 
the politics of social risk and the institutions addressing them always include 
a great variety of all kinds of contingencies, which shifts the focus on the 
more practical aspects of public policy addressing social risks. We should 
never assume theoretically that the Nordic approach to social risks is static, 
homogenous, consistent, coherent or effective. The key goal of this book is to 
show how societal and political changes in the Nordic countries have changed 
the politics of social risk and, perhaps even more importantly, how we could 
change the commonplace theoretical interpretations of the Nordic model 
given the political and institutional contingencies in these changes. 
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By providing tools for rethinking the politics of social risk in the Nordics 
we also wish to provide tools for re-politicising social risks. If there is some-
thing common to all chapters of this volume individually, it is the critique of 
the current politics of social risk in the Nordic countries. While the thematic 
areas of the critiques are perhaps familiar to most readers, the actual objects 
of the exercise may not perhaps be that familiar. By bringing fresh approaches 
to, themes in and objects of critique to one volume we hope to provide a 
somewhat comprehensive picture on the possible ways to re-invent the Nordic 
politics of social risk. Before going to the key agendas for re-politicisation and 
to the contents of individual chapters of this book and to the narrative they 
constitute more closely, it is necessary to provide some further insights to the 
politics of social risks in general and especially to that of Nordic countries in 
more particular. 
Politics of social risk: some theoretical foundations
Social risks and their political underpinnings and histories have been dis-
cussed very extensively in academic literature (e.g. Kemshall, 2002; Armin-
geon & Bonoli, 2007; Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006), which is why it is hardly 
beneficial to repeat these issues in length here. In contrast, the purpose of this 
section is to shed light over some basic political questions and dimensions of 
social risks. In order to enable the re-politicisation of social risks, some sum-
marisation and elaboration of the academic literature is also needed. First, we 
have to briefly reflect upon the social nature of social risks.
In broad-brush terms, risks can be conceptualised in two interrelated 
ways: as risks of something and as risks to something. The former refers to 
an occurrence of an event and its “likeliness”. Put differently, we can say that 
there is a risk of something happening. For example financial risks are often 
conceptualised in these terms – and often in these terms only (see e.g. de 
Goede, 2004). Financial risk-taking is about investing in pursuit of profits, 
but can also mean that the invested capital is lost. Financial risk thus has 
positive (profit) and negative (loss) aspects. What makes risk distinct from 
uncertainty – events that cannot be anticipated – is that it has a probability 
of some kind. Risks are thus events that can be anticipated: they cannot per-
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haps be too reliably predicted but their occurrence is a known fact or there 
can at least be solid theoretical explanations for why some events take place 
or may take place at some point in the future. This is the feature that makes 
risks something that can be controlled.
In the latter terms, as ‘risk to’, risk refers to an event that changes the 
expected trajectory of events. Among other things, this conceptualisation of 
risk is usually present in the risk management discourses. Most importantly, 
it is the way social risks are typically conceptualised in everyday life as well 
as academic literature (Kemshall, 2002). In the sense of risk as ‘risk of ’, one 
can for example say that when one is employed there is always the risk of 
becoming unemployed. But this is not how risks are usually conceptualised. 
One more often tends to talk about personal injuries, illnesses or for example 
about economic downturns as risks to employment. In other words, it is typ-
ical to think about activities in life as some kind of standard trajectories that 
can be compromised by some events. Risk as ‘risk to’ addresses the meaning 
and significance of the events in relation to current state of affairs. It is in 
nature positive and often normative as well – risks are something that “dam-
ages” the expected trajectory of things.
What makes risks ‘social’, then? In simplest terms, social risks are events 
that concern the relationships between human beings. However, one should 
not understand social risks only as events between individuals because the 
society is equally much about relationships between organisations, groups 
and institutions. For example unemployment can a risk to more abstract 
level social status (e.g. through loss of income, stigmatisation of living “on 
the dole”) as well as to personal relationships (e.g. status within the family, 
ties amongst friends). Moreover, social risks cannot be necessarily reduced 
to individuals or their activities. Social risks can be risks whose objects are 
institutions. For example, an economic downturn can impose cost pressures 
to states via increasing social security costs and challenge businesses via 
decreasing demand for its products. In most general terms, social risks can 
be defined as events that change the relationships between or the social posi-
tions of different societal actors, structures and practices.
If we think social risks in these very broad terms, it is clear that the idea 
of politics of social risk refers to an equally broad field of affairs. The poli-
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tics of social risk are as much about the social institutions, relationships and 
other social issues as they are about the possible events. Thus any single social 
institution or relationship can become essential in the politics of social risk. 
Moreover, if we define politics very broadly as polities, politicisation, poli-
ticking and policies in and through which all things can be decided to be done 
(or made, thought etc.) differently, we can find politics of social risk nearly 
everywhere. Indeed, the politics of social risk are everywhere. Some limita-
tions are nevertheless needed in order to make the task of presenting the key 
issues manageable. 
The limitation used in this book is rather straightforward: we are looking 
at only institutionalised social risks that can be addressed in public policy. The 
greatest benefit with this limitation is that it excludes the most demanding 
research objects, the politics in the non-disclosed private and micro-level 
interpersonal domains. The conception of politics is thus limited to only pol-
itics taking place in different public social spaces, for example in formal poli-
ties like international organisations, states and municipalities, which generate 
policies. It must be noted, however, that we are not limited to formal political 
systems. The idea of ‘public’ should be understood here very broadly. Besides 
formal public polities at all scales from micro-local to global and universal, 
the definition includes all informal polities that have public policy relevance, 
including publicly regulated organisations like firms, and political activities 
that are present visibly in the public discussion, including various kinds of 
non-governmental organisations and policy networks. 
The definition also limits the conception of social risks to a manageable 
scale. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it limits the notion of risk to only 
such risks that can be and are named, anticipated and acknowledged as such. 
Put differently, social risks are here regarded either as explicit events (‘risk 
of ’) or as objects of these events (‘risk to’) that both have social consequences 
that can be anticipated. In this sense, social risks are all but pure uncertain-
ties, unexpected events or deus ex machina type sudden external influences. 
All ‘external’ influences and unexpected events are transmitted to the local 
social realities through institutional logics that make consequences more rec-
ognisable and expected. Put differently, social risks are more endogenous than 
exogenous to local institutional orders. From the perspective of the society 
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at large, social risks produce changes that are incremental rather than trans-
formative even when changes are sudden.
Secondly, with the idea of addressing risks institutionally, it limits the 
notion of ‘social’ only to somewhat stable and elastic social structures and 
practices that are somewhat broadly shared in everyday life. Although in 
the various chapters of this book we do not rely on very narrow definitions 
of institutions but on much broader discursive or habitual definitions (see 
Gronow, 2008, for review), we are nevertheless limited to discussing the social 
risks that are diffused in the society at large – or, to institutions as archetypes 
(see Leca & Naccache, 2006). By doing this, we are focusing only on formally 
defined, broadly diffused and culturally legitimate institutions.
Given these limitations, we can define the politics of social risk as the 
public shaping and framing of and decision-making over the broadly shared 
elastic social roles, relationships and practices that are acknowledged to be 
subject to events that change them. Although this definition is rather abstract, 
it enables us to see that there are a number of practical issues that need to be 
elaborated further. For example, what kinds of public spaces are there and who 
are participating in reshaping social risks? What kinds of risks are present in 
different social institutions? How do we come to acknowledge events that may 
change the society? Although quite many ‘what’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions 
remain at the general level, the public policy focus narrows down the political 
analysis to a rather manageable set of questions. Next, we will present some 
basic dimensions of the politics of social risk.
the three Political dimensions of social risk 
It is argued here that there are three practical dimensions in the politics of 
social risk conceptualised as discussed above. The first practical dimension of 
politics of social risk is risk assessment. Any public policy that concerns social 
risks has to define or at least to name the risks that are addressed in the policy 
(in a way or another). Risk assessment is the key starting point in policy plan-
ning and formulation. Assessment is never politically neutral in policy formu-
lation. It is always possible to decide which issues are considered social risks 
and which simply are not, and to define which elements or aspects of risk are 
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addressed and which are not. It is a matter of framing and political choice. The 
key political questions here are how the assessment of risks is organised, what 
sources are used in analysing risks and, indeed, who are entitled formally and 
informally to name and assess the risks that are supposedly present broadly 
in everyday life.
In practical terms, social risk assessment can be analytically approached 
from two directions according to the two conceptions of risk as ‘risk of ’ and 
‘risk to’. Although this political dimension may sometimes be more focused 
on risks as ‘risk of ’ than everyday life thinking, it does not suggest that ‘risk to’ 
would be forgotten. When risk assessment starts from the ‘risk of ’ perspective, 
it is about naming the possible occurrence of different events, and their likely 
social consequences. When assessment starts from the ‘risk to’ perspective, 
one first defines some aspired trajectory of human life or other developments, 
after which possible events that may compromise this trajectory are analysed 
in more detail. The ‘risk to’ perspective seems rather normative with the gen-
eration of trajectories, but the ‘risk of ’ perspective is not a single bit less nor-
mative: it selects which events are considered negative and which are not.
It must be noted here that assessment at the macro-level policy formulation 
is hardly the best example of social risk assessment, which can take place at 
various different scales. Social work is a good example of highly professional-
ised risk assessment concerning micro-level personal relationships. There are 
at least three sets of risks that social workers assess according to the personal 
relationships of the service users, each set containing numerous risks that 
are not here discussed in more detail (see Parsloe, 1999, for review). The first 
set consists of risks that users face in their personal relationships, especially 
relationships with their relatives. Most often this refers to risks children face 
(e.g. abusive parents). The second set of risks consists of the behaviours (e.g. 
suicide, self-neglect) that service users may cause to themselves. The third set 
concerns risks that service users (e.g. the mentally ill, substance abusers) may 
cause for other actors, known or unknown. Social risks are always present in 
very complex networks of relationships and thus the accurate analysis of risks 
at any level is a great challenge. The more politicised or ideologically laden the 
aspirations concerning the assessment become, the more political this chal-
lenge becomes as well.
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The second dimension is the distribution of social risk. In this context, dis-
tribution does not necessarily mean that some social risks are directly allo-
cated to some people, organisations or institutions, which is not very often 
the case, but that public policy can shape the institutions through which dif-
ferent groups of people face social risks. If for example the market is seen as 
the primary institution through which people should face the risks in their 
economic life, it becomes essential to study how different market institutions 
distribute risks and to choose what kinds of markets are politically enforced. 
Indeed, in the simplest case, the politics are mostly about regulating possible 
events and their consequences in different institutions. The distribution of 
social risks refers to both the distribution of vulnerability to risks and to the 
access to mechanisms that shape social risks. The paramount political ques-
tion in this dimension is the sharing of risks. The question is not only who 
shares what risks but also how the risks are shared – or, what the rationales for 
subjecting people to risks and of controlling access to risk management are.
Take for example employment. All employees share the risk of unemploy-
ment and are subject to same public policies but the employees of one corpo-
ration are very likely to face different kinds of risks than employees of another 
company operating in the same economy. The employees of one firm may 
have a very low risk of unemployment due to fine economic prospects and 
employee protection, while the employees of another live in great economic 
insecurity. In other words, the vulnerability to employment varies for the two 
groups. The employees in both firms may furthermore also have very different 
levels of access to unemployment funds. Thus the employees in different firms 
face different kinds of risk of unemployment as well. This means that the more 
both groups of employees are subject to social risks through the same institu-
tion – employment in labour markets regulated by employment contracts – 
the fewer common risks they are in fact facing.
Although it would be a harsh exaggeration to claim that all institutions can 
be redesigned to include different risks and to distribute risks differently, there 
is much political contingency in the ways in which institutions and actors are 
connected in the society. Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) classic insight on 
welfare regime models is in part based on this idea: different models distribute 
risks through different institutions and each includes its own contingencies. 
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In the universalist model for example access to risk management is firmly tied 
to citizenship of individuals and in the corporatist model to the employment 
of the family bread-winner. In the former, the distribution of social risks is 
then politically more tied to the definition of citizenship and to national poli-
tics of public services and benefits, whereas in the latter the politics of social 
risk have much more to do with employment contracts and the policies con-
cerning work at a very general level. The mechanisms for sharing risks can 
produce significant variation in the social risks as such. 
The third dimension is the organisation of risk management. Although 
risk assessment and the access to risk management are always very impor-
tant issues in policy design – and certainly of greatest importance in pro-
viding understanding on these politics – it is likely that this dimension is most 
common to debates on public policy discourses. The organisation of manage-
ment affects a great variety of issues like the spatial and temporary limits of 
risks, the processes of materialisation or mutual dependencies between man-
agement mechanisms. For example national health services that tackle social 
risks of illness can be organised as public services that can address health 
risks according to citizens’ needs, or as service vouchers or public insurances 
with which citizens can obtain those private services available from the pri-
vate sector. The management mechanism thus limits and reshapes the risk of 
illness, and affects the manifold social consequences the materialisation of 
the risk has.
Broadly speaking, management of social risk can refer to three different 
strategies in public policy. The first strategy is prevention. The goal here is to 
prevent social risks from materialising in the first place. Take for example 
employment. Prevention can for instance mean labour legislation (e.g. redun-
dancy regulation) and education policies. The second strategy is mitigation, 
whose goal is to reshape the materialisation of the risk, and the third strategy 
coping, whose goal is to reshape the results of risks materialising. Unemploy-
ment can be for example managed with unemployment benefits that both 
mitigate the risk of unemployment by improving the capabilities to seek for 
work, and help to cope with the loss of income incurred by unemployment.
It is crucial to note here that these strategies should not be thought as 
models or paradigms of a policy regime, but only as strategies that concern 
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one or more risk management mechanisms. In order to talk about regimes, 
we need to include the politics of risk assessment and distribution in analysis. 
Even then, it is still impossible to talk about a regime. Regimes are based on 
some kinds of rationales that in fact connect the three political dimensions. 
We hold that it is quite unlikely that any kind of stable or even elastic political 
regimes of social risk can be found in the contemporary world. The reason for 
this is that the social risks are changing so fast in form and substance. True, 
many people around the world are likely to find the risk of unemployment 
significant in their everyday lives, but the meaning, consequences and causes 
of unemployment are everything but the same for different groups of people. 
Geographical and political variation certainly exists but we do not think it is 
necessary to try to analytically build any kinds of regimes out of this variation. 
We think it is more important to see what kinds of political paradigms there 
are in the making of the politics of social risk. 
If risks are assessed only for individuals, distribution of vulnerability to 
risks and access to risk management organised only through markets, and 
risks managed only with mitigation strategies in one community, it is cer-
tain that social risks look different in another community where, in addition, 
risks are also assessed for households and collective organisations, distribu-
tion organised also through collective agreements and public services, and 
risks managed also preventively and by providing coping mechanisms. But 
this is not to say risks would look the same for each member of the commu-
nity or that the differences between the two communities would be greater 
than differences within the communities. All in all, it is very difficult to talk 
about regimes when such differences are accounted, which shifts the research 
focus on more tangible issue of political paradigms.
the nordic Political Paradigms of social risk
We have above introduced some basic dimensions of politics of social risk. 
Given the topic of this book, it must be now asked: what are the Nordic poli-
tics of social risk like in each of the three dimensions, what kinds of para-
digms can we find in the Nordic public policy-making, and how could we 
reconsider these paradigms?
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Before answering this question, two things must be noted very briefly. 
Firstly, paradigms are not necessarily consistent or coherent – a political para-
digm is a paradigm whether it works or functions or not, or whether it pro-
duces the aspired outcomes or not. Indeed, political paradigms can be based 
on ideology, compromises, domination, chance, negligence, ignorance and 
manipulation as much as on rational design and bargaining. Secondly, para-
digms are not paradigms of national regimes. Indeed, it must be always asked 
whose political paradigms and paradigms of what are in fact looked at. In the 
following discussion, the focus may be on more long-term trends and broadly 
shared in the national public policy in different countries, but this is not to say 
that other paradigms would not exist or that these paradigms bind all actors 
in the Nordics.
It is beneficial to start the discussion on the Nordic political paradigms 
of social risk from the dimension of distribution, for the similar paradigm of 
distribution is probably the thing that combines all the Nordic countries most 
effectively. This political paradigm shared by all Nordic countries can be called 
a multi-pillar approach to the distribution of social risks. The stereotypical 
picture of the Nordic model states that the model is characterised by the uni-
versal benefits and systems sponsored and organised by the state, suggesting 
that all risks are primarily distributed through public institutions whose cov-
erage is defined by either citizenship or residence. It is of course true that 
risks are still quite extensively distributed via these first-pillar institutions but 
they are not distributed only or even primarily through these institutions. In 
all the Nordic countries, there are significant second-pillar, employment con-
tract based institutions like health care, pension and unemployment systems. 
Moreover, households and individuals are increasingly participating in the 
third-pillar private insurance and service markets in order to gain additional 
security in tackling social risks. (Kvist & Greve, 2011)
Of course, much variation remains between the countries in the relative 
weight of different institutions. Take for example pension systems (see e.g. 
NOSOSCO, 2008). Looking at the two most important sources of pension 
income for the last decade or so shows that the weight of pillars and their tiers 
– first tier refers to basic pensions and second tier to earnings-related pen-
sions – varies significantly in each country. In Sweden, the primary pension 
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security comes from the combination of mandatory first pillar and occupa-
tional second pillar schemes. In Norway it comes from the both tiers of the 
mandatory first pillar scheme and from the mandatory occupational second 
pillar schemes. In Denmark, pensions come primarily from the two tiers of 
the mandatory first pillar scheme and the occupational second pillar schemes, 
albeit that the latter are only “quasi-mandatory”. In Finland, pensions come 
primarily the mandatory two tiers of the first pillar schemes and, in a lesser 
scale, from the third pillar private savings but the role of the second pillar is 
relatively small if not completely ignorable.
The multi-pillar approach is a very effective means of distribution when 
social risks are tackled because it enables access to various kinds of risk man-
agement mechanisms for a great majority of citizens. The downside of this 
approach is that it may prove hard to enhance equality both in terms of facing 
social risks as equals and of facings equal risks. People who have access to 
second-pillar arrangements are likely to have the access to third-pillar schemes 
as well, while people who rely on first-pillar safety nets may fall outside all 
other schemes. The approach is also prone to generate great risks of falling 
between different systems and thus of failing to get access to any risk manage-
ment, and to create incentives to develop only one pillar instead of others. The 
latter may for instance meant that political parties have political incentives to 
primarily serve the needs of the middle classes as demonstrated by the recent 
politics of public services in Sweden (see Lindgren in this volume). 
The political dimension of risk assessment can be in the Nordic case 
divided to the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ question. The paradigm of who assesses 
risks has changed rapidly during the last few decades in all Nordic coun-
tries. In the era of welfare expansion, risk assessment was made mostly in 
tripartite negotiations (e.g. Finnish incomes policy agreements, see Alaja in 
this volume) or in other alliances between political parties and central labour 
market organisations. Now, however, the trust towards social partners and 
any collective labour market actors in assessing general questions concerning 
individual and household welfare, social risks and other general themes has 
been seriously questioned – perhaps most seriously in the labour market flex-
ibility-prized Denmark (see Jørgensen & Schulze, 2011). This has lead to a 
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political decentralisation of social risk assessment to individuals, markets and 
less central organisations and associations of different kinds.
Although risk assessment might be more fragmented than before and 
includes the risks of increasing inequality in access to risk management or 
ineffectiveness of risk management policies among things, the Nordic para-
digm of social risk assessment is not any less comprehensive than before. On 
the contrary, the decentralised or fragmented approaches are likely to provide 
more comprehensive assessments. For example the governance of the Finnish 
mandatory earnings-related pension system includes dozens of development 
groups and co-operatives at different hierarchical levels of the scheme, which 
produces comprehensive assessments and thus a strong reform capacity (see 
Johanson & Sorsa, 2010). The problem with decentralised arrangements like 
policy networks is that they may weigh expertise over representation, delib-
eration and negotiation. Indeed, if the Nordic paradigm of risk assessment 
turns more expertise-based design than stakeholder experience-based nego-
tiation, the erosion of trust towards centralised assessments may also imply 
the erosion of representation in risk assessment. 
Because there is little conclusive empirical evidence on the increase power 
of expertise over representation, it is yet hard to say anything conclusive on 
this ‘who’ question. However, the high role of expertise is also related to the 
answer of the ‘how’ question. The mode of risk assessment in the Nordic public 
policy has been for long been characterised by rather professionalist concep-
tions of assessment. The assessment in formal policy development is usually 
divided to highly professionalised groups according to predefined thematic 
questions or fields of expertise. There has for example been a broad Nordic 
consensus of assessing social risks on a life cycle basis, meaning for example 
that social risks are discussed separately for children, the youth, adults and 
the elderly (e.g. OECD, 2007; see also Finnvedcn & Lindfors, 1996). While 
the advantages of this approach are clear, including effectiveness and compre-
hensiveness, the problem is that the overall picture of life course or the ‘good 
life’ that social risks compromise may become rather abstract and incoherent. 
Without political deliberation over the good life and public representation in 
assessment, the assessed social risks may remain abstract at best and at worst 
only a means for governing the masses without the goal of good life.
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Perhaps the most characteristic issue in the political dimension of risk 
management in the Nordics has been to provide rather generous compen-
sations for the materialisation of social risks for various groups of people. 
Indeed, although variation in compensations levels remains, there is much 
common in the Nordic strategies of helping to cope with social risks with for 
example extensive public services and multi-pillar unemployment benefits 
and pensions. How about other strategies of risks management? All countries 
have for long put very much weight on education policies in terms of risk pre-
vention. Similarly, most countries have recently opted for increasing levels of 
flexibility in labour markets, thus putting less weight in regulation policies in 
mitigation. It can be argued more generally that there has been a shift towards 
workfare paradigms in and individualisation of risk management strategies 
with labour market integration policies and active labour market policies. 
Again, it must be noted that individualisation or risk management does 
not mean that management would be any less comprehensive or effective. 
Some difficult issues like the risk of lone parenthood may be magnified as well 
as suppressed in this development. The main problem here is that contempo-
rary modes of risk management produce strong dependencies. The increasing 
importance of the dependency on labour market is not the only one here. For 
example, one of the key developments in the Nordic as elsewhere in the devel-
oped world has been the financialisation of risk management. Nordic pension 
provision for instance is increasingly dependent on the performance of the 
international financial markets. Financial market dependency makes success 
dependent on financial literacy, which is neither an egalitarian approach nor 
one which makes sense confronted with highly complex financial markets 
(see Belfrage in this volume). Moreover, financial market dependency gen-
erates other dynamics as well, including for instance the possibility that risk 
management becomes pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical. 
As noted, risk management is very much about reshaping social risks and 
thus a source for new contingencies and risks (see Sorsa & Roumpakis in this 
volume). It is hardly a surprise that the Nordic multi-pillar and multi-level 
approaches to the distribution of risks and risk assessment are reflected also 
in the mechanisms of risk management and in the risks they create. There are 
so many mechanisms that it is difficult to have any kind of comprehensive 
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understanding on them in public policy. It is especially difficult to address 
issues like the falling between systems, the overall levels of protection, all 
kinds of questions concerning equality, or even the consequences of institu-
tional changes. This is perhaps the most pressing challenge in the Nordic poli-
tics of social risk. While there are strong expectations to address social risks 
in public policy, it is very difficult to see what kinds of social risks the current 
institutions in fact generate or how any aspired reforms might change them. 
This, again, helps to keep the debates over social risks primarily in profes-
sional hands, which makes the broad social expectations difficult to be trans-
lated into democratic politics.
re-Politicising social risk in the nordics
The politics of social risk in the Nordic countries have been at their best char-
acterised by highly professional but representative risk assessments, by gen-
uine multi-pillar approaches to the distribution of risks, and by extensive and 
egalitarian compensation strategies and effective regulation-based prevention 
strategies in risk management. Even despite their problems and inconsisten-
cies discussed above, these paradigms have helped to make social risks rela-
tively effectively mitigated and relatively equally distributed. Indeed, when 
international welfare and well-being comparisons and rankings of are made, 
the Nordic countries nearly always seem to be playing in their own league. Yet 
when it comes to the politics social risk, the Nordics hardly play in their own 
league – they are subject to the same political and institutional pressures as 
much as any other group of European countries. The social risks have been for 
example magnified by transferring them to the systemic level, and are increas-
ingly becoming assessed by individuals with low capabilities to do it, distrib-
uted through imperfect markets and managed only by mitigating them mildly. 
In most general terms, the transformation is related to the transition from 
the Keynesian Welfare Nation-States to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-
National Regimes as best described by Jessop (2002). The idea of competi-
tion state has indeed become central in the Nordics. National competitive-
ness is considered the primary economic risk: if the states cannot compete 
successfully over production and productive labour, they risk all economic 
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success altogether. Open competition has implied increasing vulnerability 
to the global financial system and to the production and distribution strate-
gies of multinational corporations. Moreover, the Schumpeterian paradigm 
embraces rather than suppresses risks. The mode of open competition is based 
on innovations and the so-called knowledge economy, which causes great 
pressures for all citizens to gain sufficient knowledge, skills and flexibility to 
cope with rapid economic changes. Social risks are increasingly related to 
work and employment more generally. Risks are more distributed by employ-
ment than ever before due to the rise of second and third pillar schemes and 
the retrenchment of the first pillar schemes. The role of the state is less about 
extensive service and social security provision and more about serving as a 
regulatory regime.
The best of Nordic political paradigms are currently under great pressure. 
This is not to say that we should try to return to any old paradigms in the 
politics of social risk. Rather, we need to rediscover the valuable aspects of 
old paradigms, to update paradigms and to reflect upon new ways to materi-
alise the aspired changes in the contemporary political-economic order. The 
Nordic social democratic welfare politics have, of course, been criticised and 
re-politicised along the same lines many times before for various reasons. 
When it comes to politics of social risk, it is sufficient to take Kuisma’s (2011a, 
2011b) advice from these debates: instead of being optimisation-prized econo-
mists, we need to put much more weight on ideas and policies and on showing 
what citizens can tangibly achieve when they form a political alliance.
At the most general level, we must now democratically discover and if nec-
essary redefine what good life is and how the new politics of social risk can 
help everyone to live it in the Nordics. Without this, any kind of new poli-
tics of social risk are prone to fail. In order to reinvent old paradigms and to 
adjust them to the current conceptions of good life, we also need a thorough 
re-politicisation of the current trends in all three political dimensions (assess-
ment, distribution and management). A few issues in each dimension are next 
discussed in more detail.
The Nordic politics of risk assessment have been traditionally character-
ised by collective deliberation by the representatives of people both as rep-
resentatives of citizens (state and political parties) and of economic inter-
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ests (labour market parties), and by professional setting of agendas. As noted 
above and elaborated in more detail in various other chapters of this book, 
the erosion of the central bargaining systems is certainly affecting the pos-
sibility to assess risks in collective democratic deliberation, which fragments 
the assessments and may provide even a greater role for the domination of 
professional discourses. Moreover, there have been calls for increasing assess-
ment of risks at the individual level in contrast to collective assessments (e.g. 
Pajarinen et al., 2010).
Conceptualising social risks as risks to individuals may easily mean that 
professional social and financial engineers are assessing risks on behalf of 
individuals, or that the assessment is complemented with the imperative to 
manage the risks alone. This is not probably the Nordic conception of good 
life in a good society. Assessment on an individual basis is problematic. One 
of the problems of the new individualist micro-bias is that it tends to under-
mine the macro-level risks embedded in the global economy. Individualisa-
tion of assessment becomes dangerous in the context of global economy that 
is ridden with high risk levels magnified by constant capital market infla-
tion (see e.g. Toporowski, 2005). Basically all events in the global economy 
become possible sources of system-level disturbances against which individ-
uals cannot be protected by financial risk management (Beck, 1999). All finan-
cial products that are marketed as effective hedges against social risks are in 
fact producing most benefits for their sellers (De Goede, 2004). It is evident 
that if we wish to assess social risks as risks to individuals, we must take the 
macro-level much more seriously than as a framework of competition. Before 
that, however, we as Nordic citizens need to re-politicise the entire idea and 
find agreement whether individualism as seen by financial professionals, not 
citizen representatives should be the way in which risks are assessed.
The one true cornerstone of the Nordic paradigms of social risk has been 
the distribution of risks with a multi-pillar model. The Nordic politics of 
social risks have always been very open-minded about providing access to 
risk management mechanisms in different pillars of the society. Now, how-
ever, the Nordic countries have strongly embraced the idea of workfare state 
in which risks are increasingly distributed via employment. This has increased 
polarisation between the winners and the losers. Take for example Finland. 
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The individuals working in stable and successful organisations are enjoying 
generous second-pillar health services and access to various other schemes, 
whereas precarious workers have to live with retrenched health services and 
constant uncertainty. The two-tier first pillar pension system for example can 
very effectively provide generous pensions for nearly all Finns but only in 
conditions of full employment and stable working careers which both have 
become less common since the early 1990s depression. The inequality in 
relation to social risks caused by increasingly workfare based distribution is 
becoming evident.
It must be noted that this is not to say that the first pillar or public service 
and social security provision would be in crisis. On the contrary, the first 
pillar becomes crucial in shaping the risk of unemployment. If we live in a 
‘four-fifths’ or ‘three-quarters’ welfare state in which a vast majority of workers 
enjoy access to generous second and third pillar benefits, then it is clear that 
the first pillar defines the gap between winners and losers. Perhaps one of the 
key questions in the future of Nordic risk management is the distribution of 
social risks. Do we wish to provide sufficient and equal social safety nets for 
all or for example only to provide equal access to risk management within 
different pillars?
Yet perhaps a more pressing problem with the current workfare ethos is 
that it has become difficult to affect how risks are distributed via work. Tra-
ditionally, the first (public) and second pillar (occupational) social security 
and services arrangements have not been fundamentally separated in Nordic 
political bargaining. Now however, as demonstrated by Theo Papadopoulos 
and Antonios Roumpakis in their chapter in this volume, the European social 
space strips away the possibility to coordinate second-pillar schemes with the 
first-pillar schemes effectively. This is very likely to strip effectiveness away 
from the Nordic politics of social risk, and it certainly increases the impor-
tance of the first pillar schemes. Whether this is commendable or not is a 
matter of deliberation – a deliberation whose goal has to be political action 
for Nordic governments and political parties at the European level.
In terms of risk management, the Nordic paradigms have been quite effec-
tive in providing help to cope with social risks. The key question concerning 
the Nordic paradigm here is whether the egalitarian ethos in coping strate-
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gies is sustainable or not. The access to risk management may continue to be 
relatively egalitarian but the coverage and the generosity of benefits can hardly 
be called egalitarian in essence. Although the multi-pillar model has been 
valuable in terms of policy-making, it is evident that the role of the first pillar 
safety nets has been somewhat undermined in all Nordic countries in case of 
social security, albeit not necessarily in case of public services. As result, indi-
viduals and households have become more dependent on the labour market 
in facing social risks. Although this development is all but a positive one, 
stating it is not enough to conclude the analysis of risk management: the focus 
moves to preventive and mitigation strategies.
The capabilities to prevent social risks from materialising collectively 
have also become somewhat limited in the so-called world risk society and in 
the current European framework both discussed above. The same applies to 
mitigation, the reformulation of the event causing the risk. It is for example 
increasingly hard to regulate labour markets and to ring-fence social security 
systems from international economic cycles. The flexicurity model may for 
example mitigate the risk of unemployment significantly (e.g. by enabling 
supplementary education during unemployment) but it does not make the 
risk of unemployment any less imminent or dependent of global economic 
development. On the other hand it must be noted that many prevention strat-
egies like education and health instruction have been embraced as a key part 
in the politics of individualisation. Similarly, mitigation strategies like par-
enthood leave support are still very strongly present whenever the workfare 
ethos is strengthened.
Employment is one important issue where all the three dimensions are 
relevant. The problem with the current Nordic workfare ethos is that there 
have been very few debates on ‘good work’ and the role of work in good life, 
which would provide guidelines for employment policies. Indeed, if second 
and third pillar unemployment, health, pension and other insurances become 
the norm with which risks are distributed, what kinds of employment policies 
do we wish to have? Or, put differently, if we are willing to live in a workfare 
society, to what kinds of vulnerabilities do we want to subject ourselves as 
workers? If the workfare society is very broadly considered legitimate – which 
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is not necessarily the case – the answer to these questions is essential in rede-
fining the Nordic paradigms.
Take for example equality. If we assume that all citizens should be equal, 
should the state for example serve as ‘the employer of last resort’ in order to 
achieve full employment or should individuals fully bear the responsibility 
of employment on their own? Should individuals be fully responsible for 
employing themselves even when a global financial crisis wipes off ten per 
cent of production and there is insufficient effective demand to establish new 
firms and products? Unless these questions are answered in collective delib-
eration, the risks related to work become very easily both assessed and born 
only by individuals whatever our idea of equality is. In order to strengthen the 
democratic ethos in the politics of social risk, we need to strengthen rather 
than suppress collective deliberation over the role of work in good life. 
Good life is not the only macro-level question that needs to be addressed. 
Another one is the division of moral labour in risk management between all 
societal actors. This includes both the provision of risk management and the 
costs. Due to tax cuts for businesses, the individualisation of risks in pen-
sion systems, the rise of user fees in public services and many other related 
developments, the costs of managing risks have become more individualised 
in all Nordic countries. As result, the mitigation of social risks has in general 
become more individualised. Should we accept these kinds of developments? 
The answer depends on who we consider responsible for risk management 
and how this assessment is framed. Without political debates, any deliberate 
division of labour in the politics of social risk is next to impossible.
All in all, one of the key agendas of this chapter has been to re-politicise 
the contemporary Nordic approaches to social risk in a few fronts. Firstly, we 
need more inclusive and highly representative political debates over good life 
in order to assess democratically which social risks are considered the most 
important in the contemporary Nordic societies. Whether risks should be 
assessed on individual, firm employee, regional or national-institutional bases 
is the first topic that needs to be discussed. Secondly, we need a comprehen-
sive agreement on the division of labour in distributing and managing social 
risks. To revive the Nordic egalitarian tradition, the public safety nets need to 
be maintained sufficient to ensure substantial quality while at the same time 
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making it clear in what scope risks should be borne by individuals and other 
actors in order to improve fairness. Thirdly, in order to renew the multi-pillar 
paradigm, the individualisation of social risks – if accepted in the first place 
– needs to balanced with macro-level collective policies that ensure as effec-
tive management of social risks as possible. Besides changes in attitude, it may 
require proactive global politics to “de-financialise” the global economy and 
international cooperation to change the current European regulative frame-
work. This is indeed a major prospect for the Nordic political cooperation in 
the future. It is moreover evident that the tripartite negotiation systems are 
among the key political spaces for all these debates and goals.
the structure of the book
The volume in your hand does not belong to a genre of extensive research 
reports that would aim at providing a definitive review of politics of social 
risk in the Nordics at the time of writing. Rather, the purpose of this book is 
to provide new insights and theoretical tools that can help to find new direc-
tions for Nordic social and public policies in which social risks are addressed. 
While it would have been possible to choose only scientific articles made 
by Nordic researchers – there is indeed very much high-quality academic 
research on the topic – and to opt for a fully scientific genre in style, we have 
made a selection of more essay-like analytical, historical, theoretical and pol-
icy-oriented approaches presented by Nordic and international authors. The 
reason for heterogeneity is that we believe it covers the public debate on social 
risks better than exclusively academic orientation could.
The book includes seven chapters besides this introductory chapter. 
Although all the chapters discuss a great variety of political issues, they can 
be also classified according to three key themes in the politics of social risk. 
The first key theme addressed in this book is the changes in social risks and 
especially the policies of social risk in the Nordics. There are three chapters 
that can be best fitted under this theme. 
The second chapter of the book, written by Erik Bjørsted of the Danish 
Economic Council of the Labour Movement (Arbejderbevægelsens Erh-
vevsråd), discusses the changing role of education in the politics of social risk 
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in the Danish economy. Education has become one of the key challenges and 
sources of social risk for individuals in an economy that is now more flexi-
bility-prized than perhaps ever before. Mr. Bjørsted argues that the growth in 
training levels has slowed down significantly, which will cause many imbal-
ances in the Danish labour market in the future. The policies strengthening 
the education of the workforce would help to correct these imbalances. Such 
policies would also produce positive effects both for tackling social risks more 
effectively and for enhancing the quality of economic life in Denmark more 
generally. In order to control the social risk of inadequate education more 
effectively, it is clear among other things that businesses must change their 
attitudes towards internships and that legislation on various issues ought to 
be discussed and re-evaluated.
The third chapter of the book, authored by Anne-Marie Lindgren of the 
Swedish Labour Movement Think Tank (Arbetarrörelsens Tankesmedja), 
moves to discuss the change in and experience of public service provision in 
Sweden and expands the discussion to the political foundations of new risk 
management institutions in the Nordics. This discussion is contrasted briefly 
with some contemporary perspectives on the Finnish service provision in 
the fourth chapter written by Joonas Rahkola of The Central Organisation of 
Finnish Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö). Ms. Lind-
gren brings forth the proposition that the privatisation and outsourcing of 
public services, which have recently characterised the politics of social risk 
in Sweden, have been accompanied by the financialisation of the services or 
their funding, which has challenged the rationales behind the outsourcing. 
Moreover, it has produced many somewhat negative outcomes like increasing 
inequality in social risk management and increasing costs of service provi-
sion. As Mr. Rahkola demonstrates, the possibility for such developments 
has been discussed in Finland, but they have not been materialised at least in 
comparable scope due to different policy choices.
The second key theme addressed in the book expands the discussion from 
policies to policy-making. Indeed, the effectiveness of the Nordic countries 
in managing social risks is perhaps less due to public policies than to mode 
of policy-making that helps address social risks rather comprehensively. The 
ability to discuss social risk in various centralised agreements has been a key 
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political success factor in the Nordics. That said, the idea of combining cen-
tralised policy-making with multi-pillar approaches is constantly contested, 
and this mode of policy-making has become more dependent on success sto-
ries.
In the fifth chapter of this volume, Claes Belfrage of the Queen Mary Uni-
versity of London demonstrates that the way of addressing social risks can 
prove to be crucial for the political success of a single political party. Dr. Belf-
rage discusses comprehensively the historical role of the Swedish Social Dem-
ocratic Party in shaping one of the key institutions of managing social risks of 
the elderly, the mandatory earnings-related pension scheme. Pension system 
design and reforms have provided ample opportunities to seize political vic-
tories and to build a Social Democratic identity of social risk management. 
Yet reforms can become a political burden for a party whose ‘crown jewel’ the 
pension scheme was. The pension politics have caused the Social Democrats 
to embrace a new set of values that Dr. Belfrage discusses under the notion 
of subversive neoliberalism and, ultimately, to lose their political identity in 
the face of social risks. Dr. Belfrage argues that in order to have political suc-
cess stories, the Social Democrats need to reconsider their relationship to the 
most important cornerstone of the politics of social risk, the pension systems.
Antti Alaja of the Finnish Kalevi Sorsa Foundation discusses another type 
of political success story in the sixth chapter. The Finnish centralised tripar-
tite negotiations and especially the incomes policy agreements have been the 
central institutions in which successful public policies of social risk have been 
built during the last half a century. The otherwise elastic institutions have been 
recently questioned and somewhat abandoned by the employer organisations. 
In an era of national competitiveness discourses, the key focus on social risks 
has been transferred from individual and firm levels to the national scale, to 
the overall Finnish economic success. Mr. Alaja argues that in such setting, 
the ability to coordinate economic and social policy in a centralised manner 
then becomes vital for effective and successful risk management. Without 
such ability, different kinds of political actors are unlikely to produce effec-
tive policies of risk management. It is thus little wonder that the centralised 
bargaining system has been revived. 
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The third key theme of the book is political and institutional contingency 
in the politics of social risk. By focusing on contingency we especially wish to 
show that social risk management generates social risks as such. Furthermore, 
all risk management includes operational risks as such and all political set-
tings addressing social risks have the risk of failing. It must be noted, however, 
that these risks are not only about operational successes or failures in seizing 
opportunities but they also concern the abilities to react and to mobilise polit-
ical resources. In short, the political effectiveness of the Nordic countries to 
manage social risks should never be taken for granted.
The seventh chapter of this book, authored by Ville-Pekka Sorsa and Anto-
nios Roumpakis of the University of Helsinki, is a detailed historical analysis 
on the risk and dependencies related to the Finnish and Swedish manda-
tory earnings-related pension schemes. Dr. Sorsa and Dr. Roumpakis argue 
that although the individuals bear risks differently and some institutional 
dynamics differ in the two pension schemes, they also include many similar 
contingencies. The comparative historical approach helps to see how different 
regimes come to embrace, suppress and reformulate social risks in their own 
ways, and how different approaches prove sustainable, become out-dated or 
get reformed. The two schemes have been subject and continue to be to quite 
different reform paths in political terms. The Finnish scheme for example 
continues to provide more political room for reforming the scheme in the 
operational governance, while the success of the Swedish scheme has become 
more dependent on professional systems design.
In the eighth and last chapter of this book, Dr. Theo Papadopoulos of the 
University of Bath and Dr. Roumpakis address some recent developments in 
the European framework that compromise the parity principle, which is one 
of the key political characteristics of the Nordic labour market bargaining sys-
tems. The European regulative framework challenges the Nordic politics of 
social risk by steering the politics of risk distribution towards more market-
based solutions and by limiting public possibilities to prevent and to mitigate 
social risks. Focusing especially on the role of the European Court of Justice, 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis demonstrate how the new European social 
space serves as a strong but contingent external influence to more local and 
national politics of social risks.
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In combination, these eight chapters provide valuable new insights to the 
Nordic politics of social risk. The reason for the novelty is not so much the 
themes discussed – they have been present in the academic and professional 
debates for ages – but the way in which they are discussed and combined. 
When policies are combined with policy making, institutions of social risk 
with institutions of addressing them, and risk management with generation of 
risks, it is clear that the understanding of any kind of stable or static ‘Nordic 
model’ must change. And, indeed, we also hope that this new understanding 
can provide new ideas in and approaches to the actual politics of social risk. 
All the views presented in individual chapters are of course authors’ own – 
including this introductory chapter in which many highly subjective interpre-
tations of the other chapters have been made. That said, the editor is always in 
part responsible for omissions, for highlighting some arguments over others 
and for letting factual errors end up in the final version of the book. As the 
editor of this book, I hope you find the selection of issues and approaches dis-
cussed one that helps new thoughts concerning the Nordic societies to emerge 
– hence the title of this volume.
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Lack of education as a social risk – 
the Danish case
er ik  Bjør S t ed
Denmark, like many other economies, is highly dependent on a well-edu-
cated workforce. Knowledge is an important means for production that can 
increase productivity and hence the overall welfare of the society. Indeed, 
the demand for skilled and high-skilled workers has increased significantly 
over the past years while the demand for unskilled workers has decreased. 
The restructuring from low-skilled jobs towards high skilled jobs is visible in 
every sector of the Danish economy and it requires continuing growth of the 
overall educational level of the Danish workforce. This means that the genera-
tions coming in to the labour market have to be better educated than the ones 
leaving the labour market. Here Denmark is facing a huge challenge, because 
the growth in the acquired educational levels seems to be slowing dramati-
cally down. The purpose of this chapter is to shed more light over these devel-
opments and to discuss what kinds of effects the slowing growth in educa-
tional levels affects the social risks faced by Danish employees.
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increasing share of youth generation 
without secondary education
Table 1 demonstrates the share of low-skilled workers, or workers with no 
education beyond primary and lower secondary education for different age 
groups. The share of low-skilled workers among the 65-year-old group has 
dropped from 65.8 per cent in 1990 to 40.4 per cent in 2008. The share of low-
skilled workers among the 26-year-olds and 35-year-olds has also dropped, 
but not as much as in the case of the 65-year-old. This indicates that the dif-
ference in the educational levels between the old generations and the young 
generations has fallen and, more generally, that the growth in the educational 
levels of the workforce has stopped. This is confirmed in Figure 1, which dem-
onstrates the growth in the educational level measured as how many months 
of education the population has received on average. In the 1980s, the growth 
in the levels of acquired education was about 0.6 per cent a year for the overall 
workforce. That dropped to about 0.5 per cent a year in the 1990s while the 
growth from 2000 to 2008 on average has been only about 0.3 per cent a year.
table 1: share of low-skilled workers
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
26-year-old 31.7 27.8 24.6 24.1 28.2
35-year-old 36.7 33.5 26.0 23.1 20.2
65-year-old 65.8 60.1 53.2 45.5 40.4
Source: ECLM on basis of the databank, IDA, Statistics Denmark
45
figure 1: growth in the educational level of the danish workforce
Note: The level of education is defined as how many months of education the labour force 
has received. We are looking at the labour force from 15 years to 74 years. Source: ECLM.
Of course, one could argue that due to the growth in the educational level 
it will become more difficult to obtain large growth rates in the educational 
level over time. However, compared to earlier years, a larger share of young 
people in Denmark today does not obtain education beyond lower secondary 
education. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the expected share of 
young people without education beyond lower secondary education 25 years 
after graduating from the lower secondary education. The 2007 figure suggests 
that in 2032, when the youth generation has turned 41, the share of workforce 
with no education beyond lower secondary education would be 20.3 per cent. 






















figure 2: share of young people with no education beyond lower secondary 
education
Note: We are looking at people 25 years after graduating lower secondary education. So 
in fact we are looking at 41 year old people. The expectations in figure 2 are calculated 
trough a model developed by The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research (UNI-C) for 
The Ministry of Education. 
Source: ECLM on basis of statistics from UNI-C (The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research).
In 1990, about 25.4 per cent of the young generation was expected not 
to undergo any further education beyond the lower secondary education. 
During the 1990s this share of young people decreased and by the begin-
ning of the new millennium only 17.4 per cent were expected not to complete 
any education beyond lower secondary education. During the last ten years, 
however, the expected share of a youth generation not getting any education 
beyond lower secondary education has increased to more than 20 per cent. 
When the current government took office back in 2001, it set a new target in 
education policy, the so-called Target 2015. According to government plans no 
more than five per cent of a young generation in 2015 should be without edu-



































to be very far from that goal. Moreover, as mentioned, Figure 2 addresses the 
population 25 years after they have finished lower secondary education, which 
means that we are here looking at people when they are 41 years old. If we look 
at people ten years after finishing their lower secondary education – meaning 
they are 26 years old – matters are even worse. At that age, about a quarter of 
a youth generation will not have completed any education beyond lower sec-
ondary education (see Figure 3).
figure 3: share of 41-year-old and 26-year-old people without education beyond 
lower secondary 
 
Note: We are looking at people 10 and 25 years after graduating lower secondary 
education. So in fact we are looking at 26 and 41 year old people. The expectations 
in figure 2 and 3 are calculated trough a model developed by The Danish IT Centre for 
Education and Research (UNI-C) for The Ministry of Education. Source: ECLM on basis of 



















which social grouPs droP out of school and why?
Men are less likely to get an education
Before addressing the social risks that the lack of education poses on the indi-
vidual and to society, it is useful to look at some of the typical characteristics 
of the low-skilled workers with no education. The first clear characteristic 
is gender. If one looks at the share of men not getting an education beyond 
lower secondary education and compares it to the relative share of women, it 
is obvious that men are less likely to get any education. From 1990 to 2007 the 
share of men not getting an education beyond lower secondary education has 
been significantly larger than that for women (see Figure 4). In 2007, 22.5 per 
cent of men had not completed education beyond lower secondary education 
by the age of 41 while the share of women was 17.5 per cent. However, it must 
noted that both women and men are far away from the 2015 target of having 
at maximum 5 per cent of the younger age cohort without education beyond 
lower secondary education. Figure 4 shows that the share of both men and 
women not getting an education has been increasing since 2000.
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figure 4: share of men and women without education beyond lower secondary 
education
Note: We are looking at people 25 years after graduating lower secondary education. So 
in fact we are looking at 41 year old people. The expectations in figure 4 are calculated 
trough a model developed by The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research (UNI-C) for 
The Ministry of Education. 
Source: ECLM on basis of statistics from UNI-C (The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research).
Nationality plays a vital role for education
Another important characteristic is the national origin of the worker. If the 
worker is not Danish in origin, he or she is less likely to complete an education 
that qualifies for the labour market. According to Table 2, 27.4 per cent of the 
workers with another national origin than Denmark have not completed an 
education beyond lower secondary education while the share for the workers 
with Danish origins is only 14.7 per cent. Again, women are more likely to 
complete an education that qualifies for skilled or high-skilled jobs than men. 
More than a third of men with another origin than Danish do not possess 
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an education that qualifies for skilled or high-skilled jobs. Better integration 
policies therefore also play a vital role in getting young people back to school.
table 2: share without education and origin
Share without high school diploma or 
vocational education
Share without any other competence
Danish origin Other origin Danish origin Other origin
Men 21,0 37,3 17,9 34,3
Women 16,7 25,5 11,4 20,0
Total 18,9 31,8 14,7 27,4
Note: We are looking at people 25 years after graduating lower secondary education. So in 
fact we are looking at 41 year old people. The expectations in table 2 are calculated trough 
a model developed by The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research (UNI-C) for The 
Ministry of Education. 
Source: ECLM on basis of statistics from UNI-C (The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research).
Far too many drop out of school
Education in Denmark is almost free of charge so in that respect it would 
seem surprising that so few choose to complete an education that qualifies for 
jobs other than low-skilled jobs. The truth is, however, that quite many actu-
ally begin some education beyond lower secondary education. Looking at the 
current 26-year-olds, only 5 per cent never even started taking an education 
beyond lower secondary education (Figure 5). The rest of the 25 per cent, who 
have not completed education beyond lower secondary education at the age of 
26, have actually begun an education but have dropped out of school. This is 
especially pronounced within the vocational schools where more than 50 per 
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cent drop out. The share of students dropping out of vocational educations 
has been increasing since year 2000 (Figure 6).
figure 5: reasons for not getting an education
Note: We are looking at people 10 years after graduating lower secondary education 
meaning that people in the sample are 26 years old. 
Source: ECLM on basis of statistics from UNI-C (The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research).





figure 6: share of students dropping out of school within vocational educations 
Source: ECLM on basis of statistics from UNI-C (The Danish IT Centre for Education and Research).
shortage of skilled and high-skilled labour
The lack of educational skills in the Danish labour force combined with the 
increasing demand for knowledge and skills is not sustainable in the long 
run. Not many years from now, Danish companies will lack skilled and high-
skilled workers. Even the current economic and employment crisis cannot 
prevent the emergence of this imbalance. The consequences might be severe 
not only for the companies and the society that will face productivity, growth 
and welfare losses but the lack of skills also has depressing effects at the indi-
vidual level. 
Although it is difficult to assess the exact imbalances of demand of and 
supply for educated workforce today, it is possible to make some assessments 
on how much the imbalance will worsen over the coming years. Table 3 dem-
onstrates the likely worsening of the imbalances on the Danish labour market 
over the next ten years. The demand for low-skilled workers who have no 
education beyond lower secondary education will decrease by almost 190 



















decrease by a little more than 100 000 people thus creating an excess supply 
of low-skilled workers by almost 90 000 people.
table 3: imbalances on the danish labour market in 2019
Supply Demand Imbalance
1.000 persons
Low skilled -102 -189 88
Skilled -52 -7 -45
High skilled 102 207 -105
Source: ECLM
If we look at the skilled workers, those who have completed some voca-
tional education, the demand is expected to drop only by 7 000 people. How-
ever, the supply is expected to drop by more than 50 000 people during the 
next decade or so. The expected shortage of skilled workers in 2019 is in total 
45 000 people. The shortage of qualified workers is even more pressing in 
the case of high-skilled workers who have completed a higher education. 
The supply of high-skilled workers is expected to increase by a little more 
than 100 000 people towards 2019 but the demand for high-skilled workers 
is expected to be more than double that number. So, in the case of the high-
skilled workers, Denmark is facing a shortage of more than 100 000 people. 
why is the lack of education a social risk?
As the analysis above shows, the Danish labour market will very likely have 
major imbalances in terms of supply of and demand for educated workforce. 
The social risk of not getting a sufficient education will be thus magnified in 
the near future. For individuals, the consequences of not getting an educa-
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tion range from higher risk of unemployment and lower lifetime income to 
becoming redundant or to being stigmatised as a burden to the society. The 
lack of educational skills in the labour force and the resulting imbalances also 
have severe consequences for society especially in forms of lower produc-
tivity and hence lower growth potential, larger expenditures for unemploy-
ment benefits and more inequality. The purpose of this section of the chapter 
is to explore these risks in more detail.
The higher the education, the higher the lifetime income
Workers with some education beyond lower secondary education tend to get 
a higher lifetime incomes in comparison to those who have not completed any 
secondary education. This might be all but surprising, but it is nevertheless an 
important consequence of not getting a sufficient education and thus essential 
for the understanding of failing to get sufficient education as social risk. The 
expected lifetime incomes are illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the income 
for workers at different ages with no education (low-skilled workers), workers 
with a vocational education (skilled workers), and high-skilled worker with 
a higher education (short, medium or long). The higher the level of finished 
education is, the higher the lifetime income will be – especially if one has a 
postgraduate degree (Master`s degree, PhD. etc.). Even after having passed 
the age of 70, employees with postgraduate degrees are still earning about 
300 000 – 350 000 Danish kroner while the corresponding income for, say, 
low-skilled workers is less than half that amount.
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figure 7: disposable income over life
Source: ECLM on basis of the IDA-databank, Statistics Denmark.
Education pays off even when one gets unemployed. Figure 8 shows the 
gross and disposable lifetime income for those with an education beyond 
lower secondary education and for those without. Those with an education 
beyond lower secondary education will on average earn between 11 and 12 
million Danish kroner before taxes and just below 8 million Danish kroner 
after taxes over the lifetime – even if unemployed for a total of five years. 
Those who have not finished an education beyond lower secondary education 
can only expect to earn about 7 million Danish kroner before taxes and just 
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figure 8: lifetime income in case of unemployment 
Source: ECLM.
Low education leads to higher risk of unemployment
Another conclusion that can be drawn from empirical studies is that if you 
have begun an education beyond lower secondary education you are more 
likely to be involved in the labour market. In Figure 9, the labour market 
status of those without starting education is compared to those who have 
started an upper secondary education within three years after graduating 
lower secondary education. 85 per cent of those who began an upper sec-
ondary education are employed, while only 75 per cent of those who did not 
begin an upper secondary education are in fact employed. So, the chance of 
being employed is greater if one has started an upper secondary education 
soon after graduating lower secondary education. In other words, the risk 
of being unemployed is significantly smaller if one has started an upper sec-
ondary education. All in all, any education beyond lower secondary education 
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57
figure 9: upper secondary education and labour market status
Note: We are looking at people who began upper secondary education within 3 years after 
primary and lower secondary education was completed and those who did not. Source: 
ECLM on basis of the IDA-databank, Statistics Denmark.
Large positive effects to public finances 
The lack of sufficient education is not a risk at the individual level only but 
also at the societal level. The society gains when individuals educate them-
selves. One good example is the current state of public finances, which can 
benefit significantly from education beyond lower secondary education. Table 
4 shows the effects of different education levels to the national budget. For 
example, a worker with no education beyond lower secondary education 
society can expect to produce tax income of 4.2 million Danish kroner over 
the worker’s lifetime. On the other hand, this worker also causes almost the 
same amount of costs in unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, different 































education thus produce hardly any financial profits for the state. The skilled 
workers who have a vocational education typically generate tax revenue of 5.2 
million Danish kroner over their lifetime, while society can expect a cost of 
about 3 million Danish kroner in public benefit and transfers. The total cost of 
the skilled workers’ education amounts to about 0.3 million Danish kroner, so 
all in all there is a surplus of 2.4 million Danish kroner on the public budget. 
A person with a longer (postgraduate) higher education generates over his 
lifetime a positive net effect of about 9 million Danish kroner to the public 
budget.








Low skilled 4.2 4.1 - 0.1
Skilled 5.2 3.0 0.3 2.4
Short higher  
education
6.1 2.5 0.4 3.2
Medium higher 
education
6.7 2.4 0.4 3.9
Long higher  
education
11.4 2.0 0.4 9.0
Source: ECLM on basis of the IDA-databank, Statistics Denmark.
Indeed, the longer the education is, the higher the tax revenue and the 
lower the expenditure for public benefits and transfers are. Education thus 
generates a higher net effect on the public budget – it is an investment that 
more than pays off for the society. The simple reason for the high gains of edu-
cation to the public finances is that the workers’ lifetime income is higher the 
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higher education they have completed but the risk of getting unemployed and 
being absent from the labour market is smaller. The relationship between edu-
cation and absence from labour market is illustrated in Table 5, which shows 
the share of workers with different educational levels being absent from the 
labour market due to unemployment or any other type of absence in 2007. 
From the low-skilled workers, 7.3 per cent had been unemployed, 11.2 per cent 
went into early retirement due to health problems, 4.3 per cent went into vol-
untary early retirement, 0.6 per cent were at some stage absent due to health 
problems and 9.9 per cent were absent from the labour market due to various 
other reasons. All in all, more than a third of the low-skilled workers expe-
rienced some kind of absence from work. The corresponding share for high 
skilled workers with a long higher education was only 11.3 per cent. Table 5 
thus strongly highlights the key argument in this chapter: the better educated 
you are the better position in the labour market you will get.

















Low-skilled 7,7 11,2 4,3 0,6 9,9 33,8
Skilled 3,3 4,3 5,2 0,5 4,8 18,1
Short higher 
education
3,1 3,1 4,1 0,3 5,0 15,6
Medium higher 
education
2,4 2,7 4,2 0,3 5,9 15,5
Long higher 
education
3,0 1,5 2,0 0,2 4,6 11,3
Note: The table shows the average share of the 18–65 year old affected by different kinds 
of absence from work. All the figures are 2007 figures. 
Source: ECLM based on Statistics Denmark.
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Education increases productivity
The increasing levels of education can lift productivity, which has been one 
of the driving forces in the growth of the Danish economy this far. Table 6 
shows the value created for society over a lifetime from workers with different 
educational levels. After the educational costs are taken into consideration, 
an average low-skilled worker produces earnings of about 9.2 million Danish 
kroner over his/her lifetime. A high-skilled worker, on the other hand, gen-
erates a value from 14 to 22 million Danish kroner with his/her and his/her 
employer’s earnings. The conclusion is very clear – the higher education a 
worker has completed, the more value does that worker produce for himself 
and his employer to the benefit of the society. Society can thus prosper with 
increased education, and in that respect, the lack of education in the labour 
force is expensive for the society. 




Short higher education 14.3
Medium higher education 14.2
Long higher education 22.5
Source: ECLM on basis of Statistics Denmark.
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Education can reduce the demographical reduction in the labour force 
The lack of skills in the labour force causes less economic output per working 
hour, which means that the productivity and the potential growth in the 
Danish economy will be lower in the future unless the trend in the education 
levels is changed. This is distressing because Denmark (like many other Euro-
pean economies) is already facing very moderate growth rates in the coming 
years. This is due to a number of reasons, but the decline in the so-called 
dependency ratio is one of the main reasons for moderate growth rates (as in 
many other countries). This refers to the decline in the number of people in 
the active labour force in relation to those outside the workforce. In Denmark, 
the decline has almost been eliminated with the welfare reform in 2006. The 
reform will for example gradually lift both the early retirement age and the 
ordinary retirement age until 2019. 
However, a better educated labour force can also help to increase the size 
of the labour force. This is illustrated in Figure 10. The dark blue curve rep-
resents the development in the Danish labour force from 2009 towards 2019 
taking into account demographic factors like age, gender and origin in the 
population. According to this scenario, Denmark is facing a decline of about 
40 000 workers in the labour force during the next decade or so. However, if 
one also takes the change in educational background of the population into 
account, the decline in the Danish labour force is almost eliminated (this 
is illustrated with the light blue curve). Why? As demonstrated in Table 5, 
workers with education beyond lower secondary education stay longer on the 
labour market and are less absent from it. The better the education, the more 
there’s involvement in the labour market. Because the education levels are 
slowly rising, so is the involvement in the labour market. That said, keeping 
the disappointingly large share of young people without education beyond 
lower secondary education in mind, it is obvious that things could and ought 
to be better. The growth potential of the Danish economy could be increased 
trough education not only in terms of higher productivity but also in terms 
of a better (lower) dependency ratio.
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figure 10: the development in the danish labour force, 2009–2019
Source: ECLM on basis of the IDA-databank, Statistics Denmark and own calculations.
Education leads to less inequality
As we have seen, education can be a solution to many economic problems, be 
they concerned with public finances or economic growth. At the socio-eco-
nomic level it is also worth noting that education can also reduce inequality. 
This is illustrated in Figure 11, which compares the deviation in skills and 
competences to the deviation in income in selected OECD countries. There is 
a linear relationship between the deviation in skills and income. High devia-
tion in skills leads to high deviation in income (i.e. more inequality). Low 
deviation in skills on leads to less deviation in income (i.e. less inequality) 
which is the case especially for the Nordic countries.
Labour force due to demographics 
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figure 11: relationship between difference in skills and income
 
Source: ECLM on basis of OECD 2000.
conclusions
In this chapter, it has been argued that the lack of skills due to insufficient 
education has severe consequences at the individual level. The transition from 
low-skilled towards high-skilled jobs means that workers with no education 
face the risk of becoming redundant and a (financial) burden to the society. 
The educational imbalances in the Danish labour market represent a waste 
of resources, which has for the entire society. By increasing education, the 
society could prosper with higher productivity, larger growth potential, better 
public finances and less inequality. The lack of sufficient skills in the workforce 
is definitely a social risk we as a society ought to address.
The lack of skills in the Danish labour force that qualify for skilled and 
high-skilled jobs is mostly the result of too few people getting an education. 
However, as we saw earlier in Figure 6, only 5 per cent have not started an 
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problem seems to be that far too many drop out of vocational education. Den-
mark needs an educational system that can embrace both the academically 
talented pupils and those not so talented. This can be achieved with better 
tutoring and guidance and perhaps also with a broader variety of available 
educational alternatives. Education should emphasise the practical aspects 
of training and still allow continuing to higher education. If one shows talent 
for, say, mathematics or physics, but has trouble with subjects like literature, 
language, history or so, why should that person not be allowed to study engi-
neering for instance? It would certainly make vocational education more pres-
tigious if there was a substantial chance to continue with a higher education 
later on.
Young people tend to face difficulties in finding an internship, which is 
a general requirement to complete a vocational education in Denmark. The 
trainee job requirement in a firm could be substituted by on-the-job training 
at school if no internship is found. Then again, the difficulty of finding an 
internship might be one of the main reasons for the students to drop out of 
school. To prevent this, firms have to take in more trainees in future. One 
possibility is to provide subsidies for the firms if they take trainees and make 
firms pay duties if they refuse to take them. Furthermore, education could be 
compulsory not only for those below the age of 15/16 but also for those below 
18. One instrument for example could be to make it illegal for firms to hire 
young people below 18 who are not enlisted at some school. Whatever the 
means, the vision and goal should nevertheless be that the lowest educational 
level in the future would be the upper secondary education (i.e. vocational 
training and more general education that qualifies for a higher education), 




Are financialisation, privatisation and 
individualisation the same thing?  
The Swedish experience
anne- M arie  l ind gren
introduction
Social services such as welfare, education and day care of children and the 
elderly are primarily tax-financed in Sweden, with very low user fees. School 
is completely free of charge. The political reasoning behind this paradigm is 
that the access to such important services should be determined by the eco-
nomic resources of individuals and households. Even the social insurance – 
unemployment insurance, sick leave and parental leave – are predominantly 
tax-financed through payroll taxes. The reasoning behind the tax-financed 
social services and the social insurance is the same: security in case of illness 
or unemployment cannot be dependent on the individual’s income.
Until 20 years ago, the tax-financed services were predominantly provided 
by public authorities. Schools, child care and home care for the elderly were 
organised by the municipalities, while the Swedish regional authorities (land-
sting) were responsible for providing health care. Since the early 1990s, pri-
vate actors have been increasingly allowed to access the tax-financed serv-
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ices sector. Services are still financed through public funds and the private 
providers cannot charge fees above or beyond those politically mandated. 
In other words, what was privatised was the provision of services, not the 
financing. Although the private actors are formally supervised by national or 
municipal authorities, the actual means of control are – as has become evident 
in recent years – insufficient. The principle of transparency does not extend 
to the private actors and citizens’ rights to access economic data are limited.
The privately provided services still amount to a relatively small share of 
the publicly funded services but the share is growing fast. The private actors 
operate mostly in the large cities where they may be responsible for large 
shares of the total provision. For example, while 20 per cent of Swedish sec-
ondary school students attend private schools, in Stockholm the share of pri-
vate schools is over 50 per cent.
There are several concurring factors that lie behind the privatisations. The 
demand for greater choice over schools or health clinics – the individuali-
sation – that has emerged since the mid-1980s is the most cited reason in 
public debates. Increasing individual choice was thought to require private 
actors. Behind the scenes, however, there are the neoliberal ideas that seek 
to diminish political power in favour of market solutions as well as strong 
economic interests coupled with the growing financial markets, which have 
sought to enter the large and profitable health and education sectors. After 
about twenty years of privatisations we can now see that it is the strong private 
equity companies that dominate private health care. They have gained even 
more ground in the private education sector. This has come as a somewhat 
nasty surprise. When the privatisations started, the idea was to give opportu-
nities to small enterprises, employee cooperatives, non-profit associations and 
so forth. These kinds of actors indeed dominated the emerging sector in the 
early days, but their share is now steadily declining, as they are outcompeted 
or bought by big corporations.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the recent developments in the 
Swedish public service provision and how they have affected the politics of 
social risks in Sweden. The text is divided to two sections. The first section 
addresses the changes in social policy regarding the demands of greater indi-
vidual choice. It demonstrates the ways in which the concept of individual 
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choice has become its antithesis in the contexts of social services and social 
insurance. The second section then extends the discussion to the social con-
sequences of privatisation and financialisation of the tax-funded ‘service mar-
kets’.
individualism and individual choice in social Policy
Social policy has two key dimensions in terms of welfare provision: social 
services (such as health, education and social care) and social insurance 
(such as sickness allowances and unemployment benefits). In broad-brush 
terms, the social services distribute opportunities, whereas the social insur-
ance system pools risk. Education and social care serve as possibilities for 
individuals to improve their lives in different ways. Unemployment and sick-
ness insurance, on the other hand, are protections against risks that make life 
difficult: the risk of losing your job, of falling ill or being injured so that your 
capacity to work changes. The fact that social services are paid through taxes 
means that citizens guarantee each other certain fundamental possibilities. 
The fact that social insurance is paid by taxes means that citizens share the 
individual risks together. In both cases, it is about a collective responsibility 
over individual welfare. 
It is common to say that the society has become more individualistic since 
the 1980s. However, the concept of individualism has two different meanings. 
Firstly, it can refer to the broadening of individual life choices – that is, to 
individual rights. Secondly, individualism can also stand for more individual 
responsibility. This can mean that the problems caused by the wider economic 
and social changes are presented as individual problems, which ought to be 
solved with individual choices. The latter understanding of individualism can 
be used as an argument against public responsibility for welfare. 
The changes in Swedish social services and social insurance in recent years 
demonstrate clearly how ‘individualisation’ can mean diametrically opposite 
welfare policies in practice. In politics of social services, ‘choice’ is the leading 
concept. The citizen/consumer is free to choose the school or preschool to 
her children, the health clinic for her family and so on. For this choice to be 
real the service provision should not be regulated and extra charges should 
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not be allowed. Sweden has free establishment of providers in school, child 
care and primary health care. The municipalities and regional authorities are 
obliged to compensate all producers according to the same rules. The private 
producers are not allowed to charge any fees above or beyond those set for 
the public actors. 
In case of social services, ‘individualisation’ thus means more rights to 
choose but no greater individual responsibility for the economic conse-
quences of those choices. Quite the opposite, it is considered meaningful for 
the choice that there is no such responsibility. The collective responsibility 
for financing these services stands. There is in practice a bigger collective 
cost burden because the system becomes more expensive for the funds. The 
allocation of fund assets has, however, been privatised. The possibilities to 
control costs or the distribution of funds by political or social priorities have 
thus diminished. 
The development has been the opposite within the social insurance system. 
Individual rights have been circumscribed and the responsibility of individ-
uals increased. Social benefits levels have not followed wage growth. There 
are deep cuts after a certain time of sick leave or unemployment. The require-
ments to enter the earnings-based unemployment insurance system have 
been made stricter and the individual contribution levels have been raised. 
Stringent time limits have been introduced in the sickness insurance system. 
The control over people in the case of sickness or unemployment allowance 
has become strict. The assessment of individual needs is now driven rather by 
administrative regulations than by the individuals. 
The underlying idea of these reforms is that ‘too generous’ benefits make 
people passive and less inclined to accept work. The sick and unemployed are 
under severe economic incentives to hasten their return to work. The eco-
nomic and social cost of illness and unemployment have thus been individu-
alised and privatised, whereas the administrative control on those who need 
sickness or unemployment allowance has increased. Although the demands 
that the sick and unemployed should improve their social status on their 
own have increased, the actual possibilities for doing that have in many ways 
decreased. The availability of adult education and labour market training 
has been cut. The resources for medical rehabilitation of employees are all 
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but sufficient. The number of people on sickness leave has increased but the 
resources for rehabilitation have been cut.
the background of divergent develoPments
The demands for more choice in social services emerged in the 1980s. It can 
be seen as a natural consequence of the rising prosperity. As education, health 
and childcare became to be taken for granted the demands to choose between 
alternatives became stronger. There were also rigidities within the public 
sector where the internal interests of public authorities sometimes overshad-
owed the need and demands of citizens. This also strengthened the demands 
to be free to choose and to avoid bad solutions prescribed by the public regu-
lations. Parallel to these understandable wants by citizens, there were strong 
commercial interests that sought to enter the large and profitable publicly 
financed markets. A combination of civic demands from well-established and 
articulated groups and economic interests of private service providers pushed 
for privatisation, choice and less political control but with the same level of 
public tax financing as before. The same level of public financing was a pre-
requisite for the choice citizens wanted and for the stable and secure markets 
producers sought.
Today, there is in principle an unlimited right to establishment for pri-
vate companies in primary care, education, childcare and home care for the 
elderly. There is a requirement for a formal licence by the regional authority 
for primary care, by the Swedish Schools Inspectorate for education, and 
by the municipality for all other services. A licence must be accorded, how-
ever, if the company fulfils mainly formal requirements regarding personnel, 
premises and professional knowledge. In principle there is no possibility to 
judge whether or not the activity is in fact needed. The private companies are 
then remunerated for their activities on the same basis as the municipal or 
regional agents in their respective branches. In other words, it’s a fixed-price 
compensation based on the municipality’s costs, not the actual costs for the 
private service provider. This means that reduced costs in the private sector 
never benefit the taxpayer.
72
One substantive explanation for the changes in social insurance lies in high 
sickness insurance costs and high long-term unemployment. The number 
of days covered by sickness insurance grew markedly during the 1990s. The 
main reason for the development was that long-term sick leaves increased. 
The high unemployment rates, a legacy from the economic crisis years of the 
early 1990s, diminished tangibly at the end of the 1990s but stayed at a level 
which would have been considered unacceptable in the 1980s. The rising costs 
of sickness insurance system and labour market policies became problematic 
in economic terms. Unfortunately these problems were explained wrongly. 
The faults in the social insurance system were framed as “too generous” remu-
nerations, which were seen to make people passive so that they did not make 
enough of an effort to find employment. Although there is some basis in the 
criticism in that short sick leaves were at times overly generous, the real prob-
lems – the increased long-term unemployment and number of sickness leave 
days – were not caused by the social insurance system. They were caused by 
a variety of reasons like the faster tempo of working life, the cuts in regular 
staff by firms and the higher know-how requirements, which all took a large 
share of people out of work.
In 2006, the right-wing parties won the parliamentary election and entered 
government on a promise of “Jobs Policy”, which was predominantly about 
economic incentives: about lower income taxes to make work profitable and 
about stricter requirements for sickness and unemployment allowances to 
force the sick and unemployed to find work. The “Jobs Policy” does not take 
into account that individual qualifications and the actual capacity to work 
influence individuals’ chances of employment given the requirements of the 
labour market. The program adhered to economic theories that have domi-
nated the public debate but that have been put into question during the past 
years. The OECD (2006) for example has clearly changed the perception that 
unemployment insurance should be such that the time of unemployment is as 
short as possible. Today the view is that the unemployed should be given some 
time to find the best job, not just the first on offer. The prolonged unemploy-
ment is fully compensated by the increase in productivity that follows from 
the individual finding the right place to work.
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Class dimensions of social services and social insurance reforms 
Individualisation is two different things for the social insurance system and 
social services. Unemployment and illness are transformed into individual 
problems and the solution lies in the individual’s will and ambition. The public 
support for these systems has been diminished while the control over indi-
viduals has increased. The social services on the other hand are still seen as 
an important public responsibility that ought to be paid through taxes. The 
public responsibility has been extended to choice as right, which has been 
implemented in a way that limits the possibilities to control costs. In the first 
case (social insurance system), the rights of individuals have been limited but 
societal control increased. In the latter (social services), individual rights have 
been expanded while public control has been decreased. 
There is a clear class dimension to this development. The idea of individual 
choice has been mainly driven by the well-off middle class groups, and it is 
mostly these groups that take advantage of the individual choice. Highly edu-
cated and high-income groups use more public services than the unskilled 
groups and they also demand more of them. The right to free establishment 
for service providers in the publicly funded services sector is also backed by 
powerful economic interests that also have their stronghold in the well-edu-
cated and established social groups. The social insurances are of importance 
for blue-collar employees but in a different manner. The risk of unemployment 
and work-related injury or illness is higher for blue-collar workers. Although 
unemployment has become more common even among white-collar profes-
sions, they in general have better complementary economic security through 
collective agreements or trade union income securing measures. In addition, 
their financial resources to manage a period of unemployment are on average 
better as are their prospects of finding new employment than in case of blue-
collar workers.
The powerful opinion-forming groups have less interest in the social insur-
ances but vital interests in the social services. The changes over the last dec-
ades largely concur with these interests. In public debate the social insurance 
system and services have even been pitched against each other. The conserva-
tives in particular have put forth the thesis that the costs of social insurance 
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are taking money from the “heart of welfare”, the social services, and from tax 
cuts. In general, there always seems to be potential distrust of public sector 
support, as there have often been claims of fraud or over-generous public 
spending. The claim that higher costs are due to over-generous spending has 
been compelling and, consequently, it seems clear that lower benefits are the 
right solution. This argument makes the cuts seem psychologically positive, 
not unsolidaristic, because it is supposed to help people get back to work.
Of course, one should not deny that the increase in long-term sick leaves 
and unemployment is a problem, both in social and economic terms. How-
ever, the problems do not lay in “too generous” benefits. The experience of the 
last years demonstrates this well. The strict new rules in the social insurance 
systems have all but solved the problems. The problem is caused by tougher 
requirements in the labour markets that cast more workers aside than before 
and make it harder for outsiders to return to the market. Social problems such 
as labour market exclusion are being currently portrayed as individual prob-
lems. This clearly demonstrates how the Swedish public debate has changed 
over the decades. The left-wing perspective highlighted how the social and 
economic structures affect individuals’ equality of opportunity and the social 
risks that individuals face. This has been replaced by a liberal/conservative 
perspective, which emphasises the individual’s will and ambitions without 
wanting to see how the individual’s choices are linked to social structures.
Privatisation and financialisation
When the privatisation of the Swedish public sector started in the early 1990s, 
the general perception was that it would lead to many new local businesses, 
to teachers and care staff taking over their workplace in order to run them 
on their own, and to non-profits being able to provide care and education 
according to their distinctive profiles. Twenty years later we have the results 
– and they show something completely different. During the first years of pri-
vatisation the expectations were largely met. Many local companies emerged 
in the home care sector. Among private child care providers, parent coopera-
tives became the dominant form. Now, however, the picture has changed dra-
matically. The private care is today dominated by less than half a dozen large 
75
companies backed by international venture capital. The same development 
is taking place in education. The share of schools managed by independent 
companies or non-profit organisations is declining while the share owned by 
large corporations is growing. Of the private pre-schools over half are now 
limited companies although the parent cooperatives were still predominant 
just a few years ago.
The increased concentration is not always apparent, however, as many of 
the corporations work under different names. The largest corporation of free 
schools, Academedia, has schools under seventeen different company names 
(Didactus, Vittra, Fenestra, IT-gymnasiet etc.). The many different names 
reflect the fact that Academedia is constantly growing through acquisitions 
of formerly independent, smaller companies. The private equity companies 
in the care and education market are all in the buyout segment. Such com-
panies do not seek to develop long-term ownership and they should thus be 
regarded as financial rather than production companies. The basic idea is not 
to make money off the service provision: the profits are made buying and 
selling providers. 
These companies borrow money from other financial actors like banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds that are allocated in limited matu-
rity funds. The funds are invested in activities with stable market shares with 
the intent to increase profitability by selling them for a large profit after a few 
years. The sales profit is the rent the investors get as the fund is dissolved. 
Because the funds are usually placed in tax havens, the company does not 
pay any capital gains tax. The businesses are built as long chains of holding 
companies that link the main owner (the fund) and the different service pro-
viders at the end of the chain. As a rule, every producing entity – no matter 
how small – is a company on its own. This makes it possible to move money 
up and down the chain to minimise the tax burden. The so-called shareholder 
loans, the loans to the producing companies with an internal interest that 
naturally exceeds the market rate, are one common practice. The interest pay-
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ments reduce the producing entities profits, while the shareholder company 
in a tax haven can avoid taxes on the interest gains.1
The construction of businesses demonstrated above highlights the finan-
cial character of the Swedish social services companies. This logic is also com-
patible with how real estate companies financed by multinational venture cap-
ital funds are built. In both cases profits are made with buying and selling on 
markets that are expected to produce ever rising prices. The likeness to the 
stock market behaviour before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is 
clear. Many of the large care corporations have already changed owners sev-
eral times, but this has always been about sales from one venture capitalist 
to another. The same development has begun in the education sector, where 
a number of companies founded in Sweden have been sold to multinational 
private equity companies in the last year alone.
Because large care and education corporations have been regarded as 
financial companies, the Swedish School Inspectorate has now hired econo-
mists to examine how the large corporations act financially. The private but 
publicly financed care and education sector in Sweden has proved itself a very 
attractive market for financial interests. It is easy to see how the pressure to 
turn over tax-financed services to private providers increases with the growth 
of the international financial markets and the need to find new sectors where 
to invest and yield interest. Indeed, “privatisation” does not have to mean 
“financialisation”, as the first years of privatisation showed, but as powerful 
financial interests need new markets to invest in and when social services 
provide a stable market with secure profits, then privatisation becomes finan-
cialisation. The financial actors compete or buy out the local cooperatives and 
small businesses with their economic upper hand.
1  The Swedish Tax Agency recently won a court case against one of the large care companies in 
Sweden (Attendo) with regard to this sort of internal interest. The court found that the interest 
was not a market rate and thus not tax deductible. That meant about SEK 80 million in tax 
surcharges.
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Why the big interest?
The tax-financed services such as health care and education are not sensi-
tive to changes in the business cycle – the demand is great and the payer very 
reliable. When it comes to health care, the producer also has good chances 
of increasing demand by ordering follow-ups, routine check-ups and other 
service extensions. It is a well-established fact that private for-profit pro-
duction combined with third party financing (taxes or insurance policies) 
increase demand for services. The producer has an interest in driving con-
sumption, while – in contrast to normal markets – there are little or no eco-
nomic restrictions on demand. The result is higher costs.
This explains the interest shown by large financial corporations towards 
the social services sector. The interest is likely to be increased by the very gen-
erous (or more frankly, clueless) rules of compensation, which make it rather 
easy to make a profit. Sweden, as opposed to many other countries, allows 
payouts on publicly financed services. The private companies in the health, 
education and care sector had in 2008 revenues of 13 per cent of the total 
capital compared to the average of only 9 per cent for other private compa-
nies in Sweden. It is not likely that the higher revenue would be due to private 
health and education companies being much more efficient than the private 
companies for example in the highly competitive export industry. The much 
more likely reason lies in the compensation schemes that enable easy profits. 
There are many problems associated with the financialisation of social 
services. A common argument for privatisation has been that private compa-
nies are more efficient than public ones because requirements in the authority 
tend to build bureaucracy and rigidities that lead to less efficient use of 
resources. The existence of such risk cannot be denied even though they can 
be counteracted.2 However, as modern organisational studies show, exactly 
the same risks are present in large companies. The idea that private companies 
work more flexibly and efficiently is based on the owner as the entrepreneur 
2  The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, SKL, says their systematic work 
of disseminating best practices and measuring quality and efficiency through annual so-called 
open comparisons of results and costs has led to clear improvements (see Sveriges Kommuner 
och Landsting, 2010).
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who himself is responsible for management. Yet large companies are led by 
professional manager-employees who like public servants can face the same 
(although not necessarily identical) risks of inefficiencies that all large public 
organisations face. 
As will be shown later on in this chapter, privatisations have led neither 
to lower costs nor to improved quality of services that increasing competi-
tion and the number of actors was thought to produce. This may have some-
thing to do with not having innovative entrepreneurs and small businesses 
but rather large companies that rely on mainstream methods of producing 
the services – and, indeed, companies that put smaller companies where the 
new ideas might be out of business. Yet many important risks are related to the 
financing mechanisms. The most important risk is that these large financial 
owners who never intend to invest for the long-term. The interest in running 
the company so that it can be sold for a significant profit has become a driving 
force for the companies. This affects both the target groups and the geographic 
areas the companies choose to invest in. These strategies do not necessarily 
correspond to the distributive policy goals. Companies that are systematically 
set up to avoid taxation are also a problem that requires changes in both cor-
porate and tax laws.
The uncertainties of today’s financial markets entail risks. If some financial 
institutions that back up the funds that finance investments in health care and 
education fail, it naturally has consequences for hospitals and schools. What 
the consequences for Swedish the tax payers are remains unclear. A further 
disturbing question is which interests might come in with the new owners 
in the case of a sale or financial crash. In analogy, a curious economic play is 
unfolding at the moment in respect to the car company Saab. There are innu-
merable complex and none too reassuring financial institutions behind the 
new official owner. The possibility of similar oddities in privatised schools or 
hospitals feels discomforting to say the least.
Private business interests prioritised
Publicly financed private business can take two forms with the current Swedish 
legislative framework. First, the state and the local and regional authorities 
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can purchase specified services from private entrepreneurs, or, in other words, 
provide a private company a commission to do a task according to a contract 
for a negotiated price. The contract has a time limit, after which the procure-
ment is made anew. There can be procurements for a wide range of activi-
ties: rehabilitation of addicts, clearing snow, building roads or hospital food 
to name a few. The rules for procurements are set in a specific law on public 
procurement, which in turn is based on EU law. Second, private companies 
can freely establish and provide services within a specified field, provided that 
they fulfil certain quality criteria. They are then allowed to compete for cus-
tomers and to get a fixed compensation for every customer from the public 
authority. Sweden has such open markets in education, child care, primary 
health care and home care for the elderly.
Private preschools, schools and home care for the elderly are compensated 
through service vouchers. For each person, child, pupil or pensioner who uses 
the private service, a fixed compensation is paid. The value of the compensa-
tion (voucher) is calculated on the basis of the costs of the municipal service 
(schools, child care and home care are managed by municipalities in Sweden, 
not by the state). The full value of the voucher is paid even if the cost of the 
private service is lower for example due to fewer personnel. According to 
statistics by the Swedish National Agency for Education (Skolverket, 2010), 
the group size is bigger in private preschools than in public ones, and the 
share of qualified preschool teachers smaller. Similarly, the teacher ratio is 
on average lower in private schools compared to public schools and the rela-
tive number of qualified teachers (i.e. those with completed teacher training) 
fewer. The fixed compensation scheme means that it is fairly easy to create a 
profit margin by reducing personnel a bit or by hiring more personnel with 
slightly lower education, which decreases the personnel costs while the com-
pensation stays the same.
The rationale behind the voucher system is that the municipality should 
not be allowed to favour their own services over private options and therefore 
the compensation to the private sector should be equal to that of the public 
sector. In practice this means that private service providers can be compen-
sated for costs they have never had and that rationalisations in the private 
sector will never benefit tax payers as lower costs as opposed to those in the 
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public sector. Furthermore, services provided by the state, municipalities or 
regions are subject to freedom of information legislation, which means that 
citizens have the right to full insight in the economy and administration of 
service provision. When it comes to private actors who perform the same 
functions that are also financed by taxes, citizens are not privy to that same 
insight. This is another example of how the producers’ interest is prioritised 
over the tax payers’ interests. 
The regulatory framework for private but publicly financed services 
was developed in the 1990s. The process was clearly driven by the producer 
interest, which reflects the ideological climate of that time. “Market solutions” 
were seen as superior to political solutions and market solutions required 
private entrepreneurship by definition. The key was therefore to facilitate pri-
vate enterprise in the tax financed sector in different ways. The thought that 
the interests of companies could run counter to those of the taxpayers never 
occurred. It is not until recent years when a number of problems with the pri-
vate production have become apparent that the regulatory framework is being 
questioned. At the same time, the environment for tax financed privatised 
services has changed with financialisation. The companies that dominate the 
private care and education markets are of a whole different kind than what 
was imagined in the early 1990s. The possibility that the companies taking 
over the sector would be big multinational financial institutions driven by 
purely financial calculations never entered considerations in the 1990s.3
It can be argued that the analyses of the consequences of opening up the 
tax-financed sector to private competition that forms the bases for decision-
making were flawed. There were for example no analyses of the problem of 
third party financing even though it is well known in economics. Neither were 
there any analyses on the effects of the measures in case only the profit incen-
tive would become dominant. The experiences from other countries very 
3  It must be noted here that the social democratic Prime Minister Olof Palme nevertheless 
stated in a speech in 1985 that “it surely isn’t a coincidence that demands of privatisation are 
being voiced at a time when there are lots of capital in companies. It’s quite simply about a 
hunt for new profitable markets for the money. […] In the USA, where a good part of the social 
services are managed privately, this sector is more attractive for investors than the industrial 
sector!”
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clearly demonstrate these effects and even ordinary market logic tells you 
that companies that look for a profit will locate where prospects for making 
a profit are the best. 
Today, the pattern is obvious: private medical clinics predominantly 
choose affluent areas in the larger cities while they avoid areas with multiple 
problems.4 The same goes for the newly privatised pharmacies. Few private 
schools address children with difficulties in school and these schools have on 
average a higher percentage of pupils whose parents have higher education 
than in the municipal schools. The latter is a well-established international 
pattern.
Indeed, there is a lack of insight on the effects of the profit motive and a 
poor understanding of economic incentives in general. It is truly astonishing, 
as the question of incentives plays such a great part in the economic debate 
over the last decades, not least in the calls for tax cuts and stricter social secu-
rity. Today, the incentives may be completely distorting. Fixed compensation 
is one example. Another one can be found in the Stockholm region health-
care. In Stockholm, the compensation to health clinics is based on each doc-
tor’s appointments. This has led to a situation in which people with several 
ailments have to schedule a visit for each illness instead of going through 
them all in one meeting. An additional eccentricity is that the compensation 
for medical treatment is not paid on basis of the treatment itself but of who 
conducts it. For example the compensation for a blood test is bigger if it is a 
doctor that draws the blood than if it’s a nurse. This has naturally led to doc-
tors performing procedures nurses used to do.
The economic incentives, as they are today, are counterproductive 
regarding the one goal stated in favour of privatisations – the lower costs. 
On the contrary, they often induce seeking a profit through methods that are 
neither more effective nor increase quality. Privatisations have been driven by 
ideology and financial interests rather than factual analyses of the prospects 
for and problems with private for-profit agents in a publicly financed and in 
principal needs-based system. The assumption for allowing private actors in 
4  In 2008, of in total 511 private health clinics in the Stockholm region, 400 were in the 
northern, more affluent parts of the region, and only 111 in the southern, poorer parts where 
health problems are greater. 
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the market was that it was all that was needed to do in order to gain a number 
of benefits such as lower costs more variety and better quality – or, as a con-
servative newspaper wrote some years ago, “ever more and better goods to 
choose from for less money”. (Note that the word ‘goods’ here is used to refer 
to services such as education and care.) The notions that economic incen-
tives determine the behaviour of companies and that wrong incentives create 
wrong results were not a part of the picture. 
Overall, much of the Swedish privatisation debate seems to have been sim-
plified, even naïve, in relation to serious economic analysis of real life mar-
kets in contrast to those of theoretical markets. An explanation for this can of 
course be that economic interests and political ideology steered policy instead 
of economic and political analysis of what means achieve the best results for 
the publicly finances services. The starting point was not to find out if, and 
under what circumstances, the introduction of private elements could make 
public services better and less costly. The point of departure was that private 
companies without a doubt and in all circumstances would have these effects.
conclusions: the economic and social 
effects of Privatisation
Despite the critique presented above, it must be noted that there are, of 
course, a number of private schools, preschools, clinics and other organisa-
tions that function very well. There are also some that have been disastrous 
and some that are neither particularly good nor particularly bad. Disregarding 
individual cases, what does the picture look like if one tries to evaluate the 
overall results? Above all, what are the effects like in comparison with the 
hopes of lower costs and better quality that were used to argue for privatisa-
tions? Incredibly, there are no extensive evaluations on the effects of privati-
sations. One would think it evident that the effects would be monitored, both 
with regard to the hopes associated with them and with consideration of the 
importance of the services. Yet no such general follow-ups have been con-
ducted. In order to get an idea of the effects, one needs to lay a puzzle made 
up of numerous specialised research projects or reports about specific sectors.
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The Association of Swedish Local Authorities and Regions (SKL) use sev-
eral cost and quality indicators to annually compare results for instance in the 
care of the elderly and children in the municipalities. These comparisons show 
no systematic differences between municipalities with high and low share of 
private and public providers respectively. Within education the costs have 
increased due to excessive supply and fragmentation of resources. There is 
also a clear tendency of weaker results in education on average. The costs for 
primary care have grown rapidly since the right to establish was instituted. A 
recent comparison of private and public employment agencies shows no dif-
ference in results. The privatisation of pharmacies has been accompanied by 
higher costs and many complaints of worse customer service. There was until 
recently only one large hospital that has been transferred to a private actor (ST 
Görans in Stockholm). Based on dozens of quality indicators, comparisons 
with publicly run hospitals in Stockholm place it in the middle of the pack. 
The effects of private schools – the free schools – are among the most con-
troversial. Undeniably, the average grades in the free schools are better than 
in the public schools. However, as the student population of free schools has 
a different social composition – there are more children of highly educated 
parents – the results are not comparable. A study from 2002 claimed that the 
establishment of free schools in a municipality in general led to higher average 
scores, but it was heavily questioned on methodological grounds, and in a 
revised version the results had been played down. International studies show 
mixed results: some studies from the US suggest that competition between 
private and public schools tend to raise the average scores, while studies from 
other countries show no such effects.5
PISA, a recurring comparison of the OECD countries schools, notes that 
private schools and public schools with student populations from socio-
economically advantaged backgrounds benefit the individual students who 
5  A review of the research mentioned can be found in a study by the University of Aarhus 
(Calmar Andersen & Serritzlew, 2006). This review is of interest because it tracks the 
development in the Danish school system, which has had privately run but tax-financed schools 
for nearly a century, and the effects have thus had time to stabilise. The study finds no effect 
of competition on quality, but some tendencies of rising costs and a clear tendency of social 
stratification.
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attend them, but there is no evidence to suggest that private schools help to 
raise the level of performance of the school system as a whole (OECD, 2011). 
The difficulties of comparing private and public schools has to do with dif-
ferentiated student populations, and the student population influences school 
results both according to both research and practical experience. Some effort 
has been afforded on developing methods of comparison that would correct 
these differences in student selection. The problem arises in that this neces-
sarily involves some kind of weighting. The tools can only be argued for on a 
theoretical basis but neither empirically proven nor falsified. Moreover, there 
are many ways to conduct the weighting, all of which can be theoretically 
motivated but give different results. (The problem is familiar from political 
opinion polls.)
What can be empirically stated on grounds of results in national tests 
as well as of international comparisons such as PISA or TIMMS is that the 
average results of Swedish students show a faint but steady decreasing ten-
dency since the 1990s, which is particularly apparent in mathematics. The 
reasons are naturally complex. However, it is somewhat odd that the decline 
coincides with a period that has been distinctive in the increased interest in 
pedagogical development and evaluation. The decline does coincide in time 
with two significant organisational changes: the emergence of free schools and 
the decentralisation of primary schooling to the municipalities. Both are con-
sidered to have contributed to the increased disparity between schools – that 
is, the equality of education has diminished. The differences between schools 
are still small by international standards, but the fact that they have grown is 
troubling as such. 
Free schools have clearly increased social segregation within education. 
This kind of stratification has clear negative effects for schools in socio-eco-
nomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The communalisation, the decen-
tralisation of the responsibility for schools from the state to the municipalities, 
has implied more disparity in the resources allocated for schools depending 
on differences in the municipal economy. The differences in political interest 
for school issues have possibly also played a part. The parliament has made a 
decision that the effects of the big structural changes, the decentralisation and 
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the free schools, should be evaluated in a study by the state but no inquiry has 
been yet initiated by the government.
A research review published in the fall of 2011 by one of Sweden’s biggest 
and oldest think tanks, the Centre for Business and Policy Studies (Studieför-
bundet Näringsliv och Samhälle), concludes its results:
To summarise, the consequences of increased competition are remark-
ably unexamined. The research results that do exist show neither any unam-
biguous efficiency gains nor losses in public expenses for welfare services. The 
private providers do have lower costs in several areas, but the functions are 
not comparable. Moreover, the savings usually result in higher profits for the 
producer, so it does not reduce costs for the public. In most areas there are no 
clear-cut quality gains either. The available measures on the whole indicate 
no real change in results, or the results are different depending on the study. 
(Hartman, 2011, 265, my translation.)
The studies that have been made can hence be summarised as not to give 
any credence to the theory that private companies are more efficient than 
public organisations. The studies do not show that changed mode of operation 
and competition between providers would have brought any general improve-
ments as to quality and costs. What has happened is that the supply, in partic-
ular of schools and health clinics, has increased in the more densely populated 
areas, especially areas with relatively high proportions of highly educated and 
wealthy inhabitants. This gives more choice but also drives up the costs. The 
often distorting incentives, the problems of third party financing and an insuf-
ficient regulatory framework that leave great loopholes for ‘shadow compa-
nies’ can be contributing explanations to why privatisations have not given 
particularly positive results. Today, the demands for clearer regulation and 
stronger controls are growing and a discussion about the necessity to change 
the economic incentives is on the way.
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies6 (2002, 1) stated 
already in 2002 that the 
6  The European Observatory is a cooperative including for example the WHO, The European 
Investment Bank, the World Bank and the London School of Economics.
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“experience so far indicates that entrepreneurial behaviour does not 
make for an effective health care system in an unregulated “free-for-all”. 
Supporting regulation is needed to avoid some of the dangers inherent 
in entrepreneurialism which could sacrifice the core policy objectives 
of a socially responsible health care system.”
Private profit interests and the interests of the society at large are not 
always compatible. It should be obvious that it is the social interest, not the 
private profit motive, which should be guiding all publicly financed func-
tions. This requires regulation and well designed incentives. It appears likely 
that a change of the distorted incentive structure in combination with stricter 
regulation that keeps the ‘less serious companies’ out would sort out at least 
some of the problems we have today. Cost-based compensations instead of 
fixed compensations would diminish the incentive to reduce teacher ratios in 
order to increase the profit margin. Narrower profit margins and better con-
trols would likely mitigate the risk of misallocated investments.
These changes are important and necessary. Yet they do not solve the 
problems that arise from financialisation. Nor do they solve the problem of 
profit incentive – companies going where it is most profitable – which influ-
ences where they locate geographically and the groups they address. This 
may require compensating actions for the areas and groups that are left out. 
Whether or not the gains of a well-functioning system with private providers 
really outweighs the extra costs for an expanded control system and for com-
pensating distributive measures is up for debate. However, the experiences 
indicate that the biggest possible gains are not necessarily of an economic 
nature.
Are there really grounds to expect any economic gains from privatisations 
in the first place? There is very little in the Swedish experience to support the 
thesis that private providers lower costs. There are international studies that 
point to private companies having higher productivity but other studies show 
this is not quite the case. Comparative studies on schools and health care show 
no systematic differences between countries with high proportions of private 
providers and countries with high proportions of publicly managed services. 
The PISA studies for example show no connection between school results and 
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the proportion of private schools. Finland, with a very low number of private 
schools, is at the top of the comparison while the US with a significant share 
of private schools is far below average. The health care statistics from the 
industrialised countries show that the lowest costs (as share of GDP) are in 
countries with rather high shares of publicly financed and provided care such 
as Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Countries like France and Germany, with 
more private care and compulsory insurance schemes, have somewhat higher 
costs while the US, with the most private care, has the highest health care costs 
(but hardly the best and most comprehensive care) (Dahlgren, 2010).
So it must be asked: why should private provision be better than public? 
After all, efficiency and quality are not dependent on the mode of operation 
but rather on organisation, human resources management, competent per-
sonnel, available resources and so forth. There are no magic tricks in these 
areas that are held only by the private companies: what is done well in a pri-
vate company can be transferred to public entities, and vice versa. Besides, it is 
not “only” a question of efficiency and quality. It is also a question of democ-
racy. The debate of the last few decades has been about individual choice, and 
the possibility to choose is indeed a quality the public sector should provide. 
Yet choice is never unlimited, neither in the private sphere nor in the public. 
Economic resources are always a constraint. There is never enough tax money 
to cover all expectations and wishes and therefore it is necessary to make pri-
orities. If the objective of equal access to social services of equal quality for all 
is to be achieved, politicians need to be able to ensure in an open and demo-
cratic process that everyone can influence that money is spent accordingly.
To control the distribution of tax revenue has become more difficult for 
example due to over-investment that the freedom of establishment for pri-
vate companies leads to and to the clear distortion in favour of financially 
privileged groups. In the 1980s the democratic “exit” option, the possibility to 
choose according to your preferences to use Hirschman’s (1970) terms, was 
too small. Today, the democratic part of the society that deals with “voice” – 
the common decisions about common affairs – has been forced too far into 
the background. We need a new balance!
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Markets: source of efficiency or costs? 
An analysis on the production of 
public services in Finland
jo ona S  r ahkol a
introduction
Public services are among the key mechanisms of social risk management. It 
is evident that one needs much understanding on the nature of public service 
provision and on their broader political significance in order to assess and 
evaluate the politics of social risk management comprehensively. For building 
such comprehensive account, it is at minimum necessary to understand the 
basic institutions and political characteristics of public service delivery sys-
tems addressed. Most importantly, one must understand the broader political 
role of social risk management mechanisms like public services. The purpose 
of this chapter is to discuss these basic issues in the context of public services 
provision in Finland. The chapter starts with an overview of the relationship 
between public services and one major political issue – income inequality 
– after which I will discuss the organisation and financing of public serv-
ices in Finland in more detail. Of course, income inequality as such may be 
an important topic in debates on social risk for a number of reasons. Many 
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studies have for instance found strong correlations between income equality 
and longevity or health. The purpose here is not, however, to discuss the rela-
tionships between income inequality and social risks but only to show that 
social risk management should be regarded not just as isolated mechanisms 
tackling individual social risks but as a part of broader political questions like 
equality.
Public services as Part of the income 
redistribution strategy
Income disparities have substantially increased in Finland over the past 15 
years, resulting in aggravated social inequality. While only seven per cent of 
Finns lived below the poverty line in 1995, by 2009 their share had hiked to 13.1 
per cent according to Statistics Finland.7 As worsening income inequality has 
gained considerable political attention, voices calling for a change of direc-
tion abound. In this section, I will discuss some of the mechanisms behind 
income inequalities in Finland and the means with which the problem could 
be ameliorated, focusing especially on the role public services. 
The level of income inequalities depends on three fundamental factors: 
firstly, on the number of people receiving factor income (income based on 
labour or capital); secondly, on the distribution of income between labour and 
capital; and thirdly, on income redistribution through taxation and transfers. 
When people talk about reducing income disparities, however, they often tend 
to focus only on redistribution through taxes and income transfers. Indeed, 
they play a major role. For example, the Gini coefficient8 for factor income in 
Finland in 2008 was 0.46. This figure describes the level of income inequality 
without taking into account taxes and social benefits. After taxes and wealth 
transfers the figure came down to 0.27, which is to say that taxes and benefits 
had a considerable impact.
7  The poverty line in Finland is 60 per cent of median income. 
8  The Gini coefficient measures the equality of income distribution. Smaller values mean more 
equal distribution. A value of 0 signifies total equality, and a value of 1 means that one person 
gets all the income.
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In absolute terms, the most important taxes and benefits that reduce 
income inequality include state and local income taxes, earnings-based pen-
sion, basic pension, unemployment benefits, health insurance allowances and 
income support for the poorest. In a macroeconomic analysis, redistribution 
through other tax and benefit systems is of little significance for the amounts 
thus allocated are smaller. This does not mean, however, that these other sys-
tems would not have important social impacts. Decreasing income transfers 
(in relation to income levels) and a decline in the tax system’s effectiveness to 
even out income differences have contributed to increasing income inequality 
since mid-1990s. The policy conclusion to be drawn out of this development is 
that income redistribution should be augmented and taxation should be made 
more progressive in order to decrease income inequalities.
However, a more even income distribution cannot be achieved solely by 
means of taxation and income transfers. Debates on enhancing income trans-
fers for instance largely deal with improving basic social security. Yet raising 
the Finnish basic security allowance by 100 euros per month would lead to 
a change of less than 0.02 in the Gini coefficient9. That measure alone would 
thus have only a minor effect on income disparity. This does not mean that 
the basic social security should not be raised – it most definitely should. Its 
present level does not suffice to cover even the most vital expenses of daily life 
and thus any increase would alleviate the plight of the poorest.
With regard to taxation, there is much talk in Finland about steepening 
the progression of income taxes and making taxes on capital gains progressive 
as well. Both of these are easy ways to affect income distribution, but on the 
macro level they would produce only mild changes in income inequality. For 
example in 2009 the capital gains tax brought in 1.5 billion euros in revenue 
while Finland’s national income was 179 billion. So even a radical tightening 
of taxes on capital gains would not result in substantial decreases in income 
inequality at the macro level. For the sake of fairness and social justice capital 
gains should of course be taxed progressively and with higher rates than what 
is the case today.
9  The newly elected government in Finland has announced that it will raise “basic security” 
by 100 euros in January 2012. With the term basic security the government is referring to basic 
unemployment benefit and labour market support.
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The division of factor incomes must change
In the present situation, the most effective way to reduce income disparities 
in Finland is to change the distribution of income between labour and capital. 
The first thing to consider is to make sure that wage differences do not get out 
of hand. Finland has a pretty good track record in this regard: for decades, a 
sense of solidarity has prevailed in Finnish incomes policy, resulting in excep-
tionally equal wage distribution in international comparison. 
Secondly, functional distribution, or the division of factor income between 
labour and capital income, must be reasonable. Much of the growth in income 
disparity experienced during the past 15 years can be attributed to changes 
in functional income distribution: the share of capital income (of national 
income) has gone up while the share of wages has gone down. As income on 
capital is largely concentrated among the wealthiest, any increases in its share 
will boost income inequality. The relative share of capital gains has in practice 
increased in all industrialised countries. Two common trends have contrib-
uted to this development: globalisation has weakened the bargaining power 
of wage earners, and national tax policies of most countries have followed 
similar paths. In Finland, the 1993 tax reform, which separated capital and 
labour income taxes from one another, seems to have been a major watershed.
When the tax and redistribution systems even out income disparities 
sufficiently, and income is fairly split between labour and capital, one other 
means of improving income equality remains: we must make sure that as 
many people as possible earn factor income. In practical terms this means 
that people are employed and do not need to resort to transfer payments. 
To an unemployed person, a job is a much more significant income boost 
than improvements in unemployment benefits. Therefore the most important 
means of curtailing income inequality is to get all those who are of working 
age and fit to work to work. This is where services that can ameliorate a per-
son’s possibilities in the society and the job market play a key role.
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Services and income disparity
Services provide means to increase the share of people who earn their living 
from work. When work income is the primary source of income, the need 
for income transfers is smaller and the distribution of income more equal. 
When they function as they should, social and health services balance the 
income earning possibilities of the entire population by supporting citizens’ 
capacity to work, by preventing exclusion from the job market, by helping 
those already excluded to return to work and by making it possible for all 
adults or the only adult in a family to work. Accessible, high-quality educa-
tion assures that all citizens are given equal chances to succeed in the labour 
market and earn income. Services must guarantee each person’s ability to 
function as a member of society.
Perceiving welfare services as one component of the income redistribution 
strategy is also efficient in economic terms: redistribution through taxation 
and income transfers alone is considered to create negative incentives for the 
demand and supply of labour. Such problems can be mitigated with public 
services. First of all, public services are labour intensive and thus have a direct 
impact on the demand for labour. Secondly, many public services, such as day 
care, complement and increase the supply of labour. In addition to directly 
addressing the underlying causes of income disparities, services smooth out 
differences in standards of living also by reducing social inequality caused 
by income disparities: the better individuals can satisfy their needs through 
public services outside the markets, the less their disposable income matters.
Equal schooling lays the foundation for each person’s ability to be a full 
member of society. With regard to children and the youth, the quality of the 
Finnish educational system is relatively good. The main problem is that a con-
siderable proportion of young people continue to lack adequate basic training 
– more than 10 per cent of each age cohort does not complete secondary edu-
cation. The position of these people in the labour market is often permanently 
weak and other social problems tend to concentrate among them as well, 
also later in life. Social and other problems in the family often contribute to 
a premature termination of studies. Thus a low socioeconomic status is easily 
passed on from one generation to the next. Day care plays a pivotal role in 
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identifying such problems and its role as supporter of families with children 
should be strengthened.
In theory, difficulties caused by the lack of education are easily fixed: just 
make sure that everyone receives secondary education that allows them to 
succeed in today’s job market. Standard school style learning does not suit 
all people, however. Therefore reaching the objective calls for a multiplica-
tion of different methods of learning tailored for different needs, workshop-
like activities and so on. The so-called “schooling guarantee” – making sure 
that there is a place in an upper secondary school, vocational school or some 
other education institution for all those who have completed their nine years 
of basic education – much favoured by politicians is not enough: we also have 
to see that everyone is given the necessary support to be able to advance in 
their studies. If problems at school are linked to other problems, they must all 
be addressed simultaneously.
More flexibility
Of course, income redistribution is not and should not be the main goal of all 
public services. The purpose of elderly care, for example, is simply to enable 
senior citizens to lead a dignified life. A civilised society has to provide all 
its members with the means to live in dignity, and it is clear that services are 
about a lot more than improving people’s labour market status. Moreover, 
citizens are not merely targets of the service system or passive clients who 
are provided with whatever it is the system happens to produce. In the worst 
case, when a person using public services feels like her daily life is a con-
stant struggle in the abyss of bureaucracy, the services have completely failed 
to enhance her capability to act independently. The social goals that are the 
raison d’être of services should be made more visible in their provision and 
production. For example, the objectives of social empowerment and strength-
ening people’s ability to act as members of society should be stressed more in 
all social services.
On many occasions, the need for public services is determined too late and 
too bureaucratically, often only when the need is already great. At worst, dif-
ferent problems like the lack of social capabilities, substance abuse or mental 
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health issues have already intermeshed and developed into a complex snarl by 
the time the person becomes a user of social services. At that point it is much 
more difficult to ameliorate her situation and to support social mobility than 
it would have been at an earlier stage. At the present, services are doing a par-
ticularly bad job in preventing social exclusion from the labour market and 
early intervention. All too often social services become available only when 
the problems have already developed too far. This applies to both health and 
social problems. In order to prevent such problems, persons in need should 
be reached early enough and provided with the type of service that addresses 
their problem(s). It is the service system that must show flexibility vis-à-vis 
people’s needs, not the other way around.
Social work should be directed towards people with both economic prob-
lems and the kind of social problems that make employment difficult. The 
right types of services must be provided at an early stage so that the problems 
do not become a permanent barrier to entry into the active workforce. Since 
the 1990s it has become common in Finland to support employment through 
various activation programmes. The main incentives for participating in them 
have been sanctions triggered by non-participation. While the idea itself may 
be good, such forced activation has not proved very effective in practice. The 
quality of the programmes has been anyone’s guess and their impact on real 
employment chances often negligible. In addition, people undergoing activa-
tion programmes have often experienced them as humiliating. So, at worst, 
when the targets of activation feel like they are forced to dance to bureauc-
racy’s tune, they become even more passive and suspicious of society.
Private or Public service Provision?
Privatising the provision of public services and inviting companies to tender 
are often justified with enhanced efficiency. Judging solely by short-term costs 
and quality – with the focus often heavily on the former – it may sometimes 
seem that private suppliers do a better job. Nonetheless, there exists no gen-
eralisable or universal proof of the superiority of public or private service 
provision. There are good and bad experiences of both. It usually does not 
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matter much to the user of the services whether they are being produced by 
a public or private entity.
The problem with opening public services to competition is fragmenta-
tion. Outsourcing and shopping around require detailed “productisation” of 
the services. When a person has multiple needs and no single service product 
meets those needs, there is a problem. As services are organised through pre-
determined and strictly defined products, comprehensive long-term service 
becomes more difficult. Service chains break and overall responsibility is 
obscured. Naturally these types of difficulties emerge without outsourcing as 
well, for the public sector is also perfectly capable of creating unreasonable 
service systems.
Turning services into products, opening the provision of these products 
for tender and outsourcing them take up a lot of administrative resources. 
Slashing bureaucracy is sometimes presented as a reason for privatising but in 
reality the shift towards private production of services has made their admin-
istration heavier. Procurement contracts, invitations to bid and the court 
processes related to them, and monitoring private producers all create new 
administrative responsibilities that do not exist when the services are publi-
cally produced. In some cases even the user of the service has faced increased 
bureaucracy.
Outsourcing and various purchaser-provider models require a lot of 
expertise from the buyers. They must possess complete information on the 
content and quality of the services. If this is not the case, they are buying a pig 
in a poke. All too often Finnish municipalities and their joint bodies lack ade-
quate purchasing know-how which inevitably leads to unpleasant surprises.
It is often the case that when private production is argued for on the 
basis of its lower costs compared to public production, the costs are assessed 
through a very narrow lens. In reality the costs at a single point in time tell 
nothing about the long-term evolution of the cost structure. This problem can 
be addressed by signing only short-term procurement contracts that allow for 
a re-evaluation of the situation if it changes, but this reduces predictability 
and stability, resulting in uncertain “stop-go” provision of services that does 
not benefit any of the parties concerned. Problems due to fragmentation also 
increase. Fragmentation problems can be avoided by long-term cooperation 
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between the public sector and its private contractors. There have been good 
experiences of such collaboration. Private production does not always have 
to lead to a fragmented service system.
In addition to trying to estimate what is effective and efficient, the criteria 
of “good” and “just” must also be put on the table. The development of serv-
ices and their production is ultimately about political choices. Nobody would 
disagree that the aim is to produce high-quality services with as little costs as 
possible, but how this double objective can best be achieved is not a technical 
question that can be resolved with a set of correct answers. This tends to be 
forgotten in debates on service provision. Huge and often conflicting inter-
ests are vested in the development of services. The users of the services, the 
employees providing them, private companies and many other stakeholders 
are directly affected by the choices made in the process. The needs and goals 
of different interest groups should be analysed more carefully than what has 
been done. More often than not the needs of some interest group underlie any 
proposal to improve the production of services. It is important to recognise 
this. Arguing about the superiority of one procedure over some other is point-
less unless the interests at play are identified.
Once the various interests at stake have been identified, services should 
be developed so that they best suit the needs of their users and advance the 
social goals that are their ultimate objective. All other interests are secondary. 
Service production should never be turned into an instrument of industrial 
policy, for example. Of course, it is not always easy to assess whose interests 
are ultimately served by which proposal.
Profit seeking and social goals
When reforming public services, one should be cognisant of the reasons for 
their existence and the social ends that they are meant to promote. The logic 
of the reforms must be built on this foundation. It cannot be copied from 
some other context. During the past two decades, however, there has been a 
strong tendency to develop services according to principles borrowed from 
business management and the corporate world. Efficiency gains have been 
sought by separating the purchasing and production of services. This has also 
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enabled their privatisation. In the public realm, copying micro-level incen-
tives from private companies has been perceived as a way to promote efficient 
use of resources. Such practices have originally been tailored to serve com-
pletely different ends than those of the public sector. When the models and 
measures of the private sector are used as a yardstick for public sector reforms, 
attention is easily drawn to the wrong things and not enough consideration is 
given to the social character and functions of the services. Consequently the 
role of the public sector as the guardian of the ends particular to it is blurred 
and social expertise makes way to business practices.
The operational logic of private production differs fundamentally from 
that of public production. The key question is: what is the true motivator? 
Among private actors, the answer is almost always profits. If the social objec-
tives of the services in question do not fit nicely into a company’s profit func-
tion, they are usually excluded from the company’s decision-making. It is 
extremely difficult to construct service production agreements between public 
and private actors in such a manner that they encompass the ends society 
strives to achieve through the services.
When the focus lies on profits, it is all too easy to concentrate on mini-
mising costs and maximising income and not pay enough attention to quality 
issues. One thing should always be borne in mind when contemplating dif-
ferent ways of producing services: in all circumstances the method of pro-
duction must be compatible with the quality requirements and wider social 
goals of the service. Quality control is often quite expensive. Food service in 
day care centres provides one example of this. Especially in the bigger Finnish 
cities it has been outsourced to the private sector with the hope of cutting 
costs. Indeed, the costs have often decreased, but so has quality. Finnish media 
have reported on several cases where nurseries have repeatedly run out of 
food, the food served has not been what had been ordered or the quality of 
the food has deteriorated. This type of “increased effectiveness” could prob-
ably have been achieved without outsourcing as well – although minimising 
expenses at the cost of quality is admittedly easier for profit-seeking compa-
nies.
Even though it is in practice difficult to include quality issues in corporate 
decision-making, no matter how carefully drafted the purchase agreement, 
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a common argument for privatising public service production is improved 
quality. After all, private medical clinics often have much more comfortable 
waiting rooms than public health centres, right? In reality, high quality is not 
a natural characteristic of either sector – it is the result of a sufficient amount 
of human and other resources. They may exist on both sides.
One threat posed by privatisation and market competition is that all serv-
ices may be organised and priced in such a way that committed, long-term 
efforts to promote the common good become impossible. Then we will have 
entered a greedy man’s market – the opposite of responsible public service 
provision. In order to reap the benefits that privatisation and marketisation 
yield in theory, there must be enough producers on the market. Without 
genuine competition the benefits will not materialise. Paradoxically, during 
the entire period when the role of the private sector in service provision has 
been increasing, we have been moving into the other direction. The service 
market is controlled by fewer and fewer actors. This has happened especially 
in countries where marketisation has been taken further than in Finland. In 
Sweden, for example, the care market is heavily concentrated in the hands of 
a few companies. The position of small enterprises and associations seems 
to have weakened, while large corporations account for an ever-increasing 
share of the pie. The role of institutional investors in the service market has 
also grown. Given the high yield demands they have for invested capital, the 
public sector may be turning from a promoter of social ends to investors’ 
profit machine.
To some extent, the Finnish public service provision has also been del-
egated to non-profits, especially care services for the elderly and disabled. 
Associations are not like companies, for their operational logic and objectives 
are not focused on profit: they exist to advance certain social goals or to help 
certain groups of people. Thus the social character of services is the major 
determinant of their activities. This combined with the strong expertise one 
often finds in associations usually makes them good service providers.
In a privatised service sector it is possible to seek profits by focusing solely 
on the types of services that are easy to produce. This is called ‘creaming off ’. 
Privatisation is most attractive in the services that are the most profitable, 
simplest to define and easiest to organise. Still, any mistakes that occur in 
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their provision are ultimately left at the public sector’s responsibility – the 
private producer has in any case already made its profit. Even when a service 
has been privatised, public authorities are always responsible for prevention, 
handling complications, costly specialised services and crisis preparedness. 
Maintaining them separately is often expensive and difficult to organise.
Production method and legal protection
Public and private sectors differ considerably in their ways of dealing with a 
service user who is not pleased or disagrees with the service producer. When 
problems arise, a user of a service is in a stronger position and enjoys greater 
legal protection if the service is publically produced. The activities of the 
public sector are regulated by detailed laws that are meant to reinforce pre-
ventive legal protections, avert arbitrariness, promote appropriate and pro-
fessional conduct, and prevent corruption. Regulations also cover retroactive 
legal protection and the procedures related to it. Some of this heavy juridical 
regulation admittedly smacks of unnecessary bureaucracy. 
The activities of private actors are regulated much more light-handedly. 
At best this may mean smoother practices and service, but at times of trouble 
the user of the service may have weaker legal protections and find it harder to 
get help. Lesser regulation can also mean more inequality and more possibili-
ties for abuse. In the private realm, the limits of lawful conduct are not easily 
breached: sometimes it takes even abandonment or bribery before a service 
provider must assume its responsibility.
In terms of transparency and openness, public and private provision of 
services differs considerably. More transparency is required of public actors. 
All their expenses and finances, for example, must be made public. Private 
actors do not face similar requirements, nor do they wish to disclose their 
finances in detail to the public. This is a key difference from the perspec-
tive of democratic control. Yet, outsourcing services is sometimes justified by 
increased transparency: when a particular service is purchased from a pro-
vider, the real costs of the service become visible and we know exactly what it 
is we are paying for and how much, the argument goes. However, there is no 
special link between the production or purchase method of a service and the 
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transparency of its costs. Since public finances are by definition public infor-
mation, the cost structure of a service can be determined without outsourcing.
funding
It is important to reinforce the Nordic principle of universality whereby 
all persons covered by the legislation are regarded as potential users of the 
same system and specialised services are resorted to only when special needs 
cannot be met otherwise. The ultimate goal of public services – increasing 
people’s ability and scope for action and wellbeing – must not be forgotten. 
Shared responsibilities guarantee that each one of us has a chance even when 
facing difficulties. However, it must not be forgotten either that the financing 
of public services is always subordinate to all these goals as well. 
The funding for public services may be raised by taxation, public social 
insurance or private insurance schemes. Public services can be produced pri-
vately or publically. In the Nordic models, the universal public services are 
funded primarily by taxes: everyone pays and everyone benefits. This prin-
ciple has proven its economic efficiency. Public services in the Nordic coun-
tries are generally of good quality, they have extensive coverage and their costs 
are quite moderate in relation to the benefits. High quality and universality are 
also preconditions for the broad political support they enjoy.
At the moment, the most burning financial issues have to do with health-
care. The problems of multichannel funding are widely recognised. From an 
economic perspective, the most efficient and unambiguous system would 
consist of public services funded by a single payer alongside private services 
that do not receive any public funding. It seems that taxes are the most effi-
cient means of public funding and superior to models based on public insur-
ance, for instance. In the latter, costs get more easily out of hand than in a tax-
funded system in which public authorities can directly control the supply of 
services. Public control is more difficult in insurance-based systems and can 
only be exercised by managing the range of choices offered to service users. 
This is prone to lead to bureaucratically heavy structures with rising costs. 
The best example of this is the US healthcare system. Based on private insur-
ance plans, it is extremely expensive compared to public systems. Yet a large 
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proportion of the American population had no access to healthcare before 
the most recent reforms. To some degree, continental European systems with 
their mandatory health insurances have faced similar problems of spiralling 
expenses. It would thus appear that tax-funded health systems produce rea-
sonable results with the lowest costs.
Models that shift the financial burden more upon individuals via care 
insurances or private accounts have also emerged in the funding debate. The 
resulting reductions in public responsibilities would be met by service users’ 
increased dependency on the markets and their families and friends. This 
would aggravate inequalities, undermine the insurance character of social 
security and be in direct contradiction with the mechanisms that have made 
the Nordic model such a success. In and of themselves, private accounts do 
not include any risk-sharing mechanisms. The Nordic model, on the contrary, 
is based on shared responsibility: everyone pays a share of the costs and the 
risks, no matter who they fall on, will not result in unreasonable economic 
burdens on those suffering from them. This principle has proven its economic 
and social effectiveness, and we should hold on to it. Private accounts would 
mean a step in the opposite direction.
It must be noticed that problems related to multichannel funding cannot 
be solved simply by switching to a system with only one funding instrument 
(taxes). It is also vitally important to make sure that the regulative limitations 
of and between various branches and budget articles, even when under one 
public authority, do not hinder effective provision and organisation of services. 
No public sector actor should ever face a positive incentive to juggle service 
users or costs onto other government branches or units. Within the Finnish 
tax-funded public sector, perhaps the most difficult problems have to do with 
the boundaries between state and municipal responsibilities. Sometimes these 
administrative barriers make it impossible to create sensible service systems. 
For example, municipal social and health services and the regional Centres 
for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment – charged with 
managing the regional implementation and development of state adminis-
tration – should really step up their cooperation in the provision of services 
aimed at improving people’s ability to succeed in the labour market.
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User fees
With regard to equal and universal accessibility of services, fees charged from 
users are of particular importance – fees must not create a barrier to service 
use. Compared to other Nordic countries, user fees comprise a relatively large 
part of the funding of Finnish social and health services. Take the municipal 
health services, which are of key interest due to the Finnish decentralised 
model of national public service provision. According to the Association of 
Finnish Local and Regional Authorities statistics, in 2009, they totalled 1.5 
billion euros and covered slightly over seven per cent of municipal social and 
health expenses. As a percentage of overall service production costs, user fees 
play the biggest role in day care and home services, the smallest in specialised 
medical care.
The explicitly stated policy goals of user fees are to fund services and to 
manage the way they are used. Both goals are somewhat problematic. The 
actual share of user fees in the funding of public services is quite modest. 
Although they amount to over seven per cent of the production costs, they 
do not lead to a corresponding decrease in public sector expenses. There are 
several reasons for this. The poorest people cover their user fees with income 
support. Fees paid are also included when assessing a person’s eligibility for 
care and disability allowances, thus transferring part of the payments to the 
Finnish Social Insurance Institution (Kela). So, in practice, user fees lead to 
money being moved from one public institution or budget article to another 
and do not cut public funding responsibilities as much as their nominal value 
suggests.
Likewise, the rationale for viewing user fees as instruments to shape behav-
iour is also questionable. The goal here is to decrease the use of services. This 
will inevitably worsen inequality, for low-income people will be hardest hit. 
Fees may even prevent someone from seeking a service she would need. The 
behaviour of those with higher income, on the other hand, will not change 
much because of a fee. These observations apply mainly to fixed fees but also, 
though to a lesser extent, to income-dependent fees that are used primarily 
in healthcare, institutionalised care and home services. There is empirical 
proof that user fees postpone the decision to seek treatment, which ultimately 
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increases rather than decreases costs. User fees also seem to have a consider-
able impact on health differences between different socioeconomic groups.
Service vouchers
Increased freedom to choose and efficiency gains from more market competi-
tion are often stated as benefits of service vouchers. In principle, these are sen-
sible goals: why force people to use a service decided on by a public authority 
when they might as well decide for themselves? In practice, however, the addi-
tional freedom to choose may be ostensible. If a service user does not possess 
sufficient resources to make an informed decision, the freedom is merely an 
illusion. It may be difficult for an ordinary citizen to acquire sufficient infor-
mation on the real content or quality of the services of different producers. 
Genuinely relevant information is often revealed only when the service is 
being used. In such a situation the “choice” may in fact resemble gambling. If 
you do not have luck placing your bets, it may be difficult to rid yourself of 
the consequences later on. 
Choosing the best service is especially difficult for a person who is in a 
weak condition. If not supported by able and well-informed family members 
or friends, such a person may experience this as an extra burden in an already 
difficult situation. What is supposed to increase freedom may become a man-
datory evil, another seemingly senseless bureaucratic demand. Fortunately 
the voucher systems presently in use in Finland do not allow problems to 
develop this far. It is always possible to refuse to accept the voucher, in which 
case the municipality is obliged to arrange the services needed. This seems 
somewhat inefficient. On the one hand the municipality offers vouchers and 
on the other it must maintain an alternative service system.
With service vouchers, responsibilities related to market competition are 
nevertheless shifted onto the end user. Considering that the municipalities 
purchasing privately produced services have at times had difficulties man-
aging these responsibilities, it is obvious that all service users cannot handle 
them much better. In the worst case, vouchers spell more trouble and bureau-
cratic obstacles to a user of public services.
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While individual freedom for all is a fundamental principle of a demo-
cratic society, freedom is conceived of in rather narrow terms as freedom 
to choose if all it means is that a user may choose the producer of a certain 
service. Services exist so that the freedom of those who have little of it can be 
augmented and that responsibilities are borne collectively. Reducing freedom 
to the right to choose a service provider obscures this fundamental premise.
It must be also noted here that the voucher system turns the logic of 
funding on its head. The logic of Finnish public service fees works so that 
there is a maximum amount any single user has to pay. Once the total amount 
of fees paid under a given period reach this threshold, the public sector takes 
over additional expenses. The aim of this is to guarantee equal access to serv-
ices and to make sure that each person has a real possibility to use services 
according to her needs. Vouchers work the opposite way: the public authority 
pays a certain (fixed) amount and the user’s share is the difference between 
voucher value and the real price of the service. The voucher system also scraps 
the maximum limit applied to user fees. It goes without saying that vouchers 
perpetuate inequalities in the use and accessibility of services. They move us 
closer to the demise of collective responsibility over welfare. 
Multichannel funding is widely perceived as a problem, especially in health 
services. Vouchers add another channel to the mess. In practice they resemble 
the health insurance compensations used in private healthcare. Careful anal-
ysis is needed to clarify whether we really need yet another system that sub-
sidises privatised care with public funds.
Vouchers may lead to public authorities de facto escaping their legal obli-
gations. It is easy to narrow the scope of public responsibility by letting the 
value of the voucher fall in comparison to the prices of the services it is used to 
pay for. In the longer run, vouchers may also contribute to polarisation: they 
become a form of subsidising the private treatment of people with enough 
money to go private, leaving public services to those who cannot afford any-
thing else. This would further undermine political support for maintaining 
high quality public services.
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conclusions
Extensive welfare services are an integral part of the Nordic welfare model in 
general and social risk management in particular. Besides tackling social risks, 
they promote economic efficiency by increasing and redistributing the factors 
of production available on the market. As they enable each citizen to be a full 
member of society, welfare services also contribute to social justice. When 
they function as planned, public services improve the income earning pos-
sibilities of the entire population by supporting citizens’ ability to work, pre-
venting exclusion from the labour market and helping those who have fallen 
outside the labour market to return to work. They also provide all citizens 
with equal possibilities to fulfil their basic needs outside the labour market. 
The guiding principle of any service reform must be improving the achieve-
ment of these goals.
In discussions on reforming public services, their users and broader social 
objectives often do not get as much attention as they should. As a result, serv-
ices have been developed in a system-oriented manner in line with princi-
ples and models borrowed from the private sector. These models often do 
not play well with the logic of public services. Thus many reforms have been 
mere administrative exercises, and services have become fragmented and 
service systems obscured. In worst cases, users of the services feel like they 
are fighting an increasingly inflexible bureaucratic machine.
Given all this, services must be made more flexible and user-oriented. Citi-
zens are not mere passive clients who are provided with whatever it is the 
system happens to produce. It is the system that has to adjust according to the 
particular needs of each person. This is not easily done in a system consisting 
of strictly defined service products, all produced by different actors. Some-
times even the legal protection of a service user may be put to test. Production 
methods do matter as well. Public and private service production is guided 
by completely different objectives. The production method must always be 
compatible with the social goals of the service in question. Also, the political 
and other interests underlying different methods of production must be rec-




Subversive neoliberalism and the 
financialisation of Swedish pensions: 
failure or opportunity?
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introduction
Pensions typically constitute the largest form of savings in advanced capitalist 
economies. Therefore, depending on how they are saved, invested and distrib-
uted, they often function as the key mechanisms in the institutional and nor-
mative frameworks coercing and mediating social behaviour to stabilise accu-
mulation in general and choices between saving/investing and consuming 
in particular. They are not only extremely large redistributive systems, but 
also contribute to the formation of economic subjects (Aglietta, 1998; Lipietz, 
1987). For instance, it is widely argued that post-World War II pension sys-
tems played an integral part in the construction of solidaristic “social citizen-
ship” as the key element of welfare systems (Marshall, 1950). Similarly, it has 
been argued that neoliberal pension reforms tend to support an individual-
ised, “self-responsibilising” citizenship connecting citizens to financial market 
performance, in which there is little place for norms, values and practices of 
solidarity (Harmes, 2001; Langley, 2006). 
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The Swedish ATP pension system (Allmänna Tilläggspensionen) intro-
duced in 1959 was at the heart of the construction of the “Swedish model”, 
while its successor, introduced in 1999, is central to what can be called sub-
versive neoliberalism. Subversive neoliberalism seeks to popularise values of 
private property rights and market exchange, and does so in a more discrete 
(or subversive) way than earlier neoliberal projects, championed famously by 
for example the UK Margaret Thatcher administrations. It does not aggres-
sively attack the welfare state and no longer has much public property to pri-
vatise. Instead, it channels neoliberal values, norms and practices through the 
welfare state. The most prolific process for this promotion is financialisation, 
which seeks to create interests in economic policies of low commodity infla-
tion at the same time as it promotes an attachment to price inflation on assets 
(e.g. real estate, corporate shares, etc.). Indeed, the main aim of subversive 
neoliberalism, at least in terms of welfare provision, is the normalisation of 
“asset-based welfare” (Finlayson, 2008). 
As I have argued elsewhere (Belfrage, 2008; Belfrage & Ryner, 2009), sub-
versive neoliberal aspirations lay at the heart of the 1998 Swedish pension 
reform. The aspirations of subversive neoliberalism are seemingly in direct 
opposition to the values, norms and policies underpinning the “Swedish 
Model” of solidaristic redistribution of wealth and opportunities supporting 
a perpetually rationalised export-led economy. Solidaristic values and norms 
underpinning the “Swedish Model” remained very popular when the new 
pension system was introduced (Svallfors, 1999; Rothstein, 2001). Of course, 
the Swedish model never was a finished product: it was an unfinished (albeit 
arguably quite successful) project that was in most parts reversed from the 
late 1970s onwards (e.g. Mahon, 2007). A Pension reform in the mould of 
subversive neoliberalism could be anticipated to provoke strong popular reac-
tions especially in countries like Sweden where the expansion of the welfare 
state has been central to the labour movement and the popularity of social 
democracy. 
At the time of the pension reform, Mark Blyth (2002, 246) asked what he 
called the “Swedish question”: the question about the ability of neoliberalism 
to incorporate the Swedish society into its project. Partly in response to this 
question, I have elsewhere presented two arguments concerning the pension 
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reform. Firstly, this formulation of the question seems dangerously to overem-
phasise the power of political elites and to neglect the power of social citizen-
ship. In the end, without citizens supporting the policies with their actions, 
no neoliberal order of whatever kind can emerge. Secondly, had it not been 
for the fears of the political elites concerning pension reform, there would 
have been only limited reasons for the subversive approach to the reform (in 
contrast to less subversive approaches). The subversive approach nevertheless 
requires very much political support. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the social 
democrats have often been the elite co-authors of subversive neoliberalism 
in Sweden. In other words, Social Democracy has been seeking to discretely 
subvert the attitudes, values and norms that it has itself created and benefitted 
from. This is particularly relevant in the social democratic economy par excel-
lence, Sweden. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the history of Swedish pensions, particularly 
the public pension systems, and their significance for the Swedish model and 
subversive neoliberalism, respectively. The embrace of financialisation in pen-
sion provision is, as I will argue, in the mould of subversive neoliberalism, 
which depoliticises the popularisation of private property rights and market 
exchange. The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s (Socialdemokratiska Arbe-
tarpartiet, SAP) subscription to this policy paradigm has in part undermined 
its power base and hollowed out its identity. Indeed, channelled through the 
universalist welfare state, these reforms have considerable impact, and can be 
loosely expected to reduce the SAP’s chances of re-appropriating identity and 
power base in the near future. SAP has slowly and reluctantly come to this 
realisation. Neither sponsorship of “Subversive Neoliberalism” nor the reali-
sation that it has come to hollow out the foundations for Social Democratic 
politics is specific to Swedish Social Democracy, and this paper thus contains 
potential lessons for Social Democracy more generally.
The significance of new politics of pension provision and the rediscovery 
of social democratic values promises to be of growing importance in the near 
future. The SAP’s new leader, Håkan Juholt, has, since taking the head role 
in March 2011, stated that if the other parties are not willing to substantially 
reform the pension system, he will make it a central issue to the next elec-
tions, anticipated to be held in 2014 (Sveriges Radio, 2011; see also SAP, 2011). 
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Agreeing with this statement of intent, I will argue in this chapter that a cen-
tral strategy for the SAP (and thus Social Democracy elsewhere) should be to 
focus on re-politicising the financialisation of pensions. The myths supporting 
financialisation must be revealed for Social Democracy to rejuvenate itself. 
The chapter has the following structure. Firstly, the paper outlines the 
Swedish model and demonstrates how the key policy area of pensions was 
fitted into this model. Secondly, the chapter is focused on the policy paradigm 
of financialisation in the context of pension policy and how it is linked to the 
decline of Swedish social democracy. While pension policies were central to 
the Swedish model, their reforms are of equal significance for grasping what 
subversive neoliberalism is and how financialisation has transformed the con-
ditions for social democratic politics. In the third section after the introduc-
tion, I will briefly look at the reform trajectories in this policy area to further 
illustrate this significance. Fourthly, I will discuss some of the more general 
political consequences of the process of financialisation in Sweden. Finally, I 
will conclude by arguing that what Social Democracy needs now is not poli-
cies of de-financialisation, but rather the re-politicisation of financialisation, 
not least in the policy area of pensions.
Pensions and the swedish model
The purpose of this section is to firmly establish the significance of pensions 
for the Swedish economic and social model. This will subsequently be cru-
cial for understanding how subversive neoliberalism seeks to transform and 
then make use of pensions to cultivate neoliberal values, norms and practices 
among Swedish wage-earners. Before that, however, we must briefly look at 
the Swedish history of economic policy in order to provide better under-
standing of the socio-economic role of pensions.
Pensions and the Rehn-Meidner plan
The small size of the Swedish economy made the development of an encom-
passing productive system very difficult in the post-war decades. Goods for 
mass consumption were primarily imported. Export industries were crucial 
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for balancing of the external accounts by earning foreign exchange (Mjøset, 
1987, 410). Although the domestic economy grew in significance and pro-
vided an important base in terms of production, consumption and invest-
ment during the 1950s and 1960s, foreign markets remained critical to 
Swedish industries. Indeed, “Swedish mass production and consumption 
[were] mediated by the world market” (Ryner 2002, 69). Foreign demand for 
Swedish products was high, which made the economy very dependent upon 
world markets. According to dependency theorist Samir Amin, this exposure 
does not need to result to dependency in the core economies in contrast to 
the peripheral economies. Given certain “regulatory moves”, a national eco-
nomic model could be made successful (ibid.). This idea became central to 
the Swedish post-war economic policy. 
Especially the tendency to overproduction and under-consumption had to 
be regulated through the stimulation of “domestic consumption in a manner 
which simultaneously counteracts the tendency of the organic composition 
of capital to increase” (Ryner 2002, 68). Hence the growth in productivity and 
consumption had to be made synchronous. The Swedish labour movement 
sought to ensure this synchronicity by developing a highly innovative macro-
economic model. The model, which can be positioned in between Keyne-
sianism and monetarism (see Erixon, 2002), was developed by two LO econo-
mists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, and became official LO policy in 1951. 
Put crudely, the model can be characterised as a recommendation of a 
fairly strict financial policy over business cycles in the medium-term, but as 
different from the expansionary Keynesian policies with the use of disinfla-
tionary, as opposed to Keynesianism’s inflationary, policies. These ideas were 
further combined with a selective labour market policy, which was supposed 
to enable inter-sectoral labour mobility and full employment in times of reces-
sion. Rehn and Meidner argued for a strictly solidaristic wage policy through 
central wage-bargaining in combination with taxes on corporate profits in 
order to avoid wage drift (Martin, 1984, 205–208). This sped up the structural 
transformation of the economy in favour of firms that could be internationally 
competitive while paying for solidaristic wages in firms in the less competi-
tive, sheltered industries and the public sector. The navigation between the 
Scylla of unemployment and the Charybdis of wage drift required consider-
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able capacities of counter-cyclical management, and powers over exchange 
and interest rate setting. Hence the Rehn-Meidner model depended on strict 
capital controls domestically, as well as internationally, as facilitated by the 
Bretton Woods system (Ryner, 2002, 82–91, 95–98). 
As such, the model sought to “combine full employment and growth with 
price stability and equity through the use of extensive selective employment 
programs, a tight fiscal policy and a wage policy of solidarity” (Erixon, 2000, 
1). By adopting this model in 1955, the social democrat government was able to 
combine objectives of productivity growth with socio-economic security and 
to actively integrate these in order to resolve the tensions mentioned above. 
The SAP sought to impart Swedish political life with a reformist paradigm “at 
once pragmatic and ideological, adaptable and moralistic” (Heclo & Madsen, 
1987, 27), and to appeal both to its primary LO electoral constituents and 
to Swedish capital. Moreover, it had also laid the foundation for a class alli-
ance with large segments of the middle classes. The expansion of the welfare 
system, including the pension system, was regarded as the primary means to 
secure the support of the middle classes for the model.
Welfare reform had been on top of the SAP agenda since their 1936 elec-
toral victory. A struggle between SAP minister Gustav Möller on the one hand 
and the Social Welfare Committee and LO on the other over the basic prin-
ciple of social insurance had extended over 15 years between 1937 and 1951. 
Möller, supported by the SAP, advocated flat-rate benefits while the Com-
mittee had stubbornly argued for benefits being linked to income in order 
to “uphold the standard of living as far as possible” (Lundberg & Åmark, 
2001, 165). The LO agreed with the latter in order to uphold its principle of 
‘equal work, equal wage’. A former LO representative Gunnar Sträng replaced 
Möller in 1951 and immediately embarked on coordinating a system of sick-
ness, work accident and unemployment insurance on the grounds of the prin-
ciple of income security, which also made social insurance more interesting 
for white-collar workers. Following an unproblematic legislative process, all 
social insurance systems in Sweden became subject to the principle of income 
security in the first half of the 1950s (ibid., 165–168).
A de-commodifying welfare system (see Esping-Andersen, 1985), which 
was capable of sustaining consumption levels throughout life as shielded 
117
from the extremes of cyclical market performance, was now in the making. 
For substantial de-commodification to be achieved and mass consumption 
to be sustained under the high growth conditions, however, two immediate 
policy objectives had to be met: full employment over the business cycle and 
high income-replacing pensions. Reaching the objective of full employment 
was facilitated by the creation of a manpower policy and a labour market 
board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) in 1948. In 1957, labour market policies were 
expanded by providing additional funding to the board in order to alleviate 
cyclical unemployment (Martin, 1984, 217; Pontusson, 1992, 64–65). The 
expansion of the labour market policy was politically all but controversial, 
as it was made prior to an expected minor recession in 1956–1957 and was 
expected to be partly rolled back once the recession had passed. 
In respect to pensions, the 1944 reform of the “People’s Pension” was still 
made on the grounds of Möllerian universalism. A flat-rate system replaced 
the average industrial worker’s wage by about 20% in retirement. This was 
sufficient, according to Palme (1990), to survive without having to rely upon 
poor relief. However, it hardly sustained consumption in the booming 1950s 
and 1960s. While the scheme constituted a considerable improvement for 
blue-collar workers and farmers, the white-collar workers often already had 
pension schemes – albeit limited – provided by their employers. Indeed, LO 
disagreed not only with the universalism of the reformed scheme, but with 
the continued inequalities in the retirement income between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers as well as between workers in the export-oriented and 
sheltered industries. Company pensions were not provided by a majority 
of the main employer association’s (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen, SAF) 
member firms to blue-collar workers, while the larger ones provided rather 
meagre pensions. In fact, there had been a veritable freeze on these pensions 
among SAF members, as a means to avoid competition for labour on the 
grounds of pensions (Swenson, 2002, 283–4). 
Despite the 1944 reform, the SAP had right away motioned to put together 
a commission to look into the pension issue. The resulting 1950 report pro-
posed the legislative introduction of obligatory supplementary pensions accu-
mulated in pension funds. The 1951 LO congress supported this idea and set 
up a LO committee to study possible designs of a supplementary system and 
118
political strategies of its implementation. While there was a near consensus 
in the committee on the design of the supplementary system, there were sig-
nificant disagreements over whether to seek a legislative solution or a bargain 
with SAF to the issue. Also SAF was divided on the issue. Like the centre-
right parties, SAF was especially critical of the funding mechanism. (Stråth, 
1998; see also Swenson, 2002, 284–290.) Despite the ambivalence of the labour 
market forces, supplementary pensions became an issue of highest strategic 
importance to Swedish politics. Neither the contours nor the functionalities 
of a policy model resembling the Rehn-Meidner model had been popularly 
established, so the field was still laid open for struggle over the general direc-
tion of economic development.
The birth of the national earnings-related pension scheme
Without going into any specific details of political struggles behind the birth 
of the national earnings-related pension scheme, the SAP-LO suggestion was 
to retain the People’s Pension and complement it with a large and obliga-
tory pay-as-you-go (PAYG) defined benefit (DB) system guaranteed by the 
state. The SAP-LO proposal was not only attractive to blue-collar workers 
but also to white-collar workers who were also affected by the employers’ 
varying commitment to company pensions. With Fordist Taylorism affecting 
this latter group of workers as well, its status had dropped rendering the dis-
tinction between blue and white-collar workers increasingly hard to make. 
(Stråth, 1998, 34, 45–46.)
Rehn, the LO economist, had played an active part in the formulation of 
the proposal and had advocated the accumulation of large pension funds with 
employer pension contributions, the so-called AP Funds (Allmänna Pensions-
fonderna), to serve as buffers in a future PAYG DB system. In its initial phase, 
the funds were supposed to function as a mechanism for squeezing profits 
and hence preventing wage drift. The AP funds were also supposed to provide 
the credit market with investment capital for selected sectors and firms, and 
would as such contribute to the rationalisation of the economy (Pontusson, 
1984). The design, in accordance with the Rehn-Meidner model, was finan-
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cially restrictive in order to contain inflation (Erixon, 2002, 9), while pro-
moting rationalisation as well as growth (Ryner, 2002, 90). 
The SAP-LO proposal won by one vote and soon SAF turned to support 
the new earnings related scheme ATP – to the great surprise and dismay 
of the centre-right political parties (Swenson 2002, 282). The ATP scheme 
was financed through employers’ and self-employed contributions, and was 
initially managed by three tripartite ‘AP-funds’ (Pontusson, 1984). Given a 
required working life of 30 years, it was designed to reward employees with a 
pension roughly equivalent to 60 per cent of their 15 highest salaried working 
years (the so-called 30/15 principle) (Palme, 2005, 43). The system was gradu-
ally introduced as it was built up, and the ‘ATP-pensioners’ of 1979 were the 
first to receive full benefits. In addition, the People’s Pension brought income 
replacement to the level 65 per cent of the highest salaries (Swenson, 2002, 
281). Moreover, following a series of increases and streamlining of company 
pensions, 90 per cent of wage-earners could expect a sizeable addition to 
this replacement ratio (SOU, 2005, 54). Such highly de-commodifying system 
built on the basis of income replacement was rather attractive to the white-
collar middle classes.
After the SAP victory in the 1960 election, the ATP system would not be 
seriously challenged until the 1980s. The ATP system became the symbol for 
labour’s increasingly unified struggle and power, and may be characterised as 
a breakthrough for Swedish Social Democracy (Pontusson, 1992, 79). The SAP 
also captured a substantial new constituency of white-collar workers through 
the pension struggle. As Heclo and Madsen (1987, 27) argue, social demo-
crats “captured the idea of the nation – they […] successfully interpreted the 
national identity as one of an ever-reforming welfare state”. Indeed, the pen-
sion system provided the glue that put a lid on conflict in the Swedish society. 
As LO and SAP were moving to assign the AP funds to tripartite boards, and 
as SAF had already become convinced of the ATP system, the centre-right 
parties also turned towards acceptance of the creation (and growth) of the 
AP-funds following the unsuccessful 1960 elections. 
The AP funds became “a natural [and normal] component of the mixed 
economy” (Pontusson, 1984, 10) and became incorporated into the structures 
of the hegemonic LO-SAP accumulation strategy to ensure its sustainability. 
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This was, however, facilitated by the labour movement’s recognition of the 
“free market” as “the most efficient mechanism to allocate capital within the 
private sector”, and the value of business collaboration in order to transform 
AP fund “pension savings into productive investments” (ibid., 94). The ATP 
system served to support the growth model mostly by enhancing the regula-
tory capacities of the credit system. In particular, the AP funds eased signifi-
cant policy conflicts within the Rehn-Meidner model. 
There was no guarantee that the two chief objectives of the Rehn-Mei-
dner model – ensuring adequate investments for full employment and profit 
squeeze to counter wage drift (or promote wage equality and union cohesion) 
– could be achieved at the level of wage agreements. Macroeconomic policy 
was supposed to reduce the tension between these objectives, but it required 
favourable structural conditions that eroded as the Fordist growth trajectory 
was being progressively exhausted. To reduce this tension, the bank-centred 
credit system was strictly regulated to minimise the cost of credit for pro-
ductive capital at the same time as facilitating capacities to pursue effective 
macroeconomic policy (Pontusson, 1992, 70–83). The regulations also covered 
foreign exchange and credit controls, with penalty rates for excessive bor-
rowing from the Central Bank. It also covered the so-called Investment Funds 
with which corporations could avoid corporate taxation on profit and enjoy 
favourable depreciation allowances through deposits at the Central Bank. 
Liquidity could be regulated that way without resorting to high and vari-
able interest rates, and assets held in the Investment Funds were released to 
the corporations in recessions in accordance with counter-cyclical principles. 
As the ATP system was slowly maturing, the AP funds came to play an 
increasingly important role in these functions. Since they were financed 
through employers’ contributions, set to generate surpluses, they contributed 
to the profit squeeze that counteracted wage drift. Simultaneously, they made 
credit available for private as well as public investments. The three AP funds 
were only allowed to invest in bonds and could not purchase shares in corpo-
rations. Corporations could re-borrow 50 per cent of the fees that they paid 
into the system, provided that a commercial bank took the risk of these ‘ret-
roverse loans’. This reflected converging interests between the welfare state 
complex in having ample access to cheap credit for public investments and 
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the Swedish financial circles, who did not want to see a competing centre of 
corporate control emerging under labour inclusive tripartite auspices. 
A certain kind of growth regime was emerging and the ATP pension 
system played an absolutely central role in its regulation. Given the profit 
squeeze requirement for solidaristic wage policy, LO’s growing preference in 
AP fund investments was to work along the principles of the Rehn-Meidner 
model. These funds had already started to play a significant role in urbanising 
the economy by funding large parts of the mass housing programme (Mil-
jonprogrammet) started in 1965, as well as by lending to the corporate sector. 
A hegemonic social democratic societal paradigm was established around a 
project of modernisation and growth, which was to guide subject-formation 
during the ‘golden age’ of “the Swedish Model”. As Jenson and Mahon (1993, 
79) argue, there are times when there is a relative societal consensus about the 
names of actors, their interests, and the political spaces they inhabit. Debates 
occur but the voices heard are those that speak the hegemonic language, even 
if in their own ‘dialect’. 
the decline of the swedish model and the 
emergence of subversive neoliberalism
The period from 1970 to 1999 saw the decline of the “Swedish model” and the 
emergence of subversive neoliberalism. This section will discuss the political-
economic developments from the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971, which marked the end of a period of remarkable productivity growth 
and welfare state expansion in Sweden, to the explicit enforcement of subver-
sive neoliberalism in the following decades, and firmly situate pensions as a 
crucial feature in these developments. The discussion requires a short revisit 
to the formative thinking of the previously so successful construction of the 
Swedish Model in the post-1970s crisis years. Perhaps the most important 
aspect in these debates is the changing attitudes to finance within the labour 
movement.
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Pension reforms and social democrats
In a sense, the decline of the Swedish model can be directly traced back to 
the position and actions of the SAP. The support from Swedish capital for the 
project of dismantling the model was ambivalent but secure as long as profit 
rates could be sustained (Swenson, 2002). The support from collaborating 
political parties was similarly ambivalent. In the first instance, support was 
subject to political consensus because there was some degree of agreement on 
the necessity of the Swedish model, which SAP was uniquely positioned to 
manage. In the last instance, however, the model was only coercively ensured 
through SAP’s potential ability to mobilise power resources to enforce it. The 
power of SAP had become institutionalised constitutionally by the creation 
of an Upper House conserving Social Democratic power and electorally by a 
disproportionality principle that provided the SAP with a very beneficial seat-
to-vote ratio (see Immergut & Jochem, 2006). This enabled the SAP to typi-
cally cherry-pick support from any possible ally when necessary.
The late 1960s presented a number of challenges to SAP and its ability to 
rely on the Swedish model. Firstly, the turbulence created by US hegemonic 
decline at a global level – not least evidenced by the suspension of the dollar-
gold convertibility and thus the international fixed exchange rate system in 
1971 – enabled financial markets to release its speculative “animal spirits” and 
exploit price movements. Secondly, price hikes in primary goods (especially 
crude oil) markets in the 1970s contributed to an extended period of com-
bined stagnation and inflation (“stagflation”) in the world economy. Thirdly, 
the competitiveness of Swedish businesses was in decline. The reason for this 
decline can be derived from stagflation and reduced demand for Swedish 
products, from growing competition from German and Japanese corpora-
tions, and from the absence of sufficiently effective mechanisms in the Swedish 
model to secure the investment capital necessary to continue the rationalisa-
tion process and thus sustain profit rates in key Swedish corporations. With 
profit rates under threat, capital’s support for the Swedish model was falling 
away. Fourthly, cracks within the labour movement had started to grow as sig-
nificant parts of it had become radicalised partly in response to the decline of 
US hegemony. The SAP was increasingly seen as a “state management party”, 
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which had lost its radical ambitions to democratise the economy both at the 
workplace and in terms of ownership. It was further facing accusations of 
being a “chauvinist” party that prevented women from liberating themselves 
by obstructing their entry onto the labour market (Jenson & Mahon, 1993).
In its response to these challenges, the SAP “policy-fumbled” and lost its 
(near-)monopoly on government, and with that the “Swedish model” started 
to crumble. The quest for new funding mechanisms took a radical turn in the 
famous wage-earner fund struggle. Responding to the radicalisation of the 
labour movement as well as to electoral challenges from the political Centre 
for the SAP’s white-collar support, the labour movement proposed a radical 
move towards “economic democracy”, combining long-standing ambitions for 
more decision-making power with an acceleration of the business rationalisa-
tion process. The centrepiece of this strategy was the wage-earner initiative, 
or the Meidner Plan. The Meidner Plan devised new branch rationalisation 
funds and assigned the tripartite AP Funds with a significant role in the acqui-
sition of up to 49% of the stock of Swedish corporations and for the expan-
sion of the selective and rationalising investment strategy at the core of the 
Swedish model. However, the plan received heavy criticism from within the 
SAP, which divided the labour movement. It also served to radicalise Swedish 
capital, springing into motion an ambitious, and ultimately successful, neo-
liberal counter-hegemonic project seeking to undermine Meidner Plan and 
divide a labour movement which it saw as too radical, as its decision-making 
powers and share of future profits were challenged (see Stråth, 1998). 
The much-diluted policy package that resulted from the initiative pro-
vided a very limited boost of investment capital. It certainly did not satisfy 
a radicalised labour movement, and the cracks grew even wider making the 
mechanisms for the mobilisation of power resources weaker. Potential con-
sensual support from the centre-right was effectively cut by the struggle. It 
had also turned Swedish capital against the SAP with employers’ organisations 
mobilising to respond to the radicalisation of labour. Any coercive power to 
enforce support had been removed by the 1970 electoral reform, which com-
pletely removed the Upper House and weakened SAP’s seat-to-vote ratio by 
making the system more proportional (Immergut & Jochem, 2006). This fur-
ther weakened the party’s ability to ensure a degree of peace in labour market 
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relations while national wage-bargaining started to lose its disinflationary 
potential. Global stagflation that hit the Swedish export-industries in 1975–
1976 had not helped either. The SAP’s hegemonic position and its managerial 
confidence were rapidly being swept away. 
Swedish Neoliberalism
The 1976 election of a Centre-Right government (1976–78) and the subsequent 
three Centre-Right governments’ (1978–1982) set the stage for the emergence 
of neoliberalism (Ryner, 2002). The 1979 government, strongly supported by 
SAF and led by the neo-liberalised Moderate Party (Ljunggren, 1992, 393–
400), initially continued the “policy fumbling” but soon, controversially, 
adopted austerity measures, embarked upon the retrenchment of the pen-
sion system and devalued the currency in order to tackle the growing deficit. 
It came into conflict with the labour unions over growing unemployment, 
wage and welfare policy (Mjøset, 1987, 448). The Swedish version of neolib-
eralism became most visibly accommodated in the late 1970s, although not 
unambiguously, by the political party Moderates (Moderata Samlingspartiet, 
MP) (Ljunggren, 1992). Enjoying firm support from “radicalised capital”, it 
aggressively attempted to strengthen private property rights and “free market 
mechanisms” by reference to a “there is no alternative” (TINA) rhetoric. It 
especially targeted sectors, policies and regulations that “distorted” the price-
setting mechanisms of the market. Inspired by the monetarist economics of 
Milton Friedman, budgetary deficits and inflation were constructed as public 
enemies number one and two (Grassman, 1986, 59–67; Sverenius, 1999) and 
social democrats and particularly the labour unions represented as the main 
culprits. 
The failure to counter the rising neoliberal powers by turning more rad-
ical through the wage-earner fund initiative led to growing divisions within 
the labour movement and the SAP itself. In the early 1980s, sociologist and 
welfare state doyen Esping-Andersen (1985) stated that Social Democracy 
had come to face unprecedented challenges from within in the form of the 
decomposition of the welfare state and from without with the rise of East 
Asia. Without a phenomenal economic upswing, he claimed, the only hope 
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was a new highly investment-intensive export growth strategy coupled with 
rationalisation policies targeting accumulation regimes and welfare systems. 
No upswing followed. Instead the labour movement (including its represent-
atives in the government) soon came to learn about the disciplinary impact 
of rapidly growing and mobile investment flows on globalising and inno-
vating financial markets. Social democratic politics were severely punished 
by these flows and subject to the ideological critique from the New Right with 
policy fumbling and internal divisions. The labour movement became divided 
between the radically utopian and the cautiously pragmatic, between the neo-
classical and the Keynesian, between the public sector and the exporting sec-
tors, between the city and the periphery, and so forth. 
A defensive strategy of sustaining and modernising welfare systems 
became the policy goal for social democrats but only secondary to the impera-
tive of satisfying financial market forces through fighting inflation and cutting 
public expenditure. SAP returned to government in 1982, and the new Finance 
Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt gathered an influential group of young economists 
who in opposition to the previously dominant Keynesians were inspired by 
Friedmanite ideas. During the formulation of the Swedish “Third Way”, this 
group of economists played a central role in policy-making (Feldt, 1991). Key 
neoliberal ideas thus came to be diffused into Swedish Social Democratic poli-
tics. For example, fighting inflation through “rules-based monetary policy” 
became a fundamental tenet of the intellectual framework of the group (Lind-
vall, 2009, 719) – even though inflation was in Sweden, on aggregate, far from 
exceeding the OECD average at that time. This conviction was consolidated 
not only by the famous “U-turn” in monetary policy by the French Socialist 
Mitterand government in 1982, but also by SAP’s own difficulties in setting 
discretionary monetary policy upon its return to the government later that 
year. 
In contrast to the traditional profit-squeezing policies of the SAP and 
LO, increased corporate profits were now considered necessary to boost pro-
ductivity and competitiveness in order to reinstate employment and equity 
– a fact presented as something that “the labour movement of today has to 
accept!” (Bergström et al., 1981, my translation). These new ideas resulted in 
tensions within the labour movement, within the SAP leadership, between the 
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unions and the party, and in between different ministries (Lundberg, 2003, 
234). Modernisation of welfare systems became the misnomer for subtle wel-
fare retrenchment, and the issue of pensions was positioned at the centre of 
this over-arching discussion.
Amidst cutbacks, austerity measures and overall language of ‘economic 
realism’, the symbolic significance of the ATP system was exemplified when 
the SAP vowed to restore the guarantee of the pension value in order to ensure 
the support of the rank-and-file social democratic voter. As Lundberg points 
out, it is in this context extraordinary to find the retained, if not strength-
ened, commitment to the values underpinning the ATP-system. The bour-
geois government’s removal of the guarantee was framed as a clear assault on 
the principle of de-commodification. At a special session on social insurance 
and pension provisions at the 1981 SAP party congress Sven Aspling, a top 
member of the SAP, referred to the ATP-system as the greatest institution of 
social security of the time, ‘the jewel in the crown’ of the Swedish system of 
redistribution (Lundberg, 2003, 118). 
While the foundations for the neoliberalisation of Swedish Social Democ-
racy had been rolled out, pensions were still defended. As Svallfors (1989) 
argues, the welfare state funded by high taxes was an unchallenged and sig-
nificant part of Swedish daily life still in the 1980s, and pensions were a cen-
tral part of it. From the perspective of social democrats, the ATP system was 
central to the ideological power of SAP. While other supposedly costly his-
torical commitments were to be profoundly questioned in the name of eco-
nomic realism in order to clean out the state budget, pension provisions were 
to be guaranteed at any cost in the early 1980s. The cost of restoring the ATP 
system was considered independently from the threats and fears expressed in 
the context of the precarious economic situation. Undeniably, “at the congress 
pensions were made into a kind of yardstick for the party’s continued adher-
ence to Social Democracy” (Lundberg, 2003, 120; my translation).
SAP would have seriously struggled to return to power in 1982 without the 
credibility in restoring income and pension security after the elections. How-
ever, the focus on pension security proved to be a mixed blessing for the social 
democrats. The Swedish currency, the Krona, was devalued immediately after 
the 1982 elections, which made the restored value guarantee of pensions a 
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quite slender compensation. In 1984, a parliamentary commission was set up 
by the SAP government to review the ATP system following the identification 
of a new, burgeoning threat to the welfare state – the rapidly aging population. 
The ATP system was also losing its significance as a mediating mechanism in 
the economy, particularly in relation to the supply of investment capital. As 
wages were failing to keep up with price developments, the credit provided 
by the AP Funds to the economy was shrinking relative to other sources of 
investment capital (Pontusson, 1984, 64–65). The market for bonds through 
which the AP Funds was issuing credit had become less significant with the 
growth of other financial markets. The defeat in the wage-earner fund struggle 
also effectively ruled out collectively owned equity as a policy option. Indeed, 
pensions were becoming a costly, risk-prone and economically less vital polit-
ical issue than before. 
The SAP government’s reply to the calls for increased private equity sav-
ings in the 1980s was the launching of the tax-exempted Public Savings 
Scheme (PSS) campaign (Allemanssparandet) after the elections. The centre-
right government had sought to increase private equity savings through the 
Tax Fund (Skattefond) initiative already the previous year. Prior to these ini-
tiatives, Swedish households had a relatively limited degree of savings (Klev-
marken, 2006). Combined, however, these initiatives led to a mass popularisa-
tion of private saving forms, which continued in the 1990s (Grip, 2001). While 
the different initiatives were part of the political struggle between the SAP and 
the neoliberal alliance, together they represented the burial of any meaningful 
wage-earner fund initiative. This can also be seen as the point from which 
LO became increasingly marginalised from the processes of economic policy 
making. The neoliberal Tax Fund initiative was a weapon against LO and the 
SAP’s PSS campaign symbolised a break in the relationship between SAP and 
LO (Jonsson & Lounsbury, 2004, 27–35). 
SAP lost both the 1976 and 1979 elections partly due to its continued sup-
port for the wage-earner fund campaign. The encouragement of household 
equity savings through PSS estranged the increasingly neoliberal SAP from 
the radical elements within the labour movement and distanced it from the 
idea of wage-earner funds when returning to power in 1982 (Feldt, 1991). Fur-
thermore, the boom in private retirement savings was causing worries about 
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the ability of the ATP pension system to survive the competition (Dagens 
Nyheter, 1982). By encouraging private equity savings, an even larger part of 
the wage-bill was transferred to corporations. This change was underpinning 
the Swedish ‘third way’. It meant the replacement of the Rehn-Meidner mod-
el’s combination of efficiency and equity with a neo-classical outlook empha-
sising the dual commitment to price stability and efficiency. 
Growing tensions between SAP elites and LO, however, undermined solid 
support for the Third Way, and the SAP used pension policy to reassure LO 
voters. Following SAF’s move to stop central bargaining on wages, SAP put 
pressure on LO to restrain wages, even though the weakened control over 
wage-setting would render LO incapable of preventing wage-drift effectively. 
As a consequence, LO took “a less cooperative stance with the state”. (Blyth, 
2002, 221–222.) As the 1982 devaluation turned out unnecessarily sizeable, 
import inflation added to the “distributional anxieties” of an increasingly iso-
lated LO. In a situation where the state was seen by labour to be abrogating 
its commitment to equality and universalism with its new distribution policy, 
where the burden of the solidarity wage and increased import costs fell all 
the more heavily on the unions, and where business were seen to be reaping 
profits from what LO perceived as a zero-sum redistribution, the unions 
started to turn against the ‘third way’ (Blyth, 2002, 222). 
The increasing antipathy of the labour movement towards the social dem-
ocrats resulted in the so-called War of the Roses (Rosornas Krig) between the 
SAP government and LO. SAP had slowly moved towards the political centre 
and emerged now more distant from LO and closer to the neoliberal ideas of 
the centre-right parties. Given the fear of workers’ disaffection before the 1985 
elections, finance minister Feldt nevertheless went ahead reluctantly with a 
compensation to pensioners for the reduction in pensions that the excessive 
devaluation had caused (Svensson, 2001, 55). Again, the SAP commitment 
to the ATP pension system helped to re-elect the party even when it had 
increasing tensions with the labour movement.
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The financialisation of Swedish economy and pension provision
Financial intermediaries created by the large commercial banks and oper-
ating beyond the organised credit market (“disintermediation”) emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s for the purpose of circumventing the regulations of the 
Swedish Central Bank. High-profit engineering firms like ASEA, Alfa-Laval 
and Volvo had turned to the creation of financial subsidiaries in order to 
reduce their dependency upon their ‘house banks’ (Olsen, 1991, 128). The SAP 
governments in the mid- to late 1980s saw no alternative to a liberalisation of 
the financial system, thus undermining any remaining labour union control 
over investments. The financial lobby emerged as highly influential in this 
policy process (Svensson, 2001, 254–270). Policies ensuring financial liber-
alisation at macro (monetarism, central bank independence, credit and cap-
ital controls), meso (principles and values of shareholder value) and micro 
levels (“embedding” everyday life/households in processes of financialisation 
through housing, saving/investment/consumption/credit and welfare policy 
reform, including pension reform) were introduced during the 1980s and 
early 1990s largely under social democrat leadership. Liberalisation was sup-
posed to increase investment capital flowing into the economy and thus to 
relieve the state and corporations from financial market exposure, responsi-
bility and budgetary burdens.
The centre-right government of 1991–94, led by Carl Bildt of the neoliberal 
Moderate Party and strongly supported by SAF, sought for further neolib-
eral restructuring. Indeed, the Bildt government constructed the most radi-
cally neoliberal discourse witnessed so far in Sweden. Neoliberal social forces 
openly targeted what remained of the ‘Swedish model’ with a discourse of 
‘no alternative’. Union interference with the economy, the welfare state and 
the politically dependent central bank were blamed for the economic crisis. 
Immediately after the government had come to power, businesses were called 
upon to exit tripartite cooperative forms indefinitely. (Blyth, 2002, 228–230.) 
SAF drew up “a detailed plan for the complete privatization of the welfare state 
by the turn of the century” (Pestoff, 1991, 153). These goals were justified on 
the grounds of market efficiency and consumer choice, resulting in the estab-
lishment of public-private mixes. As private solutions were primarily made 
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accessible to the affluent, a two-tier system of welfare provision was becoming 
a fact (Blomqvist, 2004). This indeed increased private savings rates in general 
(Pettersson, 1993, 26), and in particular raised equity ownership up to 60 per 
cent of the savings stock by 1994 (Fondbolagens Förening, 2004). The finan-
cialisation of everyday life was thus gaining rapid momentum. 
The early 1990s also saw the emergence of a more subtle, indeed subver-
sive, form of neoliberalism. Just like TINA neoliberalism, subversive neo-
liberalism seeks to popularise values of private property rights and market 
exchange. Growth is understood as driven by global financial markets who 
reward and discipline economic agency. Yet subversive neoliberalism does 
so more discretely than the TINA version by not targeting the welfare state 
aggressively. Instead, it makes use of the welfare state to promote neoliberal 
values, especially “financialisation”. This has typically been combined with the 
knowledge-based growth model (Jessop, 2006; Van Apeldoorn, 2009).
This is by no means less effective a strategy particularly in the context of 
the Swedish model where the welfare state is universalistic, thus affecting the 
whole of society. On the contrary, Sweden is an extremely fertile environment 
for subversive neoliberalism – especially when undertaken and defended by 
social democrats. In the full belief that there is no alternative and continuing 
to play the role of state manager, Social Democracy becomes both the admin-
istrator and the defender of neoliberalism. Its sponsorship of the 1998 pension 
reform is a significant example here (Lundberg, 2008). 
While several key initiatives of the early 1990s can be seen to be in the 
mould of subversive neoliberalism – including EC membership (see e.g. Bieler, 
1999, 2003) – I here focus only on the key initiative of pension reform. The 
ATP pension system, which already in the mid-1980s had become regarded as 
a stumbling block to the “international process of deregulation and increased 
financial sophistication” (SNS Konjunkturråd, 1986, 73) driven by neoliberal 
forces, was identified as the main target in the privatisation of the welfare 
system. Pension reform was understood as critical for the deepening of finan-
cialisation. The discursive construction of an aging population became abso-
lutely fundamental to the achievement of this objective. Upon the elections 
in 1992, the centre-right government, firmly supported by a grand coalition 
of three centre-right parties and SAP, set out to replace the existing public 
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pension system with a completely new system. However, with its voter cred-
ibility so closely associated with the historical values embedded in the old 
system of substantial redistribution and income security, the co-sponsoring 
SAP insisted that the new system to be represented as commensurate with 
such values. This could be done quite convincingly because the new system 
bore some resemblance to the old one apart from a new funded element. Still, 
undoubtedly, the new system introduced in 1999 differs radically from the old 
system (Lundberg, 2008, 16).
The new pension system is a hybrid, three-pillar system. The first pillar is 
constituted by the means-tested and tax-financed Guarantee Pension (Garan-
tipension), which replaced the universalist People’s Pension (Folkpensionen) 
of the old system. While the People’s Pension was provided as a solid founda-
tion to all pensioners, the Guarantee Pension only kicks in for those whose 
pensions do not reach the Social Assistance threshold levels of subsistence. 
Moving away from universalism towards residualism is a typical feature of 
(neo)liberal welfare systems. 
The second pillar is constituted by the Income Pension (Inkomstpen-
sionen). Accumulating over the duration of working life and rewarding dis-
proportionately work in the years immediately preceding and after standard 
retirement age of 65, the Income Pension strongly incentivises a relative exten-
sion of working life. As such, it also standardises expectations of the length of 
working life with no, or limited, consideration of work demands. Moreover, 
demands on intergenerational solidarity are reduced as there is an automatic 
adjustment process relating to size and longevity of age cohorts. Such an auto-
matic balancing mechanism also attaches to economic growth (Bromsen, or 
“the brake”), which adjusts benefits to economic growth. Altogether, this new 
second pillar is no longer intended to provide a normal standard of living, but 
rather to add insecurity and thus incentivise to increased private savings levels 
and engagement with the funded third pillar of the system. 
The third pillar of the system is arguably the most controversial one in the 
new system. A seventh of pension contributions, or 2.5 per cent of total indi-
vidual annual earnings, goes towards building pension savings through the 
fully actuarian Premium Reserve System (Premiereservsystemet, PRS). The 
PRS exposes individual pensions directly to financial market performance. 
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Thus a central objective of its introduction is the normalisation of financial 
market participation. Pension savers can choose up to five among 750 to 800 
trust funds operating in accordance with conventional commercial criteria. 
This “opportunity” is intended to incentivise pension savers to learn how to 
choose and manage portfolio investments. This process is managed by the 
Premium Pension Authority (Premiepensionsmyndigheten, PPM), which con-
structs perceptions of risk levels and provides information about individual 
pension accounts. It has also actively sought to discourage relying on the pas-
sive, index-tracking default fund, which manages the savings of those who do 
not “take advantage” of the fund choice. 
All in all, the direct form of financialisation that the PRS ensures, com-
bined with the intended inadequacy of the other two pillars, spells a highly 
significant qualitative shift toward re-commodification in Sweden. Moreover, 
redistribution is kept to a bare minimum. Combined with the financialisation 
of all supplementary pension schemes since the early 1990s, pensions now 
rather contribute towards than against the increase in inequality (Svenska 
Dagbladet, 2007). Risks have been radically redistributed from the state and 
employers to the individual level with relatively lower employers’ fees. The 
automatic balancing of the system with the introduction of “the brake” in 
the second pillar and the “actuarianism” in the third has sought to remove 
pensions from political arenas. Finally, further weakening scope for political 
intervention, any corporatist steering of investments in the PRS system is 
effectively undermined as a consequence of the fragmentation of investment 
decision-making. 
As I have argued with Magnus Ryner elsewhere (Belfrage & Ryner, 2009), 
the 1999 pension reform represented a significant dilution of social democratic 
principles in a number of respects. Firstly, and most significantly, the reform 
represents a significant degree of re-commodification, because pension savers 
become increasingly dependent on a market-determined cash nexus. This was 
so because, contrary to the old ATP system, the new Income Pension did 
not – and this was deliberate in the policy – guarantee a normal standard of 
living, hence making the pension saver dependent on the purely actuarian and 
market-oriented PRS as well as additional voluntary savings. Secondly, the 
universal and flat-rate People’s Pension was replaced by the means-test based 
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Guarantee Pension, introducing a significant element of stratification. In addi-
tion, the increased reliance on highly capitalised security markets has divested 
the pensions system of any potential role in corporatist steering.
Arguably, the Swedish pension reform is not a new type of pension for-
mula, but rather a novel pension policy instrument designed to obscure the 
shift in underpinning values and norms from typically oppositional actors 
in the electoral base, particularly the labour and pensioners’ organisations 
(Cichon, 1999, 1; Myles & Pierson, 2001; Lundberg 2003). Indeed, the Swedish 
pension reform was a distinct elite project under the auspices of a coalition 
of the main political parties very much including the social democrats, who 
excluded such organisations from the design process and kept the opportuni-
ties for public debate small (Lundberg, 2003). The adoption of the new system 
is intended to generate “a new ‘zeitgeist’” in the economy (Cichon, 2005, 1). 
Risk sharing and collectively agreed norms of fairness are done away with 
and replaced by risk privatisation and “actuarial fairness” (World Bank, 2001, 
1; Lundberg, 2003).
Shortly after the legislation of the reform, the social democrats returned 
to office in 1994, drawing on traditional social democratic imagery to repre-
sent itself as the defender of the welfare state. Successful in this endeavour, its 
return was “interpreted in Sweden as […] a fierce determination among the 
voters to protect the extensive welfare system, which came under sustained 
attack during Bildt’s tenure” (Blyth, 2002, 236). Using a very different, some-
times seemingly radical, language to legitimate its policies, SAP nevertheless 
rerouted neoliberalism onto a more clearly subversive neoliberal path. This 
based on a new discourse celebrating notions of human capital and the rational 
investor in the new knowledge-based economy as rendering the critique of 
capitalism unnecessary with labour now endogenously owning the means of 
production and capable of rational financial management (Andersson, 2007). 
Soon, the role of the state was reconceived as the so-called social invest-
ment state (Giddens, 1998; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003b), with which secu-
rity was redefined to refer to the capacity to face risks in the market, not 
protection from such risks. The social investment approach has involved 
the ‘disciplinisation’ of labour through the promotion of flexible labour (qua 
labour markets, e.g. flexicurity) and financialisation of everyday life. The new 
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attitudes and practices required by labour were even sometimes represented 
in terms of play: continuous learning, flexibility and adaptability like when 
playing with LEGO. Like with LEGO, the attitudes and practices required 
to play in life have now to be learnt intuitively – that is, without any direct 
public investment and by incentivising individuals to activate themselves and 
to build up human and social capital (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003a, 15). 
the consequences of financialisation for social 
democratic Politics: rePhrasing the swedish question
The Swedish party political convergence around the objective of a finance-led 
knowledge-based economy emerged around a symbiotic relationship between 
finance-led growth (see Boyer, 2000), active labour market policy and “mod-
ernised” welfare systems with a cultural ethic of self-responsibilisation. The 
pension reform arguably set the tone for subversive neoliberalism in Sweden. 
Yet it is far from clear whether Subversive Neoliberalism has been successful 
in universalising neoliberal norms and values, and thus in undermining social 
democratic politics in the future. Blyth’s (2002, 246) ‘Swedish question’ – “will 
the lack of public support for neoliberal ideas and the policies they augur 
prevent their consolidation or will such an order be constructed despite the 
wishes of the majority?” – is in a dangerous manner potentially overstressing 
the power of political elites and neglects popular resistance to elite projects.
Indeed, governments formulating policies in the mould of subversive 
neoliberalism are fully aware of how severely punished they can be at the 
polls. This is the case especially with big welfare transfer systems like pen-
sion systems over which trade unions and other stakeholders hold powerful 
sway both in terms of management and public opinion (e.g. Pierson, 1995). In 
Sweden, which is generally recognized as the advanced capitalist society with 
the highest degree of mobilisation of organised labour and has a hegemonic 
social-democratic ideology and welfare policy regime, taking potential resist-
ance seriously in neoliberal policy-making is crucial (Belfrage & Ryner, 2009).
The embrace of subversive neoliberalism and financialisation has led to a 
situation in which the meanings of Swedish Social Democracy and of being a 
Swedish social democrat have been severely diluted. The leading centre-right 
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party, the Moderate Party, has sought to take advantage of this dilution by 
establishing itself as “the new labour party” and have done so with consid-
erable success. It has abandoned TINA type neoliberalism and bought into 
the subversive approach by for instance claiming to defend the welfare state 
and merely modernising it. Certainly, the financialisation of the welfare state 
serves the purpose of commodifying labour, which is in perfect line with 
neoliberalism and which implies that the welfare state becomes a vehicle for 
promoting neoliberalism. The Moderate Party has, partly as a consequence of 
the abovementioned claim, made considerable inroads into previously Social 
Democratic constituencies and thus won two consecutive elections (in 2006 
and 2010). 
That said, the universalism of financialisation in Sweden has not cre-
ated the desired effects benefitting all but rather created stronger social divi-
sions. As a central example, the pension system has not successfully normal-
ised financial market investment – certainly not in any universal manner. 
Although the new pension system has produced a society in which financial 
market investment is prevalent, it has not brought about a ‘mass investment 
culture’, in which daily interaction with financial markets is “commonsensical” 
or an acceptable part of everyday life to most (see Harmes, 2001). The ‘active’ 
participation rates in the PRS system do not testify to such a development. 
This shows the limits of the Swedish subversive neoliberal project – at this 
point of time, at least. 
The PPM chief economist Daniel Barr (2008) admitted right before the 
2008 financial crisis that the active involvement of Swedish daily life into cir-
cuits of financial capital is limited to around twenty per cent of the Swedish 
population. The large majority of pension savers are instead remaining ‘pas-
sive’, index-tracking investors “committing” their savings to the 7th AP fund, 
the default fund. This group corresponds largely with the constituencies from 
which SAP mobilises its voters: women, working and lower middle class living 
in the semi-urban hinterland (Belfrage & Ryner 2009, 280). Those who are 
‘active’ tend to be those who are the most confident in their financial literacy. 
This is the typical middle class suburban Centre-Right voter. Thus the deploy-
ment of the new system seems to have reinforced growing societal divisions 
rather than universalising the commitment to neoliberalism (Belfrage, 2008). 
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The de-commodifying welfare provision remains very popular and values 
of solidarity and equality of outcome are held in high esteem in Sweden. This 
may present a lifeline, albeit thin, for Social Democracy. As the societal divi-
sions become more apparent, the subversive neoliberalism may backfire if 
any of the political parties in the grand coalition sponsoring that removes 
the commitment to the system a serious political move. SAP could make 
an “apology” for its neoliberalisation, a symbolic launch of a left-turn in its 
politics. Indeed, SAP has in the last few years made noise about its discom-
fort in the sponsoring coalition. In July 2006, in the mid-stage of the elec-
tion campaign, former SAP Prime Minister Göran Persson (2006) stated that 
the new pension system had to be critically revisited in order to address the 
growing injustices within it. Two years earlier, the SAP Finance Minister Pär 
Nuder had provocatively stated that the large “40s generation” was going to 
cause considerable problems to subsequent generations given the large pen-
sion expenditures expected and the automatic adjustment this was going to 
trigger (Expressen, 2004). There seems still to be scope for SAP to credibly 
make the move. 
Turning against subversive neoliberalism by re-politicising financialisation?
“The new pension system has now been in operation for more than 
a decade. In some sense, the system has proven successful, in other 
ways it has shown to have disadvantages. It is too vulnerable during 
dips in economic growth, which the repeated kicking in of ”the brake” 
has shown during recent years. Pensions have become too small while 
administrative costs have increased at the same time. Class divisions 
grow among the elderly as demands on longevity of contribution are 
strengthened and impact on pension levels. Fundamentally, the system 
is underfinanced. The system must now be evaluated, its funding 
strengthened and be made more fair.” (SAP, 2011, 18; my translation)
In lieu of a conclusion, I would like to discuss recent developments in SAP 
politics, in specific those relating to the pension system in the context of the 
financial crisis and indirectly in relation to financialisation and subversive 
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neoliberalism. At this difficult moment for Social Democracy in Europe in 
general and in its Swedish heartland in particular, distancing from subversive 
neoliberalism promises to be the only way for Social Democracy to recon-
struct its identity and electoral foundation. Turning against the current pen-
sion system would be the ideal move to do so. If pensions could play a central 
role in ensuring SAP popular support during its glory days, maybe pensions 
can return some of that glory now. If it is a high time to re-politicise finan-
cialisation why not start with pensions. 
As I argued in 2008, right before the outbreak of global financial crisis, 
popular responses to financialisation may in the context of great instability 
on global financial markets increasingly contribute to the outcome of Swedish 
electoral politics in the near future. As I have argued in this paper, subversive 
neoliberalism was to a large extent about the subtle de-politicisation of finan-
cialisation, about the normalisation of everyday finance and about connecting 
the size of household wallets to financial outcomes. For the rejuvenation of 
Social Democratic politics, it would seem promising to take advantage of the 
financial crisis and the simmering discontent the impact of financial markets. 
While SAP remained reluctant to do much more than revisit aspects of the 
design of “the brake” in 2011 as a member of the “grand coalition”, more noise 
has recently been made. Indeed, the SAP Crisis Commission stated (cited 
above) in March 2011 that the pension system was unfair, divisive and under-
financed. However, formulating pension politics that are capable of gaining 
substantial support is a complex matter because pensions themselves are com-
plicated. Indeed, I argue here that to be successful in this endeavour, SAP 
politics must cultivate critical financial literacy that re-politicises the pension 
system. It should aim at constructing new forms of solidarity around a critical 
knowledge of finance. This can subsequently serve as a platform for the reju-
venation of social democratic politics. The crisis is an opportunity because 
it has brought about anger, a critical attitude to and a thirst for knowledge 
about rather than exuberance or indifference in the face of finance. Social 
Democratic politics has to intervene and do so in a manner that informs an 
understanding of finance as underpinning commodification in the first place: 
as a force deeply commodifying and destroying social cohesion, which under-
mines social democratic politics.
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“Financial literacy”, not least in the form constructed by PPM in relation to 
the pension system, was represented as a politically neutral issue, simply as the 
knowledge required to make the best choice between the mutual funds par-
ticipating in the PRS. Financial literacy was rolled out by means of incentivisa-
tion to choose from a large range of financial services with some basic infor-
mation and steering mechanisms, of shaming those who did not frequently 
trade and of “nudging” pension savers in the right direction according to self-
constructed risk profiles into an enormous choice (over 2 million targets and 
funds). This is not politically neutral. It seeks to construct a mass investment 
culture populated by day traders (Belfrage, 2008; Belfrage & Ryner, 2009). 
Social Democracy should not continue to sponsor the construction of this 
“neutral” policy of financial literacy intended to promote neoliberalisation, 
but rather question it. It should ask the questions of how the Swedish pen-
sion system produces unfair pensions and forms an integral part of subversive 
neoliberalism and financialisation. It should further ask why it was set up to 
do so. On the one hand, these are uncomfortable questions to ask for Social 
Democracy because the answers will implicate it in the neoliberalisation of 
the Swedish economy. On the other hand, it may enable it to reconstruct its 
identity and its electoral foundation in a period of financial upheaval, which 
it is considerably better positioned to manage than its Centre-Right competi-
tors.
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Tripartite political exchange  
and the Finnish social model
an t t i  al aja
introduction
The Finnish model of labour market bargaining has been characterised by 
centralised and comprehensive incomes policy agreements starting from the 
late 1960s. This era of centralised incomes policy was believed to come to an 
end in 2006 when the Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän 
keskusliitto, EK) announced that it would no longer negotiate over compre-
hensive incomes policy agreements. Yet the institution demonstrated its elas-
ticity again in October 2011, as the labour market parties declared that they 
have settled for a new comprehensive agreement. Incomes policy has been a 
central part of the Finnish models of social risk-sharing and of governance 
of social risk management most importantly because the tripartite policy-
makers have not only agreed on wages and tripartite exchange also influenced 
much more general level economic and social policies. Incomes policy agree-
ments have typically combined wage bargaining and collective wage agree-
ments with changes in taxation, education policy, earnings-based unemploy-
ment insurance and pensions, unemployment benefits, work protection or 
even housing conditions.
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The idea of incomes policy agreements was adapted to the Finnish debate 
from Western European countries over the 1960s. Incomes policy was espe-
cially presented as a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. The economic con-
text of the first incomes policy agreement (Liinamaa I in 1969) was the signifi-
cant devaluation (31 per cent) of the Finnish currency markka in 1967. The aim 
of the incomes policy was to guarantee competitiveness of the export sector, 
to curb inflation and to stabilise the economic development and wage share. 
Jäntti et al. (2006) refer here to Finnish “devaluation cycles”, which occurred 
in 10-year intervals (1949, 1957, 1967 and 1977–1980). From 1967 onwards, the 
decisions to devalue were combined with incomes policy agreements which 
moderated the wage growth for two or three years.10 Pohjola (1995) sees that 
the incomes policy structures were designed to support the Finnish growth 
model. The post-war growth model in Finland was based on a high invest-
ment rate in key manufacturing sectors, high savings rate and credit rationing. 
Although the economic policy rationale for incomes policy agreements 
was based on macroeconomic foundations, it is not the topic of this chapter. 
In contrast, this chapter emphasises the idea that the institution of Finnish 
incomes policy agreements created leverage for political exchange, which thus 
have had a profound impact on the balance of power and structures of the 
Finnish social model. The importance of this dynamic institution has indeed 
been extremely high in terms of both policies and politics. For example of the 
former, Kiander et al. (2009) have portrayed the Finnish incomes policy as 
institutionalised tripartite co-operation between the labour market organisa-
tions (or labour market parties) and the government, which has, among other 
things, fostered social capital formation in Finland. For example of the latter, 
the significance of centralised bargaining is well demonstrated by the fact that 
during the period from 1969 to 2007, the number of wage settlements made 
(in contrast to central agreements) at the sector level was only seven – all of 
them signed for one year only (Asplund, 2007). 
One of the key ideas of the model was that the compromise in the tripartite 
negotiations would represent the “general interest” over “special interests”. The 
10  A wage-norm was widely adopted, which outlined that nominal wage growth should match 
the rise of labour productivity. As Sauramo (2004) has emphasised, the real labour market 
development did not always follow the theoretical wage norms.
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incomes policy has indeed been interpreted to represent the idea of parity in 
the Finnish society, the symmetry of power between capital and labour (Ket-
tunen, 2009). Although the role of the state in incomes policy has historically 
been stronger in Finland than in case of Sweden for example, as Sauramo 
(2004) argues, the tripartite agreements were of highest political importance 
for the state. In the 1970s for example, the prime minister or even the president 
could take a direct active role in the negotiations.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of the tri-
partite political exchange and incomes policy agreements for the Finnish 
social risk-sharing model, social capital formation and the mobilisation of 
power resources. To an older generation of labour market economists and 
welfare state researchers, this kind of starting point is hardly anything new. 
The Finnish economic and social history literature has already much dealt 
with the relation between labour market bargaining and social policy reforms. 
The history of the Finnish social security has been even read as an “extension 
of social wage” because so many reforms on social security were agreed in 
incomes policy negotiations (see Kiander et al., 2009). Regarding the current 
Finnish political debate on the welfare state, however, the historical institu-
tional structures, confrontations and political contingencies are widely under-
mined. To a younger generation of Finns, the welfare state institutions and 
mechanisms just “are”. There is too little awareness of the processes that ini-
tially led to collective risk-sharing institutions that are considered to be part 
of the “praised Finnish model” of risk-sharing today.11 
It is, of course, out the scope for any single article to provide any in-depth 
and detailed social history of the era of central incomes policy. Rather, the 
aim here is only to underline the importance of the incomes policy agree-
ments for the historical development of the Finnish social model. The reason 
for this is that the history of this institution is often undermined in interna-
11  For example, the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) published in 2007 an 
influential study on the Nordic Model (Andersen et al., 2007). Its basic premise and definition 
of the Nordic model is that the collective risk-sharing institutions provided by the welfare state 
enhance globalisation and adjustment to structural change. This definition is widely shared in 
the current Finnish debates, and the line of argumentation starting from this point is commonly 
used to legitimate the welfare state. 
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tional debates. According to Bergholm (2009), the comparative international 
debates still portray the Finnish social risk-sharing and collective bargaining 
arrangements as one of a “junior” Nordic country. Following the Swedish his-
torical experience, many analyses refer to a Nordic model that has been build 
around the strong parliamentary position of the Social Democratic Party. The 
Finnish model, however, has been typically more shaped by the tripartite cor-
porate political exchange than other “Nordic models” because of the weaker 
position of social democracy in the parliament. The incomes policy institu-
tions have been central in strengthening the structural position of the labour 
movement in the Finnish society. 
In the following section of this chapter, it is described how the general 
incomes policy agreements structurally shaped the Finnish model in the era 
of welfare state expansion from the late 1960s until the late 1980s. In the 1970s 
and 1980s labour unions were able to promote welfare reforms as a part of the 
incomes policy deals. “Social wage” was exchanged for modest pay increases. 
Significant work-life legislation was introduced and work-time was also short-
ened during this period. Overall, Finland experienced the era of welfare state 
expansion. The content of the incomes policy changed in the 1990s as the 
new economic and growth paradigm emerged. This is the topic of the third 
section of this chapter. The paradigm shift in economic and social policy was 
driven by European integration, neoliberal ideological change, and the deep 
depression in the early 1990s. The era of incomes policy started in 1968 and 
seemingly came to an end in 2007 at latest. The last section of the chapter 
provides an overview on how the long-lived institutional continuity produced 
new forms and different outcomes in the changing economic and political 
contexts. 
the emergence of social corPoratism
As emphasised by Jäntti et al. (2006), the post-war economic policy in Finland 
was strongly influenced by President Urho Kekkonen`s (1952) pamphlet Has 
our country the patience to prosper? (Onko maallamme malttia vaurastua?). 
Kekkonen proposed that Finland should adopt a state-led investment pro-
gram in productive means. A high investment rate in key manufacturing sec-
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tors, high savings rate and credit rationing were indeed typical characteristics 
of the Finnish growth model in the post-war decades. State-interventionist 
industrial policy was of course typical to all of the Nordic countries but the 
Finnish policies were even more interventionist than in the Swedish or Danish 
models. The Finnish growth model of the 1940s and 1950s was based on “prag-
matic interventionism and co-operation between the state and the private 
actors” and the growth model acquired a “conservative character” (Jäntti et 
al., 2006). According to Pohjola (1995), the Finnish corporatist model was 
based on the policy coordination between the state and the businesses while 
the trade unions were weak and divided. 
Several studies have emphasised that the nature of the post-war class com-
promise in Finland has been weaker in Finland than in other Nordic coun-
tries. In the 1940s and 1950s governments often reacted to economic fluctua-
tions with pro-cyclical fiscal policy and the whole welfare state development 
progressed later than in other Nordic countries (Mjøset, 1987). The civil war 
of 1918 was certainly a major cause for the late development of the welfare 
state and tripartite corporatism, as the employer-side refused to acknowledge 
the bargaining rights of the trade unions during the inter-war era. A new 
era of more collaborative industrial relations emerged in 1940, as the labour 
market organizations acknowledged each other as bargaining parties (Min-
istry of Labour, 2011). Still, the labour movement was internally divided and 
employers still conceived the wage bargaining process as a zero sum game in 
the 1940s and 1950s (Bergholm, 2009). The agrarian interests were also pow-
erful in shaping the Finnish policies, because of late industrialisation and the 
strong parliamentary position of the Centre party (Andersson et al, 1993) 
New systems for wage-bargaining developed already in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Bergholm (2009) has traced the birth of a new kind of political exchange and 
understanding between the labour market parties to the late 1950s and early 
1960s, especially underlining the importance of the earnings-related pension 
scheme of 196112, which “completed the process of class compromise” that 
had already taken steps forward in the late 1950s. Employer and employee 
organisations, as well as the Social Democratic party and the bourgeois par-
12  The national basic pension scheme had been established in 1956, which gave labour market 
parties an incentive to start working for a new earnings-related pension scheme.
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ties, cooperated closely during the pension reform process. Employers and 
employees had already been able to find a compromise concerning the unem-
ployment insurance reform in 1959–1960, but this was only after the general 
unemployment reform had failed earlier in the parliament. The reform proc-
esses of the late 1950s and early 1960s established Gent-style unemployment 
insurance funds and decentralised private pension insurance companies with 
paritarian control. 
 Earnings-based pension and unemployment insurance institutions have 
shaped the Finnish model for more than 50 years now. The reforms also 
paved way for further tripartite political exchange and social corporatism. 
The Finnish employers were not always that eager about centralised wage 
negotiations, but as the power of the left in the Finnish society increased, 
the employer-side became more willing to accept collective bargaining (Ket-
tunen, 2009a). The election victory of the Social Democratic Party in 1966 
and the radicalised young generation further shifted balance towards the left. 
The power of the left forced the employers to seek cooperation and common 
standpoints. However, for many in the far left, the general incomes policy 
represented a rather negative “class compromise”. Other critics pointed out 
that the tripartite cooperation might undermine the parliament in decision-
making processes.
Kettunen (2011) has argued that the ideas of parity and virtuous circle of 
economic and social development were important guidelines for the Nordic 
development in general in the post-war era. The influential Vordenker of the 
Finnish welfare state, Pekka Kuusi, believed that economic and social devel-
opment were to be closely interlinked. This idea was dominant in Kuusi’s 
classic book The social policy of the 60s (60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka). The eco-
nomic, social and human sphere would accumulate to wider progress. Kuusi’s 
thinking was influenced by Gunnar Myrdal`s notion of ‘circular and cumu-
lative causation’. Unlike in Sweden, where policy makers were conceptually 
referring to the Swedish Third Way between communism and capitalism, the 
Finnish welfare state thinking was inclined to depoliticise social policy (Ket-
tunen, 2001). The Cold War confrontation was perhaps important but this was 
not emphasised too much in the public debates. Instead, authors like Kuusi 
portrayed social policies in terms of pragmatic adjustment, modernisation 
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and national unification. The idea of parity in the labour market was part of 
this wider process. 
The transition to comprehensive incomes policy agreements in the late 
1960s strengthened the Nordic tradition and social capital formation in the 
Finnish society. Finnish incomes policy structures can be perceived to be, fol-
lowing Bo Rothstein`s concept, “organised social capital”.13 The political shift 
to incomes policy agreements can be interpreted, as Kiander et al. (2009) 
have done, to have brought the Finnish economy and society closer to the 
“Nordic standard of development”. As Kettunen (2009) has further pointed 
out, Sweden was portrayed to represent the “future of the Finnish society” 
already in the 1930s. Though Finland’s road to Norden and to becoming a 
“Nordic democracy” turned out to be a long one. The example of the Western 
countries and particularly the Nordic neighbours paved the way for general 
incomes policy in Finland and the politics of Nordic comparison has indeed 
played a central role.
 The emergence of the era of incomes policy agreements can be portrayed 
as a part of a more wide-ranging transition to konsensusyhteiskunta, a culture 
of consensus typical to Finland. According to Saari (2006, 112–113), in addi-
tion to incomes policy, the transition to the culture of consensual politics was 
also fostered by the stabilisation of the political system. Prime Minister Kalevi 
Sorsa initiated the famous Korpilampi conference, where different interest 
groups and actors across the political spectrum sought for common under-
standing in 1977. After 1983, Finnish governments have typically served a full 
term. In the mainstream debate the consensual cultures of politics and policy 
making are still typically seen as a source of national competitive strength. The 
tripartite political exchange is legitimated through the benefits of consensus. 
Pekkarinen (1990) has emphasised incomes policy as a political tool that can 
potentially prevent negative externalities because it enables the trade unions 
to put general interest over special interests. 
13  Organised social capital basically refers to the trust between organisations.
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Interplay between wage-work, social citizenship and universalism
The new structure of Finnish industrial relations, social corporatism and 
incomes policy agreements reflected a new kind of power balance in the 
Finnish society. The new kind of understanding between the labour market 
parties in the early 1960s and the historical shift to the era of incomes policy 
agreements in 1968 had indeed strengthened the position of the weaker side 
in the labour market, the employees.14 The political exchange of the labour 
market parties became politically essential for the Finnish institutions of 
social risk-sharing during the classic incomes policy era and welfare state 
expansion from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. The focus of the analysis here 
is on the structural development of earnings-related social security and inter-
play between wage-work, social rights and universalism in the process. 
According to Rahkola (2010), centralised wage setting and earnings-
related social insurance are the core competencies of traditional Finnish 
tripartite political exchange structures and they also significantly affect the 
working life legislation.15 Especially the earnings-related pensions, unemploy-
ment insurance16, work-injury insurance, sickness insurance17 and family ben-
14  The “weakness” of employees derives from the fact that at the work-floor level, it is the 
employer side that organises the work and always has the first-place right to interpretation in 
cases of conflicts of interest. 
15  Many of the rights of workers have been firstly negotiated on the co-ordinated incomes 
policy tables or even sectoral union tables but have later become parts of legislation. It is hence 
well founded proposition to state that the Finnish income policy model has been a crucial tool 
in making Finnish working market better functioning and more equal, step by step.
16  Basic schemes, such as basic unemployment allowance, guarantee minimum income, 
whereas the earnings-based unemployment allowance is based on insurance-principle. The 
precondition to receive earning-based unemployment allowance has considered to be a union 
membership (membership contributions which are tax deductible) and changing “employment 
condition”. Strictly speaking, it is always (by law) possible to join only the unemployment fund 
and only pay for the fund fees. The amount of earnings-related pension depended, until recently, 
on final salary. Various reforms were advanced in the 1980s, which stabilized the roles of the 
national and earnings-related pension schemes basic unemployment allowance and earnings-
based unemployment allowance. 
17  In 1981, the labour market parties agreed on sickness allowance and accident and motor 
insurance as part of the comprehensive incomes policy deal. The level of compensation was 
improved and the sickness allowance became taxable. (Niemelä & Salminen, 2006) 
155
efits have been generated in the tripartite negotiations. The reinforced role of 
the labour market parties in the 1960s and the rise of the Social Democrats to 
a stronger parliamentary position created preconditions for an era of labour 
market-driven social policy. The establishment of earnings-related pension 
scheme and unemployment funds administered by the trade unions laid the 
foundations for the “Finnish class compromise”. These reforms, in addition 
to sickness insurance, meant no less than the emergence of modern social 
insurance in Finland. The development of earnings-related social security was 
given a priority. (Niemelä & Salminen, 2006.)
The structural tension between “insiders and outsiders” deriving from the 
establishment of decentralised earnings-related insurance schemes and uni-
versalistic welfare schemes has characterised the Finnish social model since 
the beginning of tripartite political exchange. The Social Democratic Party 
and the Centre Party were the central party political forces in the building 
process of the welfare state. Social Democratic Party has historically priori-
tised comprehensive but not catch-all social insurance and welfare services 
supporting wage labour, whereas the Centre Party has prioritised univer-
salistic schemes (Haataja et al., 2010). In the recent Nordic history of social 
policy, there are indeed two parallel reinforcing and mutually relating prin-
ciples at work: the idea of universalist social rights based on citizenship, the 
idea of workfare, or the normalcy of wage-labour. The Finnish understanding 
of work and social rights cannot be thus reduced to polarity between com-
modification and decommodification. (Kananen, 2011.) 
The principles of workfare and social citizenship can be best seen in play 
in the earnings-related pension scheme and unemployment insurance. Earn-
ings-related systems have developed social rights around the institutions of 
– preferably full-time and continuous – wage-labour and the insurance prin-
ciple. However, the principles have been combined elsewhere in legislation as 
well. The labour market parties reached an understanding on the rather all-
encompassing Occupational Safety and Health Act in the tripartite negotia-
tions of 1970.18 The original purpose of this legislation was to protect workers 
from work-related accidents and diseases (Leppo, 2010). Even the develop-
ment of universalistic social and health services run by local authorities have 
18  The act came into force in 1978. 
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not thus only served the principle of universalism but also the normalisation 
of wage-labour. The Act on Children’s Day Care, in which quite similar com-
bination of the two principles can be found, was passed in the parliament a 
bit later in 1973. 
It must be noted that workfare should not be understood as a static prin-
ciple here. For example, the goal of shortening working time was a signifi-
cant part of tripartite strategies to improve the quality of working life during 
the period of welfare expansion. Labour market organisations agreed on 
the five day and 40 hour working week in the mid-1960s. The shortening of 
the working time was carried on in the golden era of incomes policy agree-
ments in 1968–1988, when the working time was decreased primarily with 
holiday arrangements and with shortening the weekly working time. The so-
called UKK agreement, initiated by President Kekkonen in 1971, guaranteed 
a 4-week annual holiday for wage earners. In 1979 it was agreed that the right 
to winter holiday should be broadened. Working time decreased steadily, as 
average annuals hours per worker decreased by 10.2 per cent between 1970 
and 1994. (Kiander, 1999; Kiander et al., 2009.) 
incomes Policy and re-negotiation of the 
Post-war settlement in the 1990s
Incomes policy agreements have provided institutional continuity and sta-
bility, which is often considered a most positive characteristic in the Finnish 
model. The analyses based on institutional continuity are with no doubt useful 
but sometimes these kinds of approaches tend to overemphasise the path-
dependency of economic and social policies. In Finland, the comprehensive 
incomes policy institution has produced quite different policy outcomes in 
different historical periods and in different economic and social contexts. The 
great depression of the early 1990s was the worst in Finnish history since the 
1930s and it generally signified a major turning point in the Finnish societal 
development. In the early 1990s, Finland, Sweden and Denmark all witnessed 
a renegotiation period of the post-war collectivist order (Kananen, 2011). The 
direction of Finnish economic and social policy changed drastically, as pre-
sented for example by Julkunen (2001). 
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The Finnish employer side reacted to the severe economic crisis with wide-
ranging reform proposals. In the fall of 1992, the Finnish Employers’ Confed-
eration (Suomen Työnantajain Keskusliitto, STK) published a list of demands 
that aimed to reduce the labour costs radically, by 20 per cent. The trade 
unions quickly dubbed the demands as “The Satanic Verses” after Salman 
Rushdie’s novel. (Vuoristo, 1998.) Esko Aho, the Prime Minister of the centre-
right coalition government of 1991–1995, was promoting the view that in the 
future, the labour market organisations should only focus on wage policies 
and let the government and the central bank solely decide on all monetary and 
fiscal policy. Labour unions counteracted effectively and the plans to the break 
the old corporatist model failed. (Kosonen, 1998.) The most radical reforms 
were not realised but some of the pension and unemployment funding was 
transferred to the wage earners and a wage freeze policy was adopted for two 
years. The employer side and the Centre Party did not succeed in breaking 
down neither the earnings-related social security with corporatist structures 
nor the corporatist model more generally.
The newly elected government led by the social democratic Prime Min-
ister Paavo Lipponen initiated comprehensive incomes policy agreements for 
the years 1996–1997, 1998–1999, 2001–2002, 2002–2004, and 2005–2007. The 
Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance were parts of the broad rainbow 
government coalition and they were motivated to further strengthen the tri-
partite structures (Kiander et al., 2009). The comprehensive incomes policy 
structures guaranteed that wage growth was to become slower than produc-
tivity growth, which contributed to the decline of the wage share in the func-
tional income distribution. Combination of wage moderation, low interest 
rates and devaluation of the early 1990s was seen to contribute to growth. 
(Pehkonen, 2002.) At the same time, however, the internationalisation of the 
Finnish companies meant that labour movement was not able to combine 
working time reductions with wage moderation, which had been the case 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Finland experienced a period of strong export-led 
growth in the late 1990s, which was led by Nokia and the booming ICT sector. 
In the late 1990s, the Finnish economy recovered with export-led growth 
but the wider social legacy of the Finnish policies of 1990s turned out to be 
more problematic. Julkunen (2001) has stressed that after the era of welfare 
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state expansion in the 1970s and 1980s Finland entered during the 1990s crisis 
an era of post-expansive welfare state development. Both the right-wing coa-
lition (1991–1995) and the broad rainbow coalition (1995–1999) governments 
introduced policies which led to welfare state retrenchment. The rainbow gov-
ernment introduced tough budget consolidation policies in 1995 in order to 
meet the EMU criteria and to take new steps in Western integration. The state 
subsidies for the municipalities were cut.19 The governments also introduced 
a bulk of cuts in the incomes transfer sphere.20 (Kautto, 2000.) The cuts in 
the universalistic minimum benefits reflected a new supply-side orientation 
in the Finnish labour market policy (Kananen, 2011). The volume of the wel-
fare sector cuts was most drastic in the earnings-related pensions system (see 
Kiander et al., 2009).
The unemployment rate had exploded to around 20 per cent in 1993 and 
the unemployment rate was persistently over 10 per cent throughout the latter 
part of the 1990s. High long-term unemployment became a permanent phe-
nomenon in the Finnish labour market development. The economic policy of 
the 1990s has indeed been criticised for adjusting the economic imbalances 
(account deficit, the risk of inflation, labour costs) through unemployment. 
The policy of strong markka had opposed the floating the currency and deval-
uations until the fall of 1992. The adopted pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal 
policies not only increased unemployment but they also left the public debt 
problems unsolved. The political elites saw the balancing of the account deficit 
as a political priority over employment. As Kiander (2001) has underlined, 
raising the unemployment rate proved to be very easy but lowering the rate 
proved out to be much more difficult, as seen in the late 1990s.
In the 1970s and the 1980s the tripartite political exchange had often led 
to welfare state expansion. Employees received social rights in exchange for 
19  In the Finnish system the municipalities are legally responsible for providing the welfare 
services.
20  Kautto (2000, 44–45) emphasises that Sweden took a more balanced approach to budget 
consolidation, as the consolidation programme was based nearly half-on-half on tax increases 
and cuts in expenditures. The social policy cuts were absolutely and relatively higher in Finland. 
Both of the countries were successful in balancing their budgets, but overall the unemployment 
level was significantly lower in Sweden in the 1990s.
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wage moderation. The economic and political context of the 1990s, on the 
other hand, was characterised by banking crisis, economic depression, capital 
market liberalisation and neoliberal ideological pressures towards the wel-
fare state. True, the political left and the trade unions were able to counteract 
the neoliberal pressures to break the corporatist structures, but the economic 
context of the 1990s meant that the tripartite political exchange produced 
very different kind of policy outcomes than in the “classic” era of incomes 
policy. Wage moderation for example became linked with income tax reduc-
tions at all income levels, which previously could hardly have been the case 
in tripartite negotiations. Kosonen (1998) has gone as far as to argue that the 
institution of social corporatism and incomes policy acted as a guarantee for 
welfare sector cuts in the late 1990s. The political elite portrayed the cutbacks 
as necessary evil because the financial markets had almost lost confidence in 
Finland’s solvency in 1992. The high unemployment and welfare sector cut-
backs reflected the new balance of power in the labour market bargaining: the 
labour side was forced to go on the defensive.
Incomes policy, competition state paradigm and the excluded 
In 2007, the new central employer organisation, the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto, EK), published its labour market and 
wage policy guidelines, which outlined that there will be no continuation 
for comprehensive incomes policy agreements, which had been a well-rec-
ognised intention already since late 1960s. The employer side claimed that 
globalisation and the internationalisation of the Finnish businesses had made 
the centralised incomes policy agreements outdated. The employers saw no 
reason for compromise with the labour unions anymore. The economic policy 
interest of the employer side is now focused on keeping the price of labour as 
cheap as possible.21 In social policy, the main aim has been to reduce employer 
21  In addition, for example Alho (2009) has argued that centralised incomes policy and 
solidaristic wage policies have led to a situation where high labour productivity is not 
recognised in salaries and especially low labour productivity is overvalued. In this line of 
reasoning, more flexibility is needed in order to safeguard national competitiveness and to 
guarantee growth in employment rates. 
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contributions. The liberalisation of the capital markets and the globalisation 
of the production have been mobilised to argue for weakening the bargaining 
power of the trade unions and for strengthening the employer side. 
Many initiatives have come since then from the employers. In the title 
of his study published by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (Elinkei-
noelämän valtuuskunta, EVA), the self-titled “policy and pro-market think 
tank” of the Finnish business community, Korkman (2007) asked: do incomes 
policies in Finland have a future? Korkman argued that the Finnish labour 
market model has worked fairly well due to the close cooperation between 
labour market organisations. On the other hand, Korkman also argued that 
the Finnish labour markets functioned poorly in relation to other Nordic 
countries. He sketches a shift towards more decentralised system of wage for-
mation inspired by globalisation and greater correspondence between wages 
and productivity. Somewhat paradoxically, Korkman would prefer the labour 
market organisations to negotiate “industrial peace” at a centralised level yet 
negotiating wage levels on a sectoral or local level.
The discussions on the global economic competition have strengthened 
the notion of “competitiveness” in the Finnish public debate. The concept of 
the competition state describes how “the states are transformed by national 
responses to globalisation” (Kettunen, 2011, 17). Albeit that the notion of com-
petitiveness has always been a central characteristic of the Finnish economic 
and social model it has become essential after the mid-90s. The competition 
state discourse includes a nationalist flavour that defines the interests of the 
“economy” or the “general interest” as the interest of the employer side. Given 
this discourse, the trade unions have to be careful in their demands if they aim 
to “safeguard Finnish competitiveness and Finnish jobs”. The global competi-
tion state perspective emphasises the notion of “us” in the global competition 
and how we must reform “our system” in order to perform in the global mar-
kets. The social risk of losing national competitiveness has become a domi-
nant social risk in the public debate: a risk that subsumes all other social 
risks. When the employer side is able to successfully represent its interest as a 
general interest – “our competitiveness in the global markets” – the political 
exchange between the labour market parties makes less sense. 
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 In addition to the challenges posed by the globalised business and neo-
liberals, the tripartite system has been challenged by the New Left and the 
Finnish Green movement. The claim is that the traditional labour movement 
has been unable to analyse and counteract the precarisation in the Finnish 
labour market. The analysis is often built around the notion that the incomes 
policy, the tripartite political exchange and the earnings-based schemes 
mostly represent the organised and well-established parts of wage earners. 
The structural exclusion of the unemployed and less organised interests in 
tripartite negotiations have led to a system in which the earnings-based social 
security is given a priority over universalistic schemes. Introduction of a Basic 
Income has been the most visible social policy demand of the new movement. 
The fact that Finland has become more unequal society since 1990s depres-
sion has further strengthened the thesis that the tripartite political exchange 
has not benefited everyone. A key aspect of the rise in income inequality since 
the mid-1990s has been the dramatic jump in incomes in the top one per cent 
of the population, albeit that the poverty rates also doubled from the mid-
1990s to 2006 (Riihelä, 2009).
The approaches defending the tripartite structures and comprehensive 
settlements have stressed that the weakened tripartite cooperation might 
lead to a situation where only the employers would have the policy initiative 
and labour unions would assume a purely reactive role in the labour market 
system. In this scenario, the labour unions would only try to counteract the 
trends of welfare state retrenchment and the worsening of labour market con-
ditions. The decentralised wage bargaining model also bears the risk that the 
new sectoral or local wage-bargaining model will overemphasise the role of 
nominal wage increases over stability, employment, “social wage” and the 
quality of working life. The question remains, for example, that if the labour 
movement is able to put enough pressure to promote working life improve-
ments, will they be tied to the wage bargaining process or not. The question 
of the quality of working life is very important policy question for Finland for 
the coming years, as there is a wide-ranging political consensus to rise the real 
pension age in Finland in order to improve the state of the public finances. 
The labour movement has emphasised that raising the retirement age must be 
handled through improvements in the quality of the working life. 
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conclusions: the surPrising non-death 
of finnish incomes Policy tradition
During 2007–2011 Finland was governed by a centre-right coalition govern-
ment and the return to the era of comprehensive incomes policy agreements 
seemed quite unlikely. The employer side EK declared frequently that it would 
prefer wage bargaining at a sectoral or even at a local firm-by-firm level. This 
all changed when the new rainbow coalition government took office in June 
2011. The government consisted of the National Coalition Party and the Social 
Democratic Party and four smaller parties across the political spectrum. The 
government and the newly elected social democratic Finance Minister Jutta 
Urpilainen spoke strongly for the policy of comprehensive incomes policy 
agreements, which could bring stability and predictability to the labour 
market development, and which would benefit the wage earners, business 
sector as well as the consumers. The government indicated that it would be 
ready to consider tax incentives in exchange for moderate wage settlement. 
Eventually, the government initiative was able to bring EK and the labour 
union confederations back to the table to negotiate over comprehensive 
agreements in the autumn of 2011. On September 13th, it was announced 
that the three main labour confederations and EK have found an agreement 
on comprehensive incomes policy settlement. The framework settlement is 
being applied at a sectoral level in various industries by the time of writing 
this chapter. The wage increases will total 4.3 per cent over the agreement 
period of 25 months. It was announced that the comprehensive settlement 
would include, among other things, a review agency for work and temporary 
employment targets, a three day paid training leave annually, paternity leave 
extension by two weeks to a maximum of 54 days, changes in employer and 
employee social security contributions, and a minor cut in the corporate tax 
base. 
The settlement proved that the incomes policy institution still has strong 
support in the Finnish society and within the political elite. The editorial of 
the influential daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat stated that incomes policy 
was an important step for the Finnish economy and employment. The speaker 
of the Finnish parliament Eero Heinäluoma stated that the possible incomes 
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Contingency in Risk Management:  
the Case of Pension Funds in Sweden 
and Finland
V il l e - Pekk a  S or S a  &  an tonioS  rouMPakiS
introduction
One of the key methods for providing understanding on the paradigms 
of social policy has been to classify different regimes according to their 
approaches to risk management. Esping-Andersen (1990) famously catego-
rised welfare states according to the levels of decommodification implied by 
the key institutions providing social protection to the citizens of the states. 
Within his classification, the Scandinavian welfare states topped the levels 
and were regarded as ‘universalist’, providing generous replacement levels on 
the basis of citizenship. Later, Esping-Andersen (1999) broadened his argu-
ments to broader political-economic foundations of modern welfare regimes, 
ultimately to the ideal type characteristics of policy-making. Various other 
scholars have as well combined institutions of policy-making with the insti-
tutions resulting from social policies. For example, there have been a great 
number of explicit critiques on Esping-Andersen’s classification supple-
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mented with alternative welfare state typologies (e.g. Bonoli, 2001; Castles, 
1993; Ferrera, 1996). 
The problem with Esping-Andersen’s as well as most of the alternative 
typologies is that although they bring political institutions and thus political 
contingencies into analysis of social risk management, they tend to ignore the 
practical aspects of risk management. Most importantly, these kinds of typol-
ogies do not usually take into account the social risks that risk management 
institutions generate. Indeed, risk management mechanisms not only respond 
to and reshape some underlying social risks, but also give new institutional 
forms to the old risks and create new and sometimes unpredicted forms of 
social risks. The management mechanisms often transmit the underlying risks 
to a more general level and may magnify them at this level (e.g. Beck, 1999; 
De Goede, 2004). This generates not only new kinds of social risks and other 
contingencies but also new kinds of political situations where risk manage-
ment issues are addressed. Indeed, risk management is always contingent and 
not without risks in itself, and it is thus absurd to study the policies and polit-
ical paradigms underlying the risk management institutions without studying 
how these institutions are governed and managed. 
We believe the issue of contingency must be addressed in any valid theory 
on politics of social risk management. If we ignore the questions of contin-
gency of the social risks and political contexts created by risk management 
institutions and the contingency of risk management more generally, both 
understanding of politics and especially the concrete politicisation of social 
risk management remain too abstracted. We thus need to bring the real-life 
operational contexts of risk management to the analysis on the politics of 
social risk if we wish such analysis to have real-life relevance. The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to see what kinds of contingencies are included in 
the risk management institutions tackling the social risks related to old age. 
Our analysis is focused on pension systems, or pension funds, to be more 
specific. 
Generally speaking, pension funds transform the social risk of failing to 
generate sufficient incomes for the period of old age into investment and other 
risks embedded in the funding mechanisms. The funding mechanisms are 
dependent on the nature of pension schemes at a more general level. For 
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example, ideal type collective defined benefit scheme (DB) models move 
individual risks to more collective level, as individual pensions are defined 
first and costs then adjusted, while the ideal type defined contribution (DC) 
schemes just changes the risks at the individual level, as pension contribu-
tions are fixed and pensions variable. The issue of pension fund governance, 
including for instance contribution collection, asset allocation and funding 
level decisions, is central for understanding the contingencies of social risk 
management wherever funded schemes exist. 
Funded, partially funded or prefunded pension systems are not only about 
alternative forms of arranging pension financing, but also about generating 
vast pools of capital that can be used in various different ways to achieve dif-
ferent kinds of social and economic policy targets. Pension funds are among 
the most significant sources of power in the beginning of 21st century (Goure-
vitch & Shinn, 2005), which is why it is difficult to choose any politically more 
relevant thematic area for the analysis of social risk management. That said, 
the academic social policy scholars have had quite limited interest in pen-
sion funds and especially investments even though most European countries 
have recently introduced funding components to their statutory systems. To 
borrow terminology from accounting, the comparative social policy studies 
have by and large focused on the ‘liability side’ (e.g. social functions, pension 
benefits) of pension provision, while the ‘asset side’ of pension provision has 
been somewhat neglected outside pension contribution levels. 
Our analysis is in nature a comparative case study, where the focus is on 
two Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland. To be more specific, we study 
the institutional differences in the liability and asset ‘sides’ of funding mech-
anisms of the funded mandatory earnings-related (first-pillar, second-tier) 
pension arrangements, the fully funded Swedish AP/PPM funds, and the 
Finnish partly funded TyEL scheme. The schemes have a massive scope in 
their welfare effects and share various institutional similarities. The Swedish 
scheme covers over 90 per cent of all working population, and the Finnish 
TyEL scheme covers approximately 1.5 million current private sector workers. 
The countries have been traditionally classified under the same variety of 
capitalism (mixed but coordinated market economies) and welfare regimes 
(social democratic, Nordic). In pension policy, the Finnish regime has been 
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understood to combine some aspects of the Swedish model with continental 
European paradigms (Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003). However, as our analysis 
suggests, when we study the contingencies in the both ‘sides’ of funding insti-
tutions, the differences are not that straightforward, and two pension systems 
are perhaps even more divergent in their social risk management paradigm.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the following section of the chapter, 
we present a very short overview on the development paths of social risk 
management in Swedish and Finnish pension regimes from the birth of the 
regimes to the recent reforms of the last few years from the perspective of 
social risk management. The birth and development of Finnish and Swedish 
national pension systems have already been well documented in the academic 
literature (see e.g. Niemelä et al., 1993; Niemelä, 1994; Salminen, 1987; Kangas, 
2006; Kangas et al., 2010; Heclo, 1975; Swenson, 2002; Esping-Andersen & 
Korpi, 1984; Korpi, 1983; Baldwin, 1990), which is why we do not discuss the 
issues here at the general level of pension reforms, but focus only on the risk 
management issues. In the third section, we discuss the contingencies in the 
current funding mechanisms in these two schemes, first from a general per-
spective of the funding mechanism and then more closely in both sides of 
the funding mechanisms, the assets and liabilities. In the fourth and the last 
section, we draw some conclusions on the Swedish and Finnish cases of risk 
management from a comparative perspective, and discuss the implications 
our analysis has concerning the politicisation of social risk management in 
both countries.
a short history of social risk management in 
swedish and finnish Pension regimes
The introduction of the Swedish mandatory earnings-related pension system 
has been one of the best documented policy reforms in the international social 
policy literature as it exemplified the power struggle between labour market 
organisations, Social Democrats and bourgeois parties. This struggle was not 
only a battle over the issue of redistribution of the pension programme costs 
and benefits, but also an important struggle over the creation of publicly con-
trolled pension funds. The birth of the Finnish earnings pension regime had 
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many similarities but also more political and institutional “variables” than the 
Swedish reforms. The agrarian, bourgeois and fragmented left-wing interests 
also in fact drew the solutions to a somewhat different organisation of the 
scheme. Given these backgrounds, the starting point for the era of manda-
tory pension provision was perhaps surprisingly similar in both countries in 
context of social risk management. 
In broad-brush terms, the initial social risk management paradigm in the 
two pension regimes can be characterized from the perspective of private 
sector workers as follows. All (resident) citizens were guaranteed a low uni-
versal basic pension with which to cover the risks brought by old age. The first 
tier of the Swedish first-pillar system (folkpension), established in mid-1940s, 
provided a universal flat-rate benefit for all, as did the corresponding Finnish 
system (kansaneläke) established a decade later. On top of that, workers 
received a compensation for their loss of ability to work with an earnings-
related pension. The Swedish national supplementary earnings-related pen-
sion scheme ATP (Allmän Tilläggspension) legislation came into effect in 1960 
and the corresponding Finnish scheme TEL (Työntekijäin eläkelaki) in 1962. 
Earnings-related schemes in both countries were partly funded and financed 
by the employer contributions. They provided a defined benefit (DB) scheme 
that covered extremely high proportion of the working population. The ben-
efits were defined in Sweden by the average salary of fifteen most highly paid 
years, and in Finland by the final salary. Both schemes also generated assets 
in a unique scale for partly funded schemes.
There were a few institutional differences in the original form of the two 
pension regimes. In terms of social risk management, two differences were 
especially important. Firstly, the two Finnish mandatory first-pillar schemes 
crowded out nearly all occupational arrangements, which remained strong 
in Sweden. This suggests that although the political importance of the first-
pillar regime might have been high in both countries, the institutional impor-
tance of the first-pillar regime in overall social risk management related to 
the old-age was much more important in Finland. This difference was further 
strengthened in Sweden by the ceiling in first-pillar benefits and later in con-
tributions, neither of which have ever existed in Finland. These differences 
are crucial in political terms, as the Finnish earnings-related regime provides 
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the primary pension incomes for workers whereas the Swedish regime is only 
one albeit very significant component among others in the overall pension 
provision.
Secondly, the assets generated by the earnings-related schemes were organ-
ised and invested quite differently. The Swedish assets were decentralised 
to functionally divided, publicly controlled but somewhat autonomous AP 
funds. The original three AP funds were for instance not allowed to invest in 
equity, as employers feared the possibility of so-called ‘pension fund socialism’ 
(Overbye, 1996a; 1996b). The three original funds had tripartite boards with 
different representative weights in different funds. However, the fourth AP 
fund that was created in the 1970s was controlled by the employees and had 
a broader mandate to invest in equity and other assets. The investments were 
mostly made to so-called social investment targets and government bonds. 
In the Finnish case, the funds were decentralised to different privately 
controlled pension providers (pension insurance companies, company funds 
and industry-wide funds), which had first weak and later strong paritarian 
control with no public representation (see e.g. Johanson & Sorsa, 2010). The 
heavily solvency rule constrained investments consisted almost exclusively 
of so-called premium loans, in which the employers had the legal right to 
borrow a great part of the contributions (originally in form of paying the 
contributions in bonds). Put bluntly, the Swedish framework enabled social 
investments with publicly defined political targets, while the Finnish frame-
work kept capital purely in private hands and in private economic targets.
The risk management created by the regimes concerned the same issues, 
but in different ways. Both earnings-related schemes reshaped the social risks 
of old age and brought them to a systemic level. In both cases, some of these 
risks also materialised. In the Swedish case, the ATP scheme, including the 
investment targets and in some scale outcomes, was normatively very legiti-
mate throughout its existence. The main risk of the ATP scheme was related 
to the somewhat fixed contribution rates. In the initial stage, the contribu-
tion levels were set quite high in respect to the early benefit levels, and it 
was broadly assumed that these contribution rates would be sufficient as the 
scheme matured. Put simply, the risk of old-age income of all Swedish private 
sector workers was turned deliberately into the systemic risk of having insuf-
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ficient contribution rates and investment returns to pay for the DB old-age 
incomes.
The original levels of pension contributions indeed proved to be too low, 
and the investment returns were modest. Although both the first and second 
tier pension programmes showed remarkable institutional resilience, the pen-
sion system was considered, due to the severe economic depression of 1990s, 
not to be able to ever meet its social policy targets in the long run and to 
have become simply too expensive (see Palme, 2003; 2005; Selén & Ståhlberg, 
2007). We will present the scheme adopted in the reforms of 1990s in more 
detail below.
In the Finnish case, the social policy targets of the TEL (from 2007 TyEL) 
scheme have been achieved at least this far, and the ‘liability side’ risks in 
general have been controlled effectively. However, this has had less to do with 
the original scheme design than with the constant parametric changes in the 
scheme (see below). Lately, there have been some accusations that the social 
partners did not raise contribution rates early enough to keep the anticipated 
rises in control (there are now greater pressures than ever to raise the rates), 
but otherwise the scheme, including its governance system, has been consid-
ered legitimate. The risks in the original scheme were more related to legiti-
macy of investments than to pension provision. 
Indeed, the TEL scheme was not only supposed to manage the risks of old 
age, but also to provide private capital for real economic growth (Niemelä, 
1994). The risk here was that if the employers did not for some reason need 
the premium loans anymore, the system design did not enable pension pro-
viders to invest in high-risk high-yield targets due to solvency regulations. As 
Finland opened and liberalised the financial sector in late 1980s, the firms in 
fact had no more need for premium loans. The recession of the early 1990s 
made Finnish sovereign bonds a convenient investment target for TEL pro-
viders and thus postponed some reforms, but it was clear in mid-1990s that 
the institution of premium lending and thus the production of economic 
growth with TEL capital had exhausted – it couldn’t answer the policy goals 
given to it anymore.
Since the initial paradigm, there have been significant institutional changes 
in both regimes. There have been major institutional albeit not necessarily as 
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much paradigmatic changes in basic pensions. Both countries have not given 
up but strengthened universalism in the basic pension system by guaranteeing 
a basic pension for all over 65 years of age. In Sweden, the whole basic pen-
sion system was replaced by a guarantee pension, thus making the earnings-
related scheme primary source of pensions. On the other hand, the guarantee 
pension is subject to the rule of living in total 40 years in Sweden, which has 
in fact weakened the universalism understood as coverage of the scheme. The 
Finns continue having a universal basic pension system for all who have lived 
in Finland for more than three years (albeit lower in benefit levels if the pen-
sioner has lived abroad more than 20 per cent of his time after 16 years of age), 
which is now also complemented by the guarantee for all those that for some 
reason fall outside all pension schemes supplementing the basic scheme. The 
financing arrangements of basic pensions have been changed in both coun-
tries. Finland for instance recently abolished the employers’ contribution, thus 
making the scheme fully financed by taxes, and the amount of basic pension 
received has made subject to the earnings-related benefits received.
Arguably the most significant political changes have taken place in the 
earnings-related schemes. The Finnish scheme has been developed in par-
ametric style in numerous small reforms concerning the accrual of pen-
sions, indexation rules, and sharing of costs (see Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003). 
Perhaps most importantly, the scheme has changed from a classic final or 
average salary DB scheme into a defined accrual scheme, in which rights to 
benefits are accrued from the salaries as they are paid. The scheme has also 
been subject to pressures of financialisation in the ‘asset side’ and governance 
(see Sorsa, 2011). The investment rules have been changed for many times to 
improve the ability to invest in higher risk and more profitable investment 
targets internationally. The regulations concerning pension providers have 
been homogenised, the investment functions have been made more inde-
pendent, and the competition between pension insurance companies has been 
increased. As result, the legitimacy of the scheme has become somewhat more 
dependent on successes in international portfolio investments in the indi-
vidual provider level in order to keep costs lower and public opinion positive.
In contrast to parametric changes in the Finnish earnings-related scheme, 
the changes in the Swedish scheme have been systemic and quite radical in 
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terms of social risk management. The pension reform that came in effect 
in 2001 was from the perspective of pension provision a major path depar-
ture from the old prefunded DB system to a new partially funded notional 
defined contribution (NDC) scheme. This change moved much of the bearing 
of investment and contribution rate risks from collective system levels (state 
and employers) to individuals, that is, to their pension benefits that are very 
much dependent on long-term real investment performance. Many demo-
graphic components have been added to the pension formulas, and employees 
now also share costs with employers by paying contributions. The new earn-
ings-related scheme includes on top of the PAYG sponsored income pension 
a (small) fully funded premium pension (PPM) that is controlled by private 
asset managers according to employee choice. This suggests that a (small) part 
of pensions is directly dependent on the financial skills and even pure chance 
of the employee. The pension provision is no more in public decision-making 
but only regulated by a government agency.
To sum up, both regimes have somewhat changed in their old age risk 
management paradigms. Both mandatory and universal two-tier manda-
tory pension systems originally managed the social risks of old age by trans-
forming the individual risks to collective risks in forms of variable pension 
contributions and of investment returns. The Swedish regime shifted invest-
ment risks from the system level to individuals after the failure to adjust the 
contribution rates, and eliminated the risk of variable contribution rates 
to employers with a fixed contribution rate. The institutional changes were 
broad. The Finnish regime has individualised some risks and changed the 
nature of collective risks by changing parameters in the pension formulas 
but without giving up the original risk management paradigm or reforming 
the institutional arrangement thoroughly. The Swedish case illustrates a very 
clear change in generating new risks, while changes in the Finnish regime 
remain more modest. Albeit in different forms in relation to social risk, the 
proficient operations of both regimes have nevertheless become equally much 
dependent on the performance of international portfolio investments. Next, 
we discuss the current form of risk management embedded in the funding 
mechanisms of these two systems in more detail.
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assets and liabilities: the funding mechanisms
The current funding mechanisms of the Swedish AP funds and Finnish TyEL 
providers have many similarities. After all, they are both partly and collec-
tively funded schemes that are very much reliant on the PAYG elements. Yet 
some visible differences remain when we look at some of the key accounting 
and administration issues of the pension formulas and funding mechanisms. 
Indeed, these differences are important in terms of understanding the contin-
gency in risk management, both in terms of generation of risks and in terms 
of formal governance of risk management. 
In the Swedish prefunded AP scheme, the logics of accounting follow a 
notional capitalised pension model. In a pure DC model, the liabilities (that 
is, the pension benefits) are defined as the workers retire from the overall 
capital accumulated, the paid contributions with investment yields. In the 
Swedish AP scheme, however, the capital is accumulated so that the contri-
butions are given a notional interest rate that is dependent on the growth of 
average earnings (see Barr & Diamond, 2011). In a pure DC model, all the 
inflowing pension contributions are in principle invested in financial markets. 
In the Swedish AP system, most of the contributions (around 90 per cent) 
are directly used to pay the AP pension benefits, while only the contributions 
exceeding the liabilities (around 10 per cent of contributions) are channelled 
to investments. The fund assets are thus used only to ensure the liquidity and 
long-term sustainability of the scheme. The capital is not invested through 
individual accounts or even within constraints provided by individual liabili-
ties as in DC schemes but via pooled capital. This suggests that the key con-
tingency related to the funding mechanism is how these buffer funds can exist 
sustainably in the first place – put simply, if they turn negative, there aren’t 
enough contributions to pay for the pensions, and the pensions must be cut.
The accounting logic of the Finnish TyEL scheme can be in part consid-
ered inverse to the AP system. In contrast to a prefunded scheme, the TyEL 
would be better characterised as a permanently under-funded scheme. In sim-
plified terms, if the funds are not sufficient (as they never are) to pay the indi-
vidual’s pension, the (always certain) deficiency can be covered by variable 
collective contribution rates. The accounting model is not based on capitalisa-
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tion as employees retire, but individuals’ liabilities are generated (that is, pen-
sion rights are accrued) throughout the working career. The accounting of lia-
bilities is individual-based until the employee reaches the age of 54 after which 
the contributions are pooled. The individual liabilities are again defined and 
settled between providers when the pension decision is made. The individual 
liabilities are paid first from the funded component and when this capital runs 
out, then by a collective PAYG component. Although the pooling technique 
brings a flavour of buffer funding to the scheme, most of the liabilities are 
individually accounted in each pension provider, which provides constraints 
for investment choices through solvency regulations. (Sorsa, 2011.)
Put bluntly, in Sweden the PAYG component is primary and in Finland 
secondary in the ‘marching order’ of accounting flows. Although this dif-
ference and the more general difference between NDC and defined accrual 
scheme may seem only technical, they are quite essential in defining the polit-
ical and the technical flexibility of social risk management. It is thus worth 
elaborating the contingencies in the ‘asset side’ of the schemes, the invest-
ments and contribution rates, and to the ‘liability side’ of the schemes, the 
pension benefits, in some more detail.
The asset side: contributions and investments
In case of contributions, there has been a clear choice in the Swedish scheme 
to fix the rates to a certain level. Basically this means that the costs of this 
mode of risk management are fixed while the management mechanism itself 
has to be flexible. From the perspective of employers and employees as con-
tributors, the costs of old-age social risk management are thus fixed and can 
be anticipated long to the future – it is the benefits and investments that are 
adjusted if necessary. If the contribution rates were to be changed, it would 
call for a review of the entire scheme by the so-called Pensions Committee or, 
ultimately, the government and the parliament. The lack of flexibility within 
contribution rates also designates less room for policy manoeuvre in the 
Swedish labour markets, putting pressure solely on AP funds to outperform 
its targets in order to cover for the too low contributions. 
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The Finnish scheme has an inverse logic: the risk management mechanism 
is fixed but its costs are not. The accrued benefits are protected by the consti-
tutionally enforced property right and thus cannot be adjusted but through 
very specific mechanisms (see below). So, it is the contribution rates that 
must be adjusted when necessary. Both the employers and the employees pay 
contributions, the former covering around three and the latter one fourth 
of the overall contribution rate (at the time of writing 27.2–29 per cent of 
monthly salary). Formally, the Ministry for Social and Health Affairs sets the 
contribution rates annually based on legally enforced calculative formulas, 
which would suggest that the contribution rates vary directly according to 
the changes in pension payments. In practice, however, the pension providers 
and the Centre for Pensions first set the bases for the calculative formulas and 
prepare the calculations before the rates are actually set, which makes the 
contribution rates somewhat contingent. Furthermore, the pension providers 
can (and must) use a part of their investment profits to customer compen-
sations for the employer-contributors, which makes a part of the contribu-
tion rates even further contingent. That said, the most significant long-term 
contingency concerning the development of the contribution rates is that all 
solutions, including the sharing of costs between employers and employees, 
are ultimately subject to the decision-making by the social partners and other 
actors in the field (Johanson & Sorsa, 2010). 
Although there are adjustment mechanisms for benefits (see below), the 
long-term investment performance is crucial in defining the financial and 
social sustainability of the Swedish scheme. Because contributions are fixed, 
the AP investment activities must be flexible in order to optimize investment 
portfolios to compensate for the possible failures of the funding mechanism in 
the long run. It is thus hardly a surprise that the investment mandates of the 
AP funds are based on quite flexible principle-based regulations albeit with 
a few direct rules concerning the investments. In the AP1–4 funds, all listed 
and transferable capital market instruments are in principle allowed with the 
exception of commodity investments.
However, at least 30 per cent of assets must be invested in low-risk fixed 
income instruments and 10 per cent of assets must be managed by external 
managers, and there are various allocation ceilings (concerning currency risk, 
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single security issuers, unlisted securities, Swedish listed company owner-
ship, and more general single entity ownership). Despite these rulings, the 
sustainability of the AP scheme is very much dependent on the investment 
performance, and thus the skills of the portfolio managers and the overall 
international financial market development. When taking the premium pen-
sions into account, the selection of investors of individual accounts further 
highlights the issue of financial skills as a crucial factor of risk management 
in the Swedish scheme. The universal application of personal choice over pen-
sion fund investment shifts the risks to individuals regardless of their finan-
cial literacy, resources available to monitor market volatility or their skills in 
calculating financial risks.22
In the Finnish scheme, the individual providers’ mandate to choose invest-
ment targets is broad, complemented with various rules and ceilings con-
cerning the investment activities as in the Swedish case. However, the funding 
mechanism and other regulations further limit the investment activities sig-
nificantly in various ways, both quantitatively and qualitatively (see Sorsa, 
2011, for details). For example of the former, the solvency rules directly con-
trol the availability of assets to be invested and the proper overall risk levels 
of the investments, and make the providers interdependent on each others’ 
choices (in a ‘game theoretical’ manner). For example of the latter, the usage 
of mandated external managers (excluding fund investments) is completely 
forbidden.
Although there are no major obstacles for making investment activities 
more flexible institutionally, the key issue here is that they don’t need to be 
flexible in order to manage the sustainability of the scheme in the long run – it 
is sufficient to adjust the pension contribution rates that are used to comple-
ment the pension payments when the funded assets are not enough to cover 
the payments. It is, of course, evident that long-term investment perform-
ance affects all contribution rates in the TyEL scheme. From the perspective 
of effectively sustainable social risk management, however, the number one 
issue is how the contribution rates are adjusted. 
22  So far the attempt to establish such mass investment culture based on individuals’ capacity 
to manage financial risk has been considered somewhat problematic (see Belfrage & Ryner, 
2009; Belfrage in this volume).
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Indeed, the key difference in the flexibility of the asset side of the two 
schemes is that they give flexibility to different sources of income, which also 
includes many asymmetries and has important implications concerning the 
politics of risk management. In Sweden, flexibility is sought by empowering 
investors, the AP funds, which are made the crucial actors in defining the 
sustainability of the overall functioning of the scheme, while no flexibility on 
the contribution rates. This is in contrast to the idea of AP funds as ‘buffer 
funds’ – the failure to achieve sufficient investment return is a social risk that 
may lead to the lowering of pension benefits. As the AP funds are directly 
responsible for the level of pension benefits, it would be wrong to call AP 
funds merely buffer funds. It must be noted, of course, that the funds are 
only responsible for the downside risks, not any kind of ‘upside risks’ – good 
investment performance does not increase pensions.
While the contribution rates in the Finnish TyEL scheme will change 
automatically as the pension liabilities increase, the social partners can con-
trol the stability of this rise by deciding to ‘frontload’ expected increases or 
decreases of costs by agreeing on adjusting the funded amount of contribu-
tions. The Finnish scheme empowers social partners, while the investments 
remain just a matter of lowering the costs of the scheme. In fact, the good 
investment performance translates only into customer compensations for the 
employers (which affect employee contributions in the long run as well) while 
bad investment performance does not, at least directly, imply any changes in 
contributions. 
These differences in the ‘politics of the asset side’ in the two countries 
directly shift focus on the governance and accountability of these schemes. 
Take for example incentives. In case of investments, the Finnish TyEL pro-
viders are accountable for positively lowering the pension costs of their cus-
tomers, while the Swedish AP funds are accountable only negatively for 
avoiding the cuts in their customers’ pensions. In other words, the Finnish 
scheme structurally provides mostly carrots for developing accountability 
in investment activities while the Swedish scheme only provides sticks. The 
Finnish investors have all the reasons to show that they perform well whatever 
the market situations while the Swedish investors have good reasons to try 
to shift the blame to financial markets when things go wrong. These are with 
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no doubt significant differences when we think about the social legitimacy of 
these schemes. We will return to other governance, legitimacy, and account-
ability issues in the conclusions section.
The liability side: pension benefits, adjustments and formulas
When it comes to the definition of pension benefits, both schemes share a 
great variety of contingencies thematically – it is just the mechanisms and 
their roles that differ. In the Swedish scheme, the pensions accrue from the 
paid contributions, and the accrued amounts are indexed to the development 
of average Swedish wage levels. As the pensions are annuitised, the estima-
tion of the pension benefit is calculated based on an annuity divisor with each 
birth cohort and each retirement age having a specific divisor that directly 
links pension benefits with life expectancy rates, average ages for men and 
women recalculated each year. After determining the amount of the pension 
benefit, this amount is each year calculated based on the annual growth of 
real wages minus a fixed 1.6 per cent interest rate that supposedly captures the 
long-term real wage growth. This means for example that if the income index 
increases by exactly 1.6 percentage points more than inflation, as measured 
by the Consumer Price Index, pensions will increase at exactly the same rate 
as inflation. If the increase is lower or higher than 1.6 percentage points, there 
will be a loss or increase respectively of real income.23 In order for pensioners 
to see an increase of their pension, average growth rates should exceed infla-
tion rates and on top of this the fixed 1.6 per cent interest rate. 
In the Finnish case, the pensions accrue from salaries variably according 
to age. For those under 53 years, the accrual rate is 1.5 per cent of the annual 
wage sum. For those between 53 and 63 years, the rate is 1.9 per cent, and 
for those between 63 and 68 years, it is 4.5 per cent. The latter, the so-called 
23  The change in the index consists of two parts. The first is the average annual change in 
average income for the latest three-year period, excluding inflation; the second is inflation for 
the latest 12-month period ending in June. Pension qualifying income is not known until after 
the final tax assessment, i.e. in December of the year following the income year. This means that 
the income for the two most recent years is based on estimates. Errors in estimates are corrected 
in the indices for subsequent years. (See Pensionsmyndigheten, 2010, for further details.) 
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‘super-accrual’, provides strong incentives to have longer working careers. The 
indexation of accrued pension is arranged so that 80 per cent of the accrued 
pension is dependent on the overall wage development and 20 per cent on 
the consumer price index changes. After the initial pension is set, the amount 
of future pension benefits is adjusted in collective terms in Finland as well. 
There are at least two key mechanisms in play here. Firstly, the amount of 
annual pensions is dependent on the consumer price inflation (80 per cent of 
the change) and the changes in the real wage levels (20 per cent). This reflects 
the idea that the purchase power of the pension is more important than the 
changes in for example labour market conditions and productivity growth. 
Secondly, the annual pensions are dependent on the expected longevity of an 
age cohort. Currently it seems that the pension benefits will be lower for the 
future generations than initially expected due to increasing longevity.
Indeed, the two pension schemes have many similarities when looking at 
the risks related to the accrual of sufficient mandatory earnings-related pen-
sions. Looking at the issue from the perspective of risks during individuals’ 
working careers, failing to accrue pension is in both countries dependent on 
the employment record and wage levels from which pensions are accrued. 
Looking at the issue from a system-level standpoint, there are again strong 
similarities in the accrual mechanism. In both countries, the accrual is 
dependent first on the development in average earnings (albeit less in Finland, 
in which it is also dependent on consumer price inflation) and, as the pension 
is annuitised, then on the life expectancy rates of the birth and age cohort. 
If the average salaries in the Swedish and Finnish economies do not rise but 
the life expectancy does, it will mean lower accrued pensions for workers in 
respective countries independent of the working career or salary level track 
records of these individuals. When looking at the accrual of pensions, there 
are only two important differences in the two regimes: the Swedish premium 
pension system makes accrual of pension in part dependent on individuals’ 
financial skills in that regime, and the ‘super accrual’ incentive makes working 
in the last years of the working career especially important in Finland.
Some similarities exist between the countries also at the moment of annui-
tisation of the accrued pensions. The Swedish annuity divisor refers to an 
adjusted estimate of the expected period of pension-drawing based on the 
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birth year and the average life expectancy in accordance with the demo-
graphic trends and medical advances.  The divisor is calculated separately 
for each age cohort. In Finland, a similar life expectancy adjustment factor is 
calculated for each age cohort in the age of 62 on the basis of last five years’ 
mortality rates. While the differences in accrual and annuitisation of pensions 
between the two regimes are significant albeit nuanced, we can find major dif-
ferences only when we look at the question of how the already accrued (that 
is, final) pensions are adjusted ex post facto over time and how this affects 
individuals’ pensions in real value. 
For example, the changes in life the overall real wage development affect 
the pensions in both countries. In the Finnish case, however, the effects of the 
development is very limited, as real wages affect only 20 per cent of annual 
adjustments (80 per cent is defined by consumer prices index). In Sweden, the 
effects can range from ignorable to ones with utmost importance. The effects 
of the somewhat arbitrary ‘real wages minus 1.6 per cent’ indexation rule are 
quite difficult to anticipate, as it is fully dependent on the development of the 
relationship between wage levels and inflation. 
The Finnish TyEL scheme has no other adjustment mechanisms for the 
final pensions besides the ones already mentioned, and thus the adjustments 
of the pension benefits after annuitisation remains rather stable although. The 
Swedish AP scheme in contrast includes a ‘brake mechanism’ that automati-
cally balances the relation between assets (the value of future contributions 
plus the cumulative returns from fund investments) and liabilities (future pen-
sion obligations), which is activated whenever the balance between assets and 
liabilities falls below 1. This is with no doubt the key difference between the 
two regimes in the ‘liability side’ of pensions. The Swedish ‘brake mechanism’ 
affects benefits according to living expectancy age per birth cohorts, labour 
market conditions, and even immigration rates (Första AP-Fonden, 2007). 
The balance mechanism is thus prone to be activated on several accounts. 
For example, in the aftermath of the US subprime crisis, in 2008, invest-
ment returns averaged -21.3 per cent, and the brake mechanism was activated 
by removing any indexation in both pension accrual and benefits (Sundén, 
2009). However, while financial markets recovered and the profitability of the 
AP funds was restored, the Swedish labour market still faced lower employ-
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ment levels and therefore low overall wage increases in 2009. During 2009 
and for the first semester of 2010 there was a substantial change in the actual 
funding of the schemes since the net inflows from the National Insurance 
Board (RFV) pension system (i.e. the net of incoming pension contribu-
tions minus pension disbursements) was negative. The labour market con-
ditions and the economic recession reduced the funded buffer despite finan-
cial recovery, and the pensioners started to expect lower retirement income.24 
It could be argued that employment actually remains the first and foremost 
influential factor for the financial stability of the balance ratio with net immi-
gration and birth rates mostly boosting the contribution base of the system. 
Low contributions channelled in the system as well as negative returns from 
the buffer funds may continue activating the balance mechanism in the future, 
with contributors and pensioners losing even more through indexation with-
drawals.
24  Benefits will be affected in 2011 and 2012. The deficit in the system affects indexation with a 
lag (see Sundén, 2009).
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table 1: mechanisms potentially causing lower-than-sufficient annual real value 
earnings-related pensions in the swedish and finnish first pillar schemes.
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All in all, the differences between the Swedish and the Finnish earnings-
related schemes are summarised in Table 1 in terms of potential negative 
effects to annual pensions and, to be more specific, of potential causes that 
can lead to lower-than-sufficient pensions (sufficiency being a political ques-
tion as such, of course). Perhaps the key difference between the Finnish and 
the Swedish ‘liability side contingencies’ is that the annual amount of pensions 
in Sweden can be very significantly adjusted also with ex post facto mecha-
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nisms, while the major Finnish adjustments are limited only to the accrual 
and annuitisation stages. From the perspective of social risk management par-
adigm, the difference is with no doubt crucial. The Swedish scheme is not nec-
essarily that effective in managing social risks of pensioners, but rather those 
of employers and workers (see Barr & Diamond, 2011). The Finnish scheme 
in contrast effectively insures against the social risks of old age, but keeps the 
division of costs between the employers and the employees an open question. 
That said, if we look at the key contingencies in both paradigms more 
closely, we can see that it is the same social issues that affect the pensions: 
national employment rates (not just own employment or the success of one’s 
own employer), overall (not just personal) wage levels that define the indexa-
tion of accrual and benefits, life expectancy of all citizens (not just workers), 
birth rates and immigration rates, and all other kinds of issues affecting the 
basic economic and social conditions of the society. What is easily forgotten 
here is that automatic adjustments based on these factors are never automatic 
in the sense that you cannot affect them politically. It just means that the 
management of the social risks of the old age are made dependent on more 
system-level issues and, as result, it has been made dependent on more gen-
eral-level employment, economic, labour market, health, immigration and 
other national policies. It is not just the risks the individuals face, but also the 
failures in these policy areas that the pension system as a mode of risk man-
agement answers to. In the Swedish case, it is the pensioners who pay the bill 
for national policy failures unless the funds can compensate for these failures 
with exceptional investment performance. In Finland, the bill of national fail-
ures is not paid by pensioners but the contributors (that is, the operating firms 
and employees) whose share of the bill can be negotiated. The employers’ bill 
is further dependent on the investment performance of the pension providers. 
These issues and linkages may give the governance of these schemes much 
more political flavour than the issues that seem to be rather technical pen-
sion system design issues. For example, the Finnish scheme provides labour 
unions as well as employer organisations a strong incentive to cooperate in 
contexts of both national economic policy and of the pension system devel-
opment in order to avoid rapid growth of pension contributions whatever the 
reason for the rise (e.g. low employment rates, high wage increases, too low 
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long-term investment performance). Furthermore, the Finnish pension gov-
ernance system, which has paritarian elements at every level (see Johanson 
& Sorsa, 2010), has a strong potential for increasing solidarity between indi-
vidual firms and employee groups. The Swedish system does not quite pro-
vide similar positive incentives. Rather, it provides individual employers an 
incentive to compete on skilled labour with generous second pillar pension 
schemes and, as is the case with employees, to question the legitimacy of the 
rather expensive first pillar scheme whenever pension benefits are cut.
conclusions: key issues for  
re-Politicising the Pension systems
The Swedish and Finnish mandatory earnings-related pension schemes we 
have discussed in this chapter illustrate a great variety of similarities and dif-
ferences in the contingencies they generate for the risk management. To end 
the chapter, we discuss some of the key political issues and challenges these 
differences generate in the respective schemes and countries. The difference 
between the two schemes can be quite feasibly approached with a few simple 
questions. Perhaps most importantly, there is the simple question of what 
can you do if the scheme ‘runs out of money’, that is, if assets are not enough 
to meet the liabilities. This is not the only important question, however. One 
must also ask who is accountable for the performance of the scheme and how, 
and what kind of incentives you have for improving the sustainability of the 
risk management paradigm. We will shed light over these questions and high-
light some key issues that should be tackled when re-politisizing the schemes 
in respective countries.
In Finland, running out of assets to meet liabilities is very unlikely to 
happen due to strict solvency and liquidity controls, and the simple ‘bal-
ancing mechanism’ of pension liabilities reducing whenever employment 
or wage levels fall. Moreover, if it for some reason is expected to happen, 
it just implies rather automatic increase in contribution rates for the next 
year. While the TyEL scheme is considered socially quite legitimate and sus-
tainable (see TELA, 2010), few employers and not that many employees are 
willing to accept higher pension contribution rates. The increasing contribu-
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tion rates have raised some concerns over the justice of generational redistri-
bution, and there have been even some demands for ceilings in contribution 
rates. These dispositions, and the fact that the scheme delivers primary pen-
sions for nearly all Finns, have lead to constant re-politicisation of individual 
institutions affecting the costs of the scheme. Given the automatic increase in 
contributions rates when decisions might be pending, the Finnish solution 
is politically empowering in the sense that the sustainability of the scheme 
are matters of contingent decision-making over individual institutions of the 
scheme, not questions dependent solely on investment returns available from 
financial markets or on the pension incomes of the masses as in the Swedish 
case. 
That said, it must be noted that the development of the TyEL system is 
dependent on the ability to find consensus or otherwise agree on politicized 
issues concerning the institutions of the field. As the field of TyEL provi-
sion is filled with various administrative, political and institutional tensions 
(see Johanson & Sorsa, 2010; Sorsa & Johanson, 2011), the overall proficiency 
of risk management is at a very general level dependent on the agreement 
between the key actors of the field. In practice, there are no institutional-
ised bodies that would ensure agreement, but all negotiations are based on 
ad hoc negotiation group arrangements. Although a first-pillar scheme, even 
the roles of the government and the parliament have been very limited in 
the development of the scheme. The role of social partners is in contrast cru-
cial: no change is possible without them agreeing, approving and initiating it. 
While the Finnish scheme is positively prone to re-politicisation, the actual 
politics of the scheme are often filled with problems and ambiguities. There is 
no rigorous political or at least democratic accountability in decision-making. 
Neither have the main political parties any political incentives to take over 
the decision-making from the social partners, because it would imply loss 
of support from employer and employee federations and unions. In case the 
decisions would decrease pension security, it is convenient for parties to leave 
decision-making to the social partners.
Lately, there have been major difficulties in finding agreement over the 
development of the scheme, the main issue on the table being the formal 
minimum retirement age (currently 63 for old-age pension). One reason for 
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the difficulties lies in the opposing views of employers and employees. The 
previous would like to raise the age, while the latter opposes it and highlights 
the importance of ‘super accrual’ incentives and of raising the de facto retire-
ment age (which is closer to 60) with informal measures and policies. Another 
reason concerns the groups or committees in which these issues have been 
discussed. The mandates that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has set 
for the negotiation groups have been all but fit for purpose. 
At a more general level, the main political challenge for finding agreement 
has been the change in collective bargaining cultures. Formerly the pension 
system development issues were a part of the annual tripartite bargaining 
over incomes policy (usually called TUPO). The potential erosion of the cen-
tral bargaining may increase ‘ad-hoc-ism’, and might make it more difficult to 
get the social partners around the same table with the state, as the partners 
are already discussing the key issues within the field in various arrangements. 
The state has, for example, very few concessions in tax policies and economic 
policy left to lure the employers to ad hoc development efforts. This provides 
incentives for the government to take direct action, which may distance the 
parliament from social partners even further. Indeed, while the institutions 
of the Finnish scheme are constantly prone to re-politicisation, it does not 
imply that the politics would be democratically accountable, deliberative, or 
without significant tensions.
If there is something characteristic to the politics of the Swedish AP/
PPM scheme, it is the aim at de-politicisation of all individual institutions 
and variables within the pension scheme. The organisation of the decision-
making over the sustainability of the scheme aims at avoiding the re-politi-
cisation of pension governance by placing the system on an ‘automatic trail’. 
The main question with the Swedish scheme is what happens if or when some 
of the parameters (fewer contributions, low or negative AP funds investment 
returns, decline of wage growth, increase of inflation rates etc.) remain unfa-
vourable towards the increase of AP/PPM scheme assets. Given that the con-
tribution rates are fixed, the room for policy manoeuvre is all but spacious. It 
is all about deciding how pensions are cut – about adjusting individual param-
eters of the brake mechanism, which will cut pensions in any case. Albeit that 
the AP/PPM is only one scheme among many in providing the overall pen-
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sion income, this makes the whole scheme vulnerable to system-level con-
testation. Indeed, in the AP/PPM scheme, the social risks are not shared and 
costs redistributed if necessary, but only elevated at the systemic level.
The paradigm of de-politicisation has been present in the governance as 
well. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Swedish government 
reformed the so-called Pension Committee, which was originally put together 
for the creation of AP/PPM scheme, to discuss issues on generosity levels and, 
essentially, why the AP funds suffered such severe losses during the financial 
crisis. The Committee is comprised by technical experts, political party repre-
sentatives25 and does not include any member from unions or employer asso-
ciations. Although the government is delegating experts to find solutions (for 
how to cut pensions if necessary, or how to gain better investment returns), 
accountability is spread among the major political parties and the political 
system as a whole – it is not directed to experts. For example, the indexation 
from contribution accruals and pension benefits was removed with the Pen-
sion Committee decision to activate the brake mechanism in the aftermaths 
of the financial crisis, and the government abided. But will this affect the 
popularity of the government, the whole AP/PPM scheme, or perhaps the AP 
fund directors? While it is impossible to anticipate the results, it is clear that 
the government is the only one that can be affected through democratic vote.
The pressure on the sustainability of the AP/PPM scheme lays on the con-
tinuation of wage growth and increase of employment levels, but also on the 
satisfactory returns of the AP funds. As the system is incorporating employ-
ment levels and wage growth within the calculation for pension benefits, the 
employers have no incentives to increase employment levels, as there are no 
gains in the case of an AP/PPM surplus. Neither is there any indication that 
the Swedish government would be willing to take an active and intervening 
role towards the increase of pension assets or shifting the investment prin-
ciples of AP funds. So it must be asked, would flexibility in the contribution 
rates be completely unfeasible for employers or politically unacceptable for 
the employees? While this would with no doubt relieve the negative contin-
gencies of the risk management, it is difficult find political incentives for this 
25  The Left (ex-communist) party opposed the reform and did not participate in the 
committee. 
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happening. There is no clear indication why employers would be interested 
in increasing their contributions towards the AP/PPM scheme in the first 
place, since they continue to fund second-pillar occupational pensions for 
their employees, which can be used as a means for competition. 
These issues show that in comparison to the Finnish scheme, there are very 
few incentives for actually developing the sustainability and to control the 
contingencies of risk management in Sweden – if the system fails, there are no 
incentives for employers or employees to increase contribution rates. Unless 
the government changes fundamentally its approach towards the regulation 
and sustainability of the scheme, a failure to meet a politically and socially 
acceptable retirement income will be transformed into a systemic questioning 
of the AP/PPM scheme, and possibly another epic reform of the system. 
To end the chapter, it is worth noting that when we combine both the asset 
and the liability sides of pensions as risk management in the two countries, 
we can see that they provide different buttons to push in economic policy. 
Both pension schemes are in nature pro-cyclic, but in a very different manner. 
When a combined financial and economic downturn hits, the Swedish AP/
PPM will react to it by lowering pensions of nearly all Swedish pensioners, 
while the Finnish TyEL scheme mildly increases the pension contribution 
rates for all employers and employees (unless otherwise distributed). In 
Sweden, this means that the effective real demand of the economy falls, which 
decreases expectations and makes it difficult to find new real investments, 
and thus ultimately slows down the emergence of any growth prospects. In 
Finland, it mostly means that at least labour-intensive new productive initia-
tives and real investments become slightly more expensive, which is hardly a 
disaster. However, it also gives incentives to cut down jobs, which may lower 
effective demand and lead to lower pensions in the long run. 
Although it is a matter of theoretical economics to evaluate which one is 
worse, the decrease in effective demand or higher costs of supply, it is clear that 
the optimal economic policy (both preventive policies and policy responses) 
is very different in the two countries if we increase our understanding on pen-
sions. This is ultimately what the contingency in risk management is all about 
in the first place – without understanding these contingencies, it only leads to 
false understanding on social risks and their politics.
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Nordic social risk management and  
the challenge of EU regulation:  
labour market parity at risk
t heo  PaPad oP ouloS  &  an tonioS  rouMPakiS 
introduction
There has been a long-standing consensus among the employer and employee 
representatives in the coordination of labour market institutions in the Nordic 
countries. This consensus has been built upon the idea of parity in collective 
bargaining, or labour market parity, which refers to the reciprocal recognition 
of interests between labour market representatives and to parity-based nego-
tiations and agreements in which a consensus can be reached (see Kettunen, 
2011). The principle of labour market parity is, in part, related to the Nordic 
conception of democracy, as the principle was entrenched to the Nordic soci-
eties with the extension of democratic rights. For example trade unions were 
supposed, as Kettunen (2011, 31) argues, to extend democracy in two senses: 
both as a ‘popular movement’, following the Nordic tradition of voluntary 
associations, and as labour market ‘party’, as one of the two parties making 
parity-based agreements on the labour market. The institutional mechanisms 
of labour market bargaining between voluntary organisation representatives 
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and the norm of parity-based agreements are both intrinsic to the so-called 
Nordic model in terms of organising power relations in the national govern-
ance of social risk management and in social risk sharing more generally. 
In this chapter, we argue that the recent developments within what we call 
‘the European social space’ prescribe many challenges for the future of col-
lective bargaining in Nordic countries. In terms of labour market parity as a 
norm, the Nordic model does not quite correspond to the current European 
policies but rather provides alternative policies and ideas for the future of 
European integration (see discussions on ‘flexicurity’, Lisbon Treaty targets 
etc.). While there has been much critical review of the normative contents of 
the Lisbon Treaty and EU employment targets (see e.g. Carmel, 2005), there 
has been yet much less attention to the institutional effects of the integra-
tion process. In this chapter, we argue that the European regulation of labour 
market bargaining poses direct institutional challenges for the Nordic collec-
tive bargaining institutions built upon the parity principle in particular and 
for the national governance of social risk management more generally.
Schematically, there are two streams of literature that discuss how the con-
temporary mechanisms of national collective bargaining have become under 
pressure in various economies. Many authors have highlighted the impor-
tance of globalisation as ‘a temporal and spatial reconstruction of social 
practices’ that widen power asymmetries between labour market actors and 
weaken the prerequisites for national social solidarity (e.g. Kettunen, 1999). 
Others have focused on changes in national labour market institutions and 
especially highlighted the employers’ role in promoting decentralised forms of 
bargaining, flexible wage negotiations and regulation of temporary work (e.g. 
Dølvin et al., 2010; Lindvall & Rothstein, 2006). In this chapter, we demon-
strate that these streams can be feasibly combined when we look at transna-
tional regulatory mechanisms. To be precise, they also ought to be combined 
when the goal is to provide rigorous understanding on how the European 
regulatory environment poses challenges to the national labour market agree-
ments in the Nordic countries. We argue that the ability of trade unions to act 
as a collective actor in the European social space is significantly hampered by 
a particular form of (emerging) meta-governance. 
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The chapter continues with a section that provides definitions for the three 
key theoretical concepts used in this chapter – structural power, European 
social space and meta-governance – after which the characteristics of Euro-
pean meta-governance will be studied empirically in more detail. In the third 
section of the chapter, we first examine what was regarded as a ‘neo-liberal’ 
attempt to integrate services market through the Services Directive (2006/123/
EC). We consider this attempt a typical example of top-down models of reg-
ulating national industrial relations. Our empirical research then draws on 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions in the cases of ‘Laval’, ‘Viking’, 
‘Rüffert’ and ‘Luxemburg’. The Services Directive and the rulings of ECJ cases 
represent attempts to set competition as the main principle for regulating 
socio-economic life in the EU. The ECJ cases demonstrate that the main chal-
lenge for the governance of labour-capital relations in the EU is not solely the 
competition of wages between workers but rather how EU institutions might 
favour the inclusion of other collective agreements than the existing national 
ones. In this way, there is not just a downward competition between wages, 
but also a competition between different collective agreements. 
In the fourth and last section of the chapter, we discuss the implications 
that stem from the creation of competitive markets at the European level to 
the future of the European industrial relations in general and to the Nordic 
industrial relations in particular. We argue that, fundamentally, the ECJ rul-
ings are about the struggle over the ‘hierarchy of values’ that could frame 
the European social space and its process of integration. This is a struggle 
in which, so far, European labour seems to be on the losing side. In this sec-
tion, we also explore what kinds of effects the power asymmetries within the 
European labour markets produce to the collective bargaining mechanisms 
that mediate labour market partners’ interests to social risk management in 
Sweden and Finland (with the Laval and Viking cases, respectively). We con-
clude the chapter with a reflection on the challenges that competition and 
market-based principles pose for the Nordic model of social risk sharing and 
to the potential attempts to apply the ‘labour market parity’ principle beyond 
the national levels of action.
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structuring Politics and contextualising action: 
Power, social sPaces and meta-governance 
The purpose of this section is to provide definitions for three key ideas and 
concepts used in the following sections of the chapter. The first one is struc-
tural power, which is crucial for understanding the nature of labour market 
relations in different settings, in our case the difference between the Nordic 
labour market parity and the European labour market paradigms. When we 
use the concept of power we refer to a dynamic relation between social agents. 
We have intentionally distinguished power as a dynamic relation and power as 
a resource. Instead of referring to actors having power (i.e. the more colloquial 
use of the term), we understand social agents as exercising power by mobi-
lising power resources in any or all of the dimensions of power: structural, 
relational and discursive power.26 The dimension addressed here is structural 
power, which can be seen similar to what Hay (2002) describes as the ‘con-
text-shaping aspects’ of social action. Exercising power in this dimension is 
achieved by mobilising power resources in order to defend or alter the insti-
tutions and/or the mode of governance that regulates the distribution of the 
power resources – the ‘rules of the game’, that is. 
By exploring this dimension, analysis can potentially ‘capture’ the insti-
tuting capacity of social agents. Power asymmetries are observable as differ-
ences in the capacity of social agents to maintain or alter the rules of the game. 
In addition, changes in the form and content of institutions follow changes 
in the agents’ capacity to mobilise structural power resources. In this context, 
structural power is the dynamic relation between social agents intending to 
defend or alter how regulatory processes are consolidated institutionally. The 
outcome of this dynamic relation ‘translates’ into both the contents of the 
26  Besides structural power discussed in the text, relational power is the ability to force a social 
subject to do something that otherwise s/he would be reluctant to do, and discursive power the 
way that society recognises, understands and interprets social categories within the existing 
power-relations. Discursive power thus refers to the concepts, assumptions and perceptions 
of reality that are hegemonic in one or more social spaces of the society. Consequently power 
resources have relational, structural and discursive properties (see Papadopoulos, 2006). This 
conceptualisation of power is a theoretical synthesis drawing inspiration from Lukes (2005), 
Strange (1994), Hay (2002) and Bourdieu (2005).
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institutions and the modes of instituting them. Institutions are here under-
stood as “structurations of power and as residues of conflict” (Korpi, 2001, 8). 
The second key concept in this chapter is the European social space. By 
‘social space’ we refer to a spatially and temporally specific combination of a 
mode of governance, corresponding institutions, interacting agents and their 
power resources. The term is inspired by Bourdieu (1985) who used it to define 
a multidimensional field of social action created and institutionally (re)consti-
tuted by the power dynamics between social actors. A social space is regulated 
by a (territorially and temporally contingent) mode of governance, whose 
institutional architecture (as well as its logic of instituting) determines how 
power resources will be redistributed in the social space and, consequently, 
how the relational power dynamics between the social actors will be exercised.
Although social spaces are of different regulatory scales (e.g. local, national 
or transnational), they are also linked to each other, often hierarchically. Thus 
it is not only the character of social spaces of action at different scales (for 
example the different types of national employment models, national pro-
duction regimes or the ‘European social model’ etc.) but also how they relate 
to each other and how and at which scale their relationship is regulated that 
one must address here. In this chapter, we examine how the structural power 
asymmetry between unions and employers is currently articulated in the 
shifting levels of governance and spaces of action in the EU by examining 
how the interaction between national social spaces is regulated at the Euro-
pean level. It is argued that the locus of the power dynamics between labour 
and capital in the EU is shifting from national social spaces into an emerging 
European social space. The latter is not merely a summation of national social 
spaces nor ‘European’ in sense of supranational, but primarily a social space 
cum mode of governance that regulates the interaction between these two 
levels of social action. 
Finally, our chapter adopts an analytical definition of governance to refer 
to both the content of institutions in a social space and the mode of instituting 
it (see Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003). However, governance is not only the 
mode of governing at one level of social action but also about governing the 
interplay between different modes of governance and between different levels 
of social action. To avoid conceptual conflations, we adopt Jessop’s concept of 
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meta-governance to refer to the emerging mode of governance of the Euro-
pean social space (as defined above). We argue that the aforementioned shift 
from national social spaces into an emerging European social space is accom-
panied by ‘a re-articulation of powers and a re-territorialisation of social rela-
tions’ (Brenner et al., 2003), which is meta-regulated to favour capital and the 
market rationale of governance. Drawing from recent events in the develop-
ment of EU labour relations, we argue that the ability of trade unions to act 
as a collective actor in the European social space is significantly hampered by 
the particular form of (emerging) meta-governance, whose characteristics we 
will next explore in more detail empirically. 
regulating labour relations in the euroPean social 
sPace: from harmonisation to comPetition
The Services Directive has its origins in the guidelines named after the Dutch 
Commissioner for internal market issues in the EU, Frits Bolkestein. The 
directive aimed at liberalising the provision of services in the European social 
space and at further integrating the services market as stated in the Lisbon 
strategy. According to the Bolkestein guidelines, services could be bought 
depending on the wage levels of the country of origin of the service provider. 
The initial plan of the guideline was to ‘harmonise’ the internal labour market 
by withdrawing market distortions (national agreements) in the service sector 
in the European social space. Apart from ‘harmonisation’, the possible adop-
tion of the guideline would have cancelled the national collective bargaining 
and simultaneously provided the necessary regulation to promote downward 
wage competition between EU citizens. The proposal sparked fierce protests 
in countries with ‘coordinated market economies’, a term borrowed from the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature (see Hall & Soskice, 2001; Menz, 2003). 
Despite the political clout in several countries, the succeeding Com-
missioner McGreevy and the Commission President Barroso were putting 
through the reform agenda of the Commission, the Services Directive being 
at the heart of this agenda. The member countries did not welcome the Serv-
ices Directive warmly. The idea of the ‘Polish plumber’, an example of under-
mining the wage and working conditions of French plumbers, managed to 
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mobilise a majority that rejected the adoption of the European Constitution. 
It was clear with the French non in March 2005 that the Services Directive 
had attracted very much negative attention – so much that it in part halted 
the approval of the whole European Constitution. 
Almost ten months later, the Services Directive was passed in European 
Parliament but with significant amendments limiting the impact of ‘harmoni-
sation’. The split of employers’ interests, along with the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) lobbying for the amendment of the proposal, paved 
the way for a distinct alliance of interests within the European parliament 
(Dølvin & Ødergård, 2009). In terms of voting, the social democratic parties 
and the Christian democratic parties voted in favour of the amended pro-
posal. In contrast, liberal parties expressed their concern that the proposal 
is not meeting the needs for a ‘harmonised’ labour market. The conserva-
tive parties from Great Britain, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic rejected the revised proposal. Left wing and communist par-
ties also voted against the proposal. The voting was very much based on “a 
mixture of a ‘left-right divide’ and a ‘clash of capitalisms’” (Höpner & Schäefer, 
2007, 14). 
In the end, the Commission presented a proposal that incorporated the 
amendments voted by the Parliament and the European Council of Economic 
Ministers accepted unanimously the ratified proposals. ETUC was satisfied 
with the abolishment of the ‘country of origin clause’ and regarded the end 
result as a ‘success’. However, ETUC remained less sceptical about the abolish-
ment of the ‘respect for fundamental rights’ and its replacement to the respect 
of the Community law (European Trade Union Confederation, 2006a). The 
‘country of origin’ clause was abolished but replaced by the ‘freedom to pro-
vide services’, which, as we will show, effectively introduces elements of down-
ward wage pressures to the coordinated market economies. The replacement 
of the ‘country of origin clause’ with the ‘freedom to provide services prin-
ciple’ was neither thoroughly examined nor thoroughly understood by rel-
evant actors. For example ETUC celebrated the exclusion of the ‘country of 
origin clause’ but, at least publicly, failed to capture the implications of the 
new legislation for the service providers in the private sector.
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The new legislation approved by the European Parliament links the 
Member States’ labour and workers’ protection to be interpreted in their com-
pliance with the Community law by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 
a ’case by case’ basis (European Union, 2006, 11). Essentially, the right to col-
lective action was not undermined directly by the Services Directive but was 
subjected to the approval of the ECJ doctrine on the proportionality of restric-
tions on the freedom to provide services (Novitz, 2008). Some have argued 
that ECJ rulings are not so much about labour rights protection but the ECJ 
is known rather for promoting business and competition-friendly rulings, 
while others have highlighted that the Community law as such is not about 
protecting labour rights (see Davies, 1997).
As Supiot (2006) argues, the European Commission stated in its paper for 
‘Better Lawmaking’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2005) that 
EU’s ‘regulatory environment’ should further promote European competitive-
ness through the creation of an ‘expert committee’, which would assess and 
filter policy proposals that harm European competitiveness. According to the 
guidelines on impact assessment, new legislation has to be thoroughly scruti-
nised for its impact on economic and competition aspects at both national and 
European levels. The adoption of these assessment criteria prioritises compe-
tition and effectively pre-empts any significant attempts of new legislations to 
challenge the dominant logic of competition (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002, 2005, 2006). Further regulatory attempts should be kept 
at minimum level, thus locking the abilities of new legislature into a frame-
work that promotes the market rationale. The market rationale “is no longer 
limited to the realm of the economy; it is now the organising precept of the 
juridical sphere” (Supiot, 2006, 116). 
In this way, ‘competition’ becomes the main principle of policy making, 
setting in motion a regulatory mechanism that rejects any policy that might 
harm competition and only allows policy proposals that are compatible with 
this logic. This ‘cata-regulation’ or ‘meta-regulation’ (Supiot, 2006) provides a 
new mode of governance that tends to exclude or dominate competing ways 
of understanding regulatory policy choices. It institutionalises a presump-
tion in favour of market governance, which causes bureaucrats to reframe or 
‘translate’ aspects of social welfare that previously may have been expressed 
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in the language of need, vulnerability or harm into the language of market 
failures or market distortion. (Morgan, 2003, 2.) These attempts to ‘econo-
mise’ social spaces using ‘top-down’ means are witnessed strongly in the case 
of the ‘Bolkestein proposal’ and the EC directives. However, the pressures 
do not stem just from the bureaucratic and political elites in the EU. Euro-
pean firms based on the EU legislation are effectively driving a competition 
between national labour laws (Supiot, 2006). As it will be shown next, many 
ECJ rulings did not explicitly touch upon harmonisation but instead opted 
for consolidating competition between state regulations as the key principle 
for regulating socioeconomic conditions within the European social space.
Collective action vs. ‘freedom to provide services’: the Laval case
All of the four ECJ cases discussed below illustrate significant turning points in 
the competition between state regulations and in the shifting role of national 
collective bargaining between labour and capital. The first case discussed 
here is the so-called Laval case, in which the City of Vaxholm in Sweden 
was interested to renovate a school and the city council selected the offer of 
the Latvia-based company Laval. In the agreement signed between the two 
contractors, it was stated that in order for the collective agreement between 
the firm and its employers to be effective in Sweden, collective bargaining 
should happen under the Swedish Labour law and the Swedish trade unions 
should thus participate in the collective agreements. Laval initiated negotia-
tions with the Swedish construction union (Byggnads) but did not accept the 
terms and wage rates set by Swedish collective bargaining regulations and 
instead employed Latvian workers that would be posted to Sweden. Laval 
stated that it had the right to negotiate wages according to the Latvian collec-
tive agreements. Byggnads exercised their right – in accordance with Swedish 
labour law – and reacted with industrial action and a blockade.
The first collective agreement in Latvia came in 2004 and covered only the 
members of the trade unions. Since Laval workers were not unionised, the 
company could not have legally stated in the Vaxholm case that it followed 
the Latvian collective agreement. However, soon after the first agreement, a 
second national collective agreement became effective in Latvia. It provided 
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coverage to all employees and issued that workers in Latvian companies can 
be legally represented only by the Latvian trade unions and therefore any col-
lective agreement should be in accordance with the Latvian laws (Byggnads, 
2005). The response of the Latvian government, the alteration of the coverage 
of the collective agreement, was both reflexive and strategic. It outright mani-
fests how important the role of the state is in facilitating competitive advan-
tages for national capital interests.
The Latvian company was able to exploit the confusion between the 
Swedish labour law and the EU laws. According to the latter and the freedom 
of establishment, every employer should pay workers at least the national 
minimum wage. The crucial point here is that the Swedish collective bar-
gaining is not binding for all workers and employers, and the state will not 
enforce such agreements.27 Due to well-organised trade unions and employers’ 
associations, the Swedish collective bargaining achieves a great coverage and 
problems of collective action are thus dealt by the central and industry-level 
organisations. Despite their extensive legislative framework and application, 
the Swedish industrial relations do not declare a minimum wage. Part of the 
unions’ strength stems from their negotiating power in determining wages 
with employers. Therefore the existence of a minimum wage would under-
mine their power as actors and as social partners.
Laval pointed out that since there is no minimum wage and the appli-
cation of agreements is not binding, the company is not obliged to pay the 
wage that is determined by the Swedish social partners. While the Swedish 
centre-right government backed up the unions, the Confederation of Swedish 
Employers (Svenskt Näringsliv, SN) supported and funded Laval’s case before 
the court. (Woolfson & Sommers, 2006, 59–61.) Laval took the case to the 
Swedish Labour Court and SN took it to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
with the question whether the Swedish trade unions’ right to collective action 
is at odds with the ‘freedom to provide services principle’. 
In December 2007, the rulings of the ECJ were received with conflicting 
emotions from various actors involved in the case. SN was delighted with the 
rulings and stated that “this is good for the free movement of services. You 
can’t raise obstacles for foreign companies to come to Sweden” (Financial 
27  The same applies for Danish and German collective agreements.
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Times, 2007). The ETUC received the ECJ ruling with ‘disappointment’ and 
regarded the decision as a challenge for the successful ‘models of flexicurity’ 
(European Trade Union Confederation, 2007a). It is clear from the rulings 
that the ECJ prioritised competition and the freedom to provide services over 
the right to collective action:
“It must be pointed out that the right of the trade unions of a member 
state to take collective action by which undertakings established in 
other Member states may be forced to sign the collective agreement 
for the building sector – certain terms of which depart from the legis-
lative provisions and establish more favourable terms and conditions 
of employment – is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult, 
for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, and 
therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
within the meaning of Article 49 EC (i.e. provision of services).” (Euro-
pean Court of Justice, 2007a, Point 99, parentheses added.)
Coordinated action vs. ‘freedom to establish’: the Viking case
The case of the Finnish ship Rosella, or its owner firm Viking Line to be more 
exact, is another court case that illustrates how EU is mediating a competi-
tion between different state regulations. The Finnish firm that operates the 
ship route from Helsinki to Tallinn discovered that if the ship was under the 
Estonian and not the Finnish flag it could benefit from lower wages and thus 
enhance its competitive advantage over other firms. The Finnish Seamen’s 
Union (Suomen Merimies-Unioni, FSU) contacted the International Trans-
port Workers’ Federation (ITF) about the intentions of the Finnish shipping 
firm. The ITF advised FSU that according to the Flags of Convenience policy, 
wages and conditions of employment are to be decided upon the Finnish 
national agreements irrespective of the company will to employ Estonian 
workers because the ship is owned by a Finnish firm. At the same time as the 
negotiations for collective agreement between the Viking Line and the FSU 
occurred, the company applied to the Court that no agreement would have 
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an immediate effect (European Court of Justice, 2006). As a response, FSU 
declared a warning for industrial action in November 2003.
Viking Line appealed to the Finnish Courts in order to cancel the industrial 
action of the trade unions and also to ask for compensations. In December 
2003, both actors re-entered negotiations and a new revised agreement was 
reached. However, in 2004, Viking Line addressed the UK Commercial Court 
since the ITF had its base in London. The judge’s decision was against the 
coordination of action on behalf of the trade unions. The decision stated that 
trade unions could result in industrial action for the re-flagging of the ship. 
The judge forced ITF to withdraw all letters to affiliated trade unions. The 
rationale of the decision was that the actions of the FSU and ITF was against 
the EU law and hampered competition. The Finnish unions appealed and the 
case was referred back to the ECJ.
In the Viking case, the ECJ recognised a fundamental the right to collec-
tive action if all other means of protest are exhausted and if the action does 
not harm the freedom to provide services (European Court of Justice, 2007b, 
point 44–5). The vagueness of this ruling is rather obvious. (Can a right be 
both fundamental and restricted by conditions, especially if the latter are not 
clear?) The judgement of the ECJ is not denying the unions’ right to collective 
action in the national spaces of action but subjects it to certain conditions: 1) 
the action has to be a last resort and exhaust other means that do not harm 
operation of the firms and 2) that actions to block ‘the freedom of establish-
ment’ are justified if they result in worse working conditions. 
While the rulings on the Viking case were received with more enthusiasm 
by ETUC, they missed a significant point in our opinion. The ECJ is safe-
guarding employees’ right to collective action as much as it is willing to pre-
vent a coordinated action on behalf of national unions within the European 
social space. The ECJ pre-empts abilities of unions to show solidarity through 
blockades in Europe since such action is deemed to exercise discriminatory 
effects on the freedom of movement for persons and to provide services 
(European Court of Justice, 2007b, points 57–66; see also Achtsioglou, 2010). 
The ruling of the Viking case manifests how the ECJ prevents coordination of 
union action across European social space and instead prioritises competition 
over the right to collective action.
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Counting losses: ECJ rulings on the Rüffert and Luxemburg cases
Apart from the two cases that were discussed in detail above, two more cases 
ended up in the ECJ, whose decisions significantly challenged national col-
lective bargaining and labour law across Europe. The Rüffert case refers to 
the ability of a Polish subcontractor to provide constructing services at 46.5 
% of the wage rate that the German workers were entitled to. Similar to the 
Laval case, the ECJ declared that due to the lack of a minimum wage in Lower 
Saxony and to the lack of a universally (nationally) applicable collective agree-
ment, any obligation for improving wages and working conditions under 
the German public law is not applicable but restrictive to the fundamental 
freedom to provide services (Schalchter & Fischinger, 2009). 
In a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice (dated 15 July 
2010) the German state was condemned over the practice of local authority 
employers to award contracts for pension services on the basis of a selection 
laid down in collective agreements. The Court ruled that although the right 
to collective bargaining is a fundamental right, the European public procure-
ment rules should prevail (European Trade Union Confederation, 2010). The 
ECJ ruling refers to the precedent of Laval and Viking cases in arguing that 
the right to collective bargaining is withheld in order to secure the freedom 
to provide services and of establishment with the European social space. In 
the ruling of the Rüffert case, it takes a step further to question Member States 
authority on determining public procurement law: 
“While it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Ger-
many the constitutional protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) 
of the German Basic Law upon the right to form associations to safe-
guard and promote working and economic conditions, the fact remains 
that, as provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be exer-
cised in accordance with European Union law.” (European Court of 
Justice, 2010.)
In the Luxemburg case, the European Commission suggested that the 
Luxembourgian application of the Posted Workers Directive (PWD) was too 
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extensive. Luxemburg, in accordance with the PWD, set mandatory condi-
tions under which posted workers can provide their services and effectively 
incorporated these changes under public policy provisions. The conditions 
were:
•	 the requirement of a written employment contract or a written docu-
ment established in accordance with Directive 91/533
•	 the automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of living
•	 the regulation of part-time work and fixed-term work
•	 the respect of collective agreements
 The ECJ issued that the Members States’ demands over posted workers’ 
wages and working conditions, as posed by the country of destination, are 
restrictive to Article AC 49 and the ‘freedom to provide services’ principle. 
The ruling of the ECJ goes to suggest that “national mandatory agreements 
are applicable only when they do not violate the freedom to provide services” 
(European Court of Justice, 2008). In other words, the ECJ ruling in the Lux-
emburg case touches upon Member States’ jurisdiction on what consists of a 
public policy provision since the ECJ ruled that national mandatory agree-
ments are applicable only when they do not violate the freedom to provide 
services (ibid.). 
The responses of the European Trade Union Confederation
Before the ECJ rulings the ETUC, which represents the vast majority of 
unions across EU member states, called Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso for a 
“carefully balanced approach […] ETUC is not opposed to the devel-
opment of the internal market or the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and workers. Nor does it promote protectionism. On the con-
trary, it seeks a level playing field between Member states, based on 
fair treatment and upward harmonisation of workers’ rights and con-
ditions.” (European Trade Union Confederation, 2006b, our italics.) 
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The ETUC responses to the rulings of the ECJ differed in the two cases. 
While it welcomed the decision of the Viking-case ruling since it recognised 
the right to collective action as fundamental (European Trade Union Con-
federation, 2007b), the decision for the Swedish unions was received with 
‘disappointment’ (European Trade Union Confederation, 2007a). Almost 
two months after the rulings, the ETUC publicised its position stressing the 
importance of the cases and the need for Europe to ‘repair this damage’ (Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation, 2008a). For the first time, ETUC stated in 
public that the right of collective action comes second after EU’s free move-
ment provisions. It is clear that the plea for a balanced approach was not 
enough to prioritise social protection over competition rules, a hierarchy that 
should not come as a surprise since ETUC is not holding any significant struc-
tural power over EU decision making and clearly remains under the hegem-
onic vision of EU-elites. 
It was only after the outcome of all four cases that the European ETUC 
(2008b) changed its discourse and its secretary John Monks admitted: “the 
score at the moment is ECJ 4, European trade unions 0; and I do not exag-
gerate when I say that we are reeling at the score”. ETUC recognised that these 
cases were fundamental not only to the ability of unions to defend labour 
standards (e.g. wages and working conditions) but also in the sense that col-
lective bargaining and national labour law came second to the freedom to pro-
vide services and to firms’ right to establishment. As the ETUC recognised, 
“the ECJ seems to confirm a hierarchy of norms (in the Viking and 
Laval cases), with market freedoms highest in the hierarchy, and collec-
tive bargaining and action in second place. This means that organised 
labour is limited in its response to the unlimited exercise of free move-
ment provisions by business which apparently does not have to justify 
itself. Any company in a transnational dispute will have the opportu-
nity to use this judgement against trade union actions, alleging that 
actions are not justified and ‘disproportionate’. […] The ECJ interprets 
the Posting Directive in a very restrictive way. On the one hand, it 
limits the scope for trade unions (in the Laval case) to take action 
against unfair competition on wages and working conditions […] On 
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the other hand, it limits Member States (in the Rüffert case and Com-
mission vs. Luxemburg case) in applying their public procurement law 
or public policy provisions on situations of posting to prevent disrup-
tion of their labour markets and unfair competition between local and 
foreign service companies.” (European Trade Union Confederation, 
2008b, bold and italics in original).
The response of the ETUC as well as its analysis of the ECJ cases admitted 
not only that the main European trade union originally underestimated the 
challenges that the Service Directive and the application of the Community 
Law posed but mainly that the ECJ decisions on these four cases clearly sets a 
hierarchy of norms and priorities regarding the instituting logic of the emer-
gent European social space. 
Responding to ECJ ruling in the Rüffert case, John Monks, the General 
Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) made the fol-
lowing statement:
“This is another damaging judgement for social Europe. […] This 
judgment ignores the public authorities’ independence when they are 
acting as employers. More worryingly, it also confirms the supremacy 
of economic freedoms over fundamental social rights. The dark series 
initiated by the Viking and Laval cases is far from being over.” (Euro-
pean Trade Union Confederation, 2010.)
The response of the ETUC leaves no doubt that power imbalances are wid-
ening but at the same time demonstrate the weak position in which the ETUC 
is placed in terms of ‘balancing’ policy making within the European social 
space. Furthermore, the interpretation of the PWD subscribes to a minimum 
core of labour rights and allows foreign service providers to circumvent col-
lective bargaining as set by the host country’s labour institutions (Cremers, 
2008).
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the imPact of meta-regulation on national 
labour institutions and trade unions:  
the end to nordic labour market Parity?
We have highlighted at least two tensions that arise from the ECJ rulings. 
First, the power asymmetries between labour and capital are widening. It is 
clear in the ECJ cases that unions and employers strategically aimed at exer-
cising their power not at their national or EU levels but, more importantly, 
within the emerging European social space of action. Firms such as Laval and 
Viking Line were willing to exploit the confusion among EU and national 
labour laws while the SN strategically aimed at undermining the institutional 
context that is meant to be facilitating its competitive advantage. Therefore 
employers mobilised their power resources at both the national and European 
spaces of action. 
The ability of the unions to respond to these pressures through collective 
action in the national social space was condemned for harming competition 
and for violating the ‘freedom to provide services’ principle in the case of 
Laval in particular. In the Viking case, unions were able to act in coordination 
and effectively form a pan-European blockade that did not allow the Finnish 
firm to operate with Estonian wages and working conditions. The ability of 
unions to act in a coordinated manner across the European social space was, 
however, interpreted as a ‘discriminatory action’ against firms ‘freedom of 
establishment’. Therefore the ability of unions to protect wages and working 
conditions from the logic of market competition is hampered by what Wood 
(2004) calls the ‘extra-economic’, or an effort mostly concerned with the reg-
ulation of the economic, political and juridical coercion on social relations. 
Secondly, the emerging European social space is indeed challenging 
national labour and political institutions. The first two ECJ cases discussed 
above illustrate the role of EU as framing different institutional orders for 
domestic actors. The literature on European integration so far stresses either 
the importance of nation states as the key actors (Moravcsik, 1993; Martin, 
2004) while others (e.g. Fligstein & Sweet, 2002) prioritise the importance 
of European institutions in driving European integration. We argue that 
focusing on the national or/and the European level (the EU) is not adequately 
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capturing the process of European integration. The process is equally much 
about the criteria and the hierarchy of norms underlying the process of insti-
tutionally constructing the European social space that could effectively under-
mine the perpetuation of national market economies and their labour market 
institutions. 
The ECJ cases demonstrate that the challenge for the governance of the 
European labour markets is not solely related to the competition of wages 
but also to how EU institutions might favour the inclusion of other collec-
tive agreements than the existing national ones – especially so in countries 
where no minimum wages are set as universal and mandatory, which effec-
tively introduces an attempt for regulation of competition between (national) 
state regulations. This meta-regulation is mediating the decisions of the power 
imbalances between regimes to the national space of action. These ‘attempts 
aim not only to ‘economise’ social spaces (Morgan, 2003) but also, crucially, 
to make competition the dominant mode of instituting that space.
In essence, the ECJ recognises both social rights and market freedoms as 
fundamental for the regulation of the European social space. However, when 
these two principles collide, as they did in the cases discussed above, the ECJ 
decided to set a hierarchy of norms that puts competition as the superior 
principle for socio-economic instituting of the European social space (see 
Achtsioglou, 2010). In conclusion, the ECJ has exercised its juridical power to
•	 prioritise the freedom to provide services over unions’ ability for col-
lective action both in private (Laval case) and public undertakings 
(Rüffert case) 
•	 hamper the ability of unions to act in solidarity within the European 
social space (Viking case)
•	 challenge the EU Member States’ right to define public policy pro-
vision (Luxemburg case) and procurement law (Rüffert case) within 
their own social space
These rulings may produce significant challenges for national collective 
bargaining and public policy to address social risks that are generated and 
present in the European and national social spaces. This, as such, can be con-
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sidered a major social risk – the risk of failing to respond to changing social 
risks. This risk is essentially structural and at the heart of the European inte-
gration project. It concerns the role of European juridical institutions and 
their ability not only to set a ‘hierarchy of norms’ but also to question national 
collective bargaining agreements and the ability of nation states to determine 
public policy provision. Inferring from the rulings discussed in this chapter, it 
is clear that the ECJ prioritises market principles over the right for collective 
action to tackle social risks.
The key question in the national contexts is how far market principles will 
continue to undermine and restrict rights that are considered fundamental in 
the national political economies. Some European national governments have 
already responded to the ECJ rulings. New German labour law withdrew the 
obligation for remuneration from collective agreements that are not generally 
applicable, Luxemburg exempted foreign service providers from the require-
ments of public policy provision (see Malmberg, 2010) and some states that 
have not set minimum wages, including Sweden and Denmark in the Nordics, 
are reforming their national labour laws. 
It is clear that so far the ECJ has played a pivotal role in determining the 
priorities between social rights and market freedoms and demonstrated how 
European institutions challenge national governments’ authority to determine 
public policy procurement. That said, we do not expect nation states’ modes 
of instituting and models of political economy to wither away (Menz, 2003). 
However, what currently emerges from these rulings is a process of Europe-
anisation that emphasises regulatory competition among member states – a 
market for state regulations. The future of European national political econo-
mies and, in this respect, the future of all kinds of national institutional con-
figurations in Europe is directly related to the institutional configuration of 
the emerging European social space. This space is not external to the develop-
ment of the variety of welfare capitalisms and market economies. 
The Nordic model is not an exception in facing these pressures. For 
example, the ECJ poses a direct challenge for the Nordic model of social risk 
management via collective bargaining in one thematic area: the minimum 
wage. The ECJ allows member states to declare minimum wages that are gen-
erally applicable in order to allow variation (and therefore competition). At 
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the same time, through the interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive 
(PWD), it suggests that posted workers’ wages and working conditions cannot 
be determined through collective bargaining institutions of the host member 
state but is subject to the minimum core of wages and working standards 
declared nationally in the member state. As a result, the ECJ undermines the 
institutional role and the rationale of social risk management, since it encour-
ages employers to bypass national collective agreements and prescribes com-
petition as the main principle for instituting labour relations.
The ECJ rulings touch upon the cornerstone of labour market parity: the 
determination of wages based on the recognition of reciprocal interests by 
both the workers’ and the employers’ representatives. At the normative level, 
it could be suggested that the ECJ rulings place the interests of employers’ 
first and regard unions as representing only a particular group within the 
society. At the institutional level, the declaration of a minimum wage in the 
Nordic countries ‘distorts’ the mechanisms of labour market regulation, since 
it essentially provides disincentives for employers to enter into negotiation 
and for unions to represent workers’ interests in the first place. 
Towards European labour market parity?
As it was noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Nordic labour market 
parity principle can be regarded as an alternative to the current European 
mode of organising industrial relations. The alternative resembles the early 
position of ETUC, which requested for a carefully balanced approach to ensure 
level playing field between Member States and aimed at the fair treatment 
and upward harmonisation of workers’ rights and conditions. The plea of the 
ETUC can be seen as an extension of the labour market parity principle at 
the European level through the recognition of reciprocal interests between 
member states as well as between European-based labour market actors. 
The ETUC plea did all but lead to this kind of outcome. The outcome of the 
process was one of a great power struggle, which ETUC tended to somewhat 
neglect. We have not yet witnessed a similar struggle to institute the parity 
principle at the European level.
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As we have showed, the shifting of governance and scale of action should 
be a strong signal for trade unions to react by re-orienting their actions to the 
emergent European social space. Unions’ responses at the national level alone 
are deemed ineffective and any attempt to promote protectionist measures 
will promote welfare nationalism at best. It is clear that it is this new social 
space in which trade unions – among other social groups – should coordinate 
their actions and seek alliances. For example, the attachment of a ‘progressive 
social protocol’ that will safeguard social rights over economic freedoms in 
European treaties, as suggested by the ETUC, could be extended to address 
not only trade unions interests but also other social groups (e.g. agrarians). 
The ETUC proposal aims at prioritising social rights over market freedoms 
but the call for such a protocol has, at least so far, fallen on deaf ears. 
For us, it is certain that the potential counter-movement cannot be 
exhausted in the role of organised labour or at the national level of action. It 
is in the thin new European social space that European trade unions among 
other social groups should coordinate their actions and expose socio-political 
character of the ‘economic’ and provide proposals for an alternative institu-
tional order in Europe. For trade unions, it is also necessary to retain the effec-
tive capacity to operate as agents of social change in the emerging European 
social space in the first place.
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